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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report analyses and reviews the corporate fi nance structure of non-fi nancial corporations 
(NFCs) in the euro area, including how they interact with the macroeconomic environment. Special 
emphasis is placed on the crisis that began in 2007-08, thus underlining the relevance of fi nancing 
and credit conditions to investment and economic activity in turbulent times. When approaching 
such a broad topic, a number of key questions arise. How did the corporate sector’s capital structure, 
internal and external fi nancing sources, and its tendency to leverage, evolve in the euro area over the 
last decade and in the run-up to the fi nancial crisis in particular? Did these developments contribute 
to and/or exacerbate the fi nancial crisis? Did the corporate sector’s response to various shocks and 
vulnerabilities support or encumber the euro area economy, both during the fi nancial crisis and in 
its aftermath?
This report attempts to shed light on these and other key issues: fi rst, through an analysis of fi rms’ 
internal and external fi nancing and their fi nancial situation based on euro area accounts data 
(Chapter 2); second, by analysing key corporate fi nance decisions based on granular fi rm-level 
data (Chapter 3); and third, by connecting corporate sector developments to developments in the 
economy as a whole (Chapter 4). While primarily empirical, the assessment relies on insight and 
models taken from economic and corporate fi nance theory as a means of interpreting facts and 
evidence. The data available for this report generally cover the period 1999-2012, and the cut-off 
date for the statistics is 30 April 2013. When drawing comparisons with previous historical crises, 
the data go back to the 1960s.
The main fi ndings of the report can be summarised as follows.
ACCUMULATION OF DEBT IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CRISIS
In the years leading up to the crisis there was an intense accumulation of corporate debt in the 
euro area, with very large disparities across euro area countries (see Section 2.4). The rise in euro 
area indebtedness was, in general, more pronounced than in most of the fi nancial crises in recent 
history (see Section 4.2). A number of economic factors contributed to the formation of such a 
debt overhang. Within a global context of subdued uncertainty and widespread under-pricing 
of risk, there is evidence that loose fi nancing conditions in some countries had created a self-
reinforcing feedback loop, in which macroeconomic imbalances (including excessive borrowing 
by the corporate sector and over-investment in some euro area economies) built up. As discussed in 
Section 2.4, the accumulation of debt masks important differences across sectors; for instance, the 
construction and real estate services sector has experienced an extreme rise in leverage over the last 
decade, largely refl ecting booming housing markets in a number of euro area countries. In addition, 
fi rm-level evidence collected for the report points to a signifi cant correlation between the size of 
a fi rm and its leverage. In the sample period about one third of fi rms did not have any fi nancial 
debt. However, among indebted fi rms, leverage decreases as fi rms become larger and older. This 
evidence, together with the high percentage of young and small fi rms without any fi nancial debt, 
suggests that young and small companies mainly rely on equity fi nancing but, once they begin to 
borrow, they rely heavily on debt to fi nance their business (see Section 3.2).
ROLE OF CORPORATE DEBT IN CORPORATE INVESTMENT
The surge in leverage sowed the seeds of the fi nancial crisis and has had a signifi cant effect on the 
nature, severity and persistence of the downturn at both the country and sectoral levels. While debt 
can, in general, improve economic welfare and spur economic growth if it remains at moderate 
levels, when it reaches excessive levels it creates the conditions for fi nancial instability and hampers 
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARYinvestment and economic growth. As discussed in Chapter 4, a formal assessment of euro area 
countries provides evidence to support the theory that debt accumulation increases the probability 
of a fi nancial crisis. In addition, the data show that reduced investment (and output) during the 
recession has, in general, refl ected the intensity of corporate debt accumulation prior to the crisis. 
The fact that excessive corporate sector indebtedness may have become a drag on private sector 
investment (and economic activity) is underpinned by fi rm-level evidence in a number of euro area 
economies. This is in line with the evidence presented in Section 3.4 of the report, which shows 
that fi rms with higher levels of debt reduce their investment, indicating that the drain on future cash 
fl ows from debt repayments weighs negatively on fi rms’ current spending and investment decisions 
when the macroeconomic outlook deteriorates. Lower cash holdings and higher interest payment 
ratios (large fi rms aside), together with high indebtedness, are associated with sharper declines in 
investment levels during crisis periods.
BANK LENDING CONDITIONS AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCING
In the months after September 2008, global fi nancial panic, liquidity shortages in the interbank 
markets and mounting losses led to banks tightening credit conditions in order to repair their balance 
sheets and deleverage. Indeed, the same mechanisms that had contributed to fuelling corporate 
sector imbalances in the run-up to the crisis worked in reverse, but in an amplifi ed manner, in 
the subsequent downturn. Overall, on the basis of selected quantitative assessments described in 
Section 4.1, credit supply conditions accounted for almost one third of the contraction in real GDP 
at the peak of the crisis in the fi rst half of 2009. At the same time, in such periods of restricted bank 
lending, one mitigating factor was the ability of corporations to replace bank credit with alternative 
sources of fi nancing, as internal and external fi nancing instruments increased in importance relative 
to bank loans. Depending on the fi nancing environment, the effect of seeking alternative sources 
of fi nancing differed markedly across euro area countries (see Section 2.3). On the one hand, 
companies replaced bank loans with market-based fi nancing or fi nancing via unquoted equity during 
the crisis. In this respect, the relevance of debt securities increased, especially in some countries, 
such as France. On the other hand, inter-company loans temporarily became more signifi cant in 
other countries, such as Germany. To a certain extent, trade credit appears to have acted as a buffer 
in some euro area countries. At the same time, in some countries, NFCs’ external fi nancing was 
exceptionally weak during the crisis, refl ecting very subdued economic activity, high risk aversion 
on the part of lenders, a decline in fi rms’ creditworthiness and constraints in the supply of external 
funds, in particular bank fi nancing.
MATURITY STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND FIRMS’ CASH MANAGEMENT
During the crisis period fi rms increased their holdings of short-term fi nancial assets relative to 
long-term ones, probably as a precaution, and relied to a larger extent on their most liquid assets 
to cover short-term liabilities (see Section 2.1). As documented in Section 3.3, cash management 
generally differed according to the size of the fi rm, as smaller fi rms tended to hoard larger amounts 
of cash, potentially as a result of their more limited access to external fi nancing. During the crisis, 
this common trend became even more pronounced.
DELEVERAGING PROCESS AND FINANCING GAPS
Corporate indebtedness ratios only started falling in the later stages of the recession, and also 
relatively gradually; this lag was to be expected in the aftermath of a severe fi nancial crisis. 
Firm-level evidence presented in Sections 3.2 and 4.2 points to heterogeneous developments across 
fi rms as, despite the overall deleveraging trend, fi rms with low leverage levels have been increasing 
their leverage, irrespective of the size of the fi rm. Firms’ fi nancing gaps narrowed during the crisis 
(see Section 2.2) – this can be linked to lower capital formation and higher gross saving in some 
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euro area countries, which was partly due to cost cutting measures and cuts in dividend payments. 
Overall, the decline in debt fi nancing and the narrowing of fi nancing gaps has been stronger in 
those euro area countries that had accumulated large amounts of debt in the run-up to the crisis, and 
where the pressure to deleverage is higher as a result. At the same time, the decline in leverage ratios 
during the crisis was partly impeded by valuation losses in equity (see Section 2.4). Corporate debt 
vulnerabilities diminished during the crisis, owing to falling interest payment burdens associated 
with lower key monetary policy interest rates. Nonetheless, as discussed in Section 4.1, lending 
rate developments in the euro area have, at times, masked diverging patterns across countries, 
in particular in connection with heightening tensions in some euro area sovereign debt markets. 
Overall, as also shown in Section 2.4, the fact that short-term debt only accounts for a limited 
proportion of total debt meant that corporations’ refi nancing risks remained contained. At the 
same time, NFCs were exposed more severely to interest rate risks, which, on average, increased 
marginally at the euro area level, while varying considerably across countries.
FUTURE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
A number of indicators presented in the report signal that further deleveraging of NFCs is expected 
in the euro area, and specifi cally in selected countries. This process will take place within the 
general context of banks being more prudent in granting new loans, and fi rms attempting to 
mitigate balance sheet vulnerabilities in an environment of subdued aggregate demand. Notably, 
deleveraging pressures on euro area NFCs mask signifi cant differences between sectors, according 
to how highly leveraged they were in the past. For instance, the assessment in Section 2.4 shows 
that in some sectors, such as construction and real estate services, it is of paramount importance 
(and also desirable from a welfare perspective) that imbalances be unwound. The assessment also 
shows, however, that in services other than real estate this is far less important, or even unimportant. 
Overall, the extent to which the corrective adjustments will be a drag on the economy depends 
primarily on the macroeconomic channels through which the adjustment process occurs. Reduced 
indebtedness caused by banks’ constraints on the provision of new credit or by corporations scaling 
back investment could be costly for the economy at large.
MAIN POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The crucial role played by bank credit prior to and during the crisis confi rms the notion that it 
is better to assess risks to price and macroeconomic stability within a broad-based analytical 
framework that pays specifi c attention to monetary and fi nancial conditions. Such an assessment 
should focus on the medium term, acknowledging the fact that imbalances, which often accumulate 
in an environment of subdued volatility and under-pricing of risk, ultimately generate sizeable 
macroeconomic instability with variable and uncertain time lags (see Section 4.2).
Through its standard and non-standard monetary policy measures, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has contained the intense pressures leading to disorderly deleveraging in both the fi nancial 
and non-fi nancial private sector during the crisis. In addition to the conventional interest rate 
instrument, the ECB’s Governing Council has adopted a series of non-standard measures, which 
were exceptional in nature, scope and magnitude, and yet commensurate to the severity of the 
circumstances. These measures were, to a large extent, aimed at the monetary fi nancial institution 
(MFI) sector, taking into account the importance of bank loans in the fi nancing of NFCs in the 
euro area. These interventions have signifi cantly reduced the downside pressures on price stability 
by avoiding an abrupt credit crunch stemming from sudden shortages of liquidity and funding for 
banks. However, at times, the effectiveness of monetary policy itself has been hindered by fi nancial 
fragmentation, in particular against the backdrop of the sovereign debt crisis in some euro area 
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EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARYcountries. As a result, the accommodative monetary policy stance set by the Governing Council has 
had an uneven effect on fi rms, depending on their geographical location and, often, the sector they 
are in. 
Structural policies designed to develop a fi nancial system that offers a broader range of fi nancing 
alternatives and instruments can contribute to creating improved corporate capital structures that 
have more diverse fi nancing sources and thus are, crucially, more resilient to abruptly changing 
bank lending conditions. Specifi cally, raising the proportion of risk capital in the fi nancial structure 
of fi rms, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), via measures that improve their 
access to equity and debt markets, could encourage more moderate and stable recourse to loans. 
In addition, a more balanced and harmonised fi scal treatment of fi rms’ debt and equity fi nancing 
could strengthen their capital bases, enhance their internal fi nancing capacity and also improve 
their creditworthiness, a crucial element for their access to external fi nancing. Finally, measures 
enhancing the level of competition in the product and factor markets are instrumental in reallocating 
resources towards better performing fi rms and thus increasing the overall competitiveness of the 
euro area.
The theoretical insights and historical episodes described in Section 4.2 suggest that, in the future, 
policy-makers face a challenging balancing act in accompanying the necessary adjustment toward 
more sustainable economic patterns. First, policy interventions should prevent a disorderly and 
disruptive deleveraging process, the effects of which are typically amplifi ed by various sectors 
attempting to reduce their leverage levels simultaneously. In this context, monetary policy has 
proved effective in containing deleveraging pressures on banks stemming from liquidity shortages 
and mounting losses, thereby mitigating knock-on effects in terms of a forced unwinding process 
in the corporate sector. Conversely, economic policies should avoid contributing to a delay in 
the balance sheet adjustment process, which would ultimately increase the economic costs of the 
deleveraging process. For example, concerns over the adverse short-term consequences of their 
interventions (e.g. aggravating a credit crunch) may lead banking supervisors to tolerate banks 
delaying loss recognition or even to be lenient with banks in terms of their management of corporate 
loan risk. In such an environment, excessive and overly protracted monetary accommodation may 
end up making it easier for ailing and ineffi cient institutions to continue operating. Overall, in order 
to strike a balance, economic policies need to fi rmly encourage an orderly restructuring process 
in the non-fi nancial and fi nancial sectors that is consistent with sustainable long-term economic 
growth trends. Previous crises have highlighted the importance of measures aimed at strengthening 
banks’ balance sheets; doing so allows fi nancial institutions to withstand potential loan losses 
associated with the deleveraging process of the non-fi nancial private sector and, at the same time, to 
continue providing credit to the economy.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 1
The euro area corporate sector’s capital structure, internal and external fi nancing, and leverage 
have followed a clear pattern over the last decade, notably prior to and during the economic crisis. 
The corporate sector’s indebtedness increased substantially in the years preceding the crisis, on the 
back of subdued global uncertainty and loose fi nancing conditions in selected countries. The rapid 
increase in leverage not only fuelled the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in the 
run-up to the crisis, it also sowed the seeds of the fi nancial crisis and strongly infl uenced the nature, 
severity and duration of the downturn. Against this background, it is crucial to investigate in detail 
fi rms’ fi nancing choices and the changes in corporate fi nancing and levels of indebtedness in the 
run-up to and during the fi nancial crisis. The ability of the euro area’s corporate sector to replace 
bank credit with alternative sources of fi nancing can help to mitigate the dampening impact of the 
crisis on the economy as a whole. In addition, fi rms’ characteristics, such as their size, as well as 
their balance sheet structure (characterised, for instance, by the amount of tangible assets they hold, 
their cash holdings or their levels of indebtedness), should play an important role in their decision-
making, in particular regarding investment. Finally, in the light of the ongoing costly adjustment 
process, it is important to compare the current crisis with previous crises of a similar magnitude. 
The report will shed some light on this, while also considering other aspects related to corporate 
fi nancing and economic activity in the run-up to and during the fi nancial crisis.
The report is divided into three chapters. 
Chapter 2 analyses the developments in corporate balance sheets and fi rms’ internal and external 
fi nancing based on euro area accounts data for the period 2000-2012. In doing so, emphasis will 
be placed on comparing developments across countries and sub-periods, notably before and during 
the crisis. The assessment begins by reviewing the maturity structure of assets and liabilities, 
before assessing fi rms’ internal fi nancing and how their fi nancing gaps have developed across 
euro area countries. This chapter specifi cally focuses on corporate fi nancing characterised by 
sustained debt accumulation prior to the crisis, and a subsequent unwinding process that began 
later in the downturn. The changing composition of corporate fi nancing during the crisis refl ects the 
replacement of bank credit with alternative sources of fi nancing, a fact that has helped to mitigate 
the adverse effects of tightening bank lending conditions. Chapter 2 complements the assessment 
with two boxes. Box 1 reviews loan fi nancing from the perspective of NFCs’ creditors, as well as 
the balance sheet position of fi rms’ main creditor sectors. Box 2 investigates the use of trade credit 
by NFCs.
Chapter 3 investigates differences between fi rms in order to better understand the different degrees 
of intensity with which fi nancing problems and uncertainty have affected individual fi rms during 
the recent crisis. After highlighting the critical information provided by fi rm-level data, which 
also complements traditional macroeconomic analysis, this chapter provides a brief overview of 
the theoretical discussions concerning the contributing factors in fi rms’ capital structure decisions 
(Box 3). An econometric analysis confi rms the relevance of most determinants of leverage identifi ed 
by the economic literature. Some of these factors are fi rm specifi c, such as profi tability, age or 
size. Other factors are common to fi rms in the same sector, or depend on the characteristics of the 
institutional and fi nancial environment in which they operate. The assessment then investigates 
cash holding policies in relation to fi rms’ size. Traditionally, small fi rms keep more cash on their 
balance sheets and are more cautious than large fi rms. The crisis has exacerbated this phenomenon, 
1 Prepared by Giacomo Carboni, Annalisa Ferrando and Petra Köhler-Ulbrich.
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I INTRODUCTION 
AND MOTIVATIONand small fi rms’ cash holdings have become more dependent on (volatile) cash fl ows and the 
availability of collateral. In addition, the analysis focuses on fi rms’ investment decisions and how 
they are related to their fi nancial situation. During the crisis this seems to have become a more 
infl uential factor in deciding whether to invest, in particular for smaller fi rms. Finally, data from 
surveyed fi rms is used to focus on the dynamics of their fi nancing gaps. In this context, Box 4 
investigates whether the recent lending policies across euro area countries have been justifi ed by 
the deterioration in the fi nancial situation of fi rms.
Chapter 4 explores how fi rms’ fi nancing conditions and indebtedness interact with the 
macroeconomic environment, placing special emphasis on the crisis period. Focusing primarily 
on short-term developments, the fi rst part of Chapter 4 acknowledges the relevance of banks’ 
intermediation processes in determining the terms and conditions for corporate sector fi nancing. 
The fact that this was both a fi nancial and banking crisis has led to credit institutions suffering from 
impaired balance sheets and capital positions, leading to a restriction in the provision of bank credit 
to the economy on the supply side. The adverse macroeconomic impact of tightening conditions 
governing the supply of credit has partly been mitigated by the replacement of bank credit with 
alternative sources of fi nancing and, more importantly, by the ECB’s policy measures. Box 5 
discusses alternative theoretical explanations for the replacement of bank loans with debt securities 
that was observed during the crisis. The second part of Chapter 4 focuses primarily on the corporate 
sector’s debt cycle from a medium-term perspective. The assessment begins by considering the 
latest euro area crisis within the broader international and historical context of crisis periods, with 
the aim of deriving a set of empirical constants, drawing lessons from them, and inferring policy 
prescriptions that can be applied in today’s circumstances. The focus then turns to the relationship 
between how the euro area corporate sector’s indebtedness came about, and selected aspects of the 
macroeconomic environment. Finally, the assessment investigates plausible possibilities for further 
deleveraging in the euro area, in particular in selected countries.
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2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, FINANCING AND LEVERAGE OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
IN THE EURO AREA2
How did the corporate sector’s capital structure, internal and external fi nancing, and leverage 
evolve in the euro area over the last decade, and notably in the run-up to and during the fi nancial 
crisis? Was the corporate sector capable of fi nding ways to replace bank fi nancing, which became 
scarce during the crisis? Did companies’ fi nancial positions become more or less vulnerable during 
the crisis? The second chapter of this report reviews these questions and puts forward an analysis, 
largely based on the euro area accounts for the period 2000-2012, which primarily compares the 
period before the fi nancial crisis with the crisis period.3 The analysis shows that there have been 
signifi cant changes in the fi nancing structure of NFCs during the crisis.4
The analysis in this chapter relies largely on euro area accounts data, as they allow for a broad 
analysis of the fi nancing and fi nancial positions of NFCs at market prices and following the 
principle of residency across countries5 and time (see Annex 1 for a brief overview of some 
methodological issues). At the same time, the aggregate view provided by macroeconomic data has 
some limitations, especially with respect to analysing distributional aspects of fi rms’ fi nancing.6 
The analysis of fi rm-level data in Chapter 3 therefore complements the analysis based on 
macroeconomic data.
Section 2.1 reviews the corporate balance sheet structure and its heterogeneity across countries, with 
a special focus on changes in the maturity structure of assets and liabilities and in the importance 
of fi nancing instruments. Section 2.2 focuses on the development of fi rms’ internal fi nancing in 
the run-up to and during the fi nancial crisis, and on how fi rms’ fi nancing gaps have developed 
across euro area countries. In Section 2.3, the analysis is centred on the external fi nancing of NFCs. 
It describes strong corporate debt fi nancing up to the crisis and its subsequent decline during 
the crisis. It looks in particular at fi rms’ ability to replace bank loans with alternative sources of 
fi nancing during the crisis. This appears to have helped mitigate the adverse effects of the fi nancial 
crisis on corporate fi nancing and can thus be seen as one of the ways in which NFCs cope with 
periods of fi nancial stress. Finally, Section 2.4 investigates the intense accumulation of corporate 
debt in the period prior to the fi nancial crisis, with high dispersal across euro area countries and 
sectors of economic activity, as well as the dynamics of the deleveraging process during the crisis, 
and corporate debt vulnerability indicators. Chapter 2 includes two boxes. Box 1 reviews loan 
fi nancing from the perspective of NFCs’ creditors, as well as the balance sheet position of fi rms’ 
main creditor sectors. Box 2 investigates the use of trade credit by NFCs.
2 Coordinated by Petra Köhler-Ulbrich.
3 In this report, the pre-crisis period refers to the period from the fi rst quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2008, and the crisis period 
refers to the period from the third quarter of 2008, when the fi nancial crisis intensifi ed, to the fourth quarter of 2012 (i.e. the latest 
available data for the euro area accounts).
4 See also European Central Bank (2007a) and European Central Bank (2007b). Compared with the 2007 Structural Issues Report, there has 
been a signifi cant improvement in the availability of quarterly harmonised data from the fi nancial and non-fi nancial accounts at the euro 
area level, and across euro area countries, regarding, for instance, the range of corporate fi nancing instruments available and the availability 
of non-fi nancial accounts. These data can be used to analyse corporate balance sheets with a view to determining the availability of 
internal funds. Additional data which have become available since the last Structural Issues Report also include loans broken down by 
creditor sector, loans across different sectors of economic activity and more detailed data for assessing the debt sustainability of NFCs. 
Thus, overall, a substantially more detailed analysis of corporate fi nance and leverage was possible, compared with the situation at the 
time of the last Structural Issues Report, when a large part of the analysis was based on annual (as opposed to quarterly) data up to 2005.
5 Therefore, the analysis presented in this report refers to the set of fi rms residing in a given country, irrespective of the nationality of the 
owner. An analysis of differences according to fi rm nationality requires alternative data sources, such as market data. This type of data is, 
however, less readily available than national accounts data.
6 The main differences between national accounts data and fi rm-level data, as used in Chapter 3 of this report, relate to how representative 
the data is, the country coverage and the valuation of balance sheet items (see Box 6 in Annex 3 for details).
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2 CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE, 
F INANCING AND 
LEVERAGE OF 
NON-F INANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS 
IN THE EURO AREA
2.1 BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS7 
NFCs generally need external fi nancing, in addition to their internal funds, in order to fi nance 
their real and fi nancial investment. Their decision on external fi nancing may be infl uenced by the 
availability of funds, as well as by their intention to reach certain (long-run) targets or optimum 
levels of debt or equity, in particular so as to balance the tax advantages of debt versus bankruptcy 
costs (see Box 3 for a discussion of the main theoretical hypotheses underlying capital structure 
decisions). This, in turn, determines their corporate balance sheet structure. NFCs’ choices 
concerning both sources of funds and the way funds are employed have important implications for 
their future profi tability and stability, and can have repercussions for the stability and performance 
of the wider economy. In order to set the scene for the subsequent analysis contained in this report, 
it is useful to examine the proportional distribution of the main components of NFCs’ assets and 
liabilities prior to the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis, as well as during it.8
MATURITY STRUCTURE OF NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS’ ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
While corporate holdings of short-term fi nancial 
assets have been limited compared with long-
term fi nancial and fi xed assets, their relative 
importance compared with their long-term 
counterparts increased in the run-up to the crisis 
(see Chart 1). This may have partly resulted 
from increasing corporate profi tability in times 
of sound economic growth. During the crisis, 
despite the pronounced declines in profi tability 
(see Chart 5), short-term fi nancial assets on 
fi rms’ balance sheets have continued to increase 
in importance (see Table 1). Firms may have 
tried to reduce the impact of fi nancial turbulence 
by relying on their most liquid assets to a greater 
extent, in order to cover existing short-term 
liabilities. This pattern is largely confi rmed 
when looking at the cross-country data in 
Chart 2, and Table A1 in Annex 2, where an 
increase in the ratio of short-term to long-term 
fi nancial assets has been recorded in most euro 
area countries. At the same time, while the 
increase in the proportion of short-term assets 
was very pronounced for Greek corporations, in 
general no typical pattern can be found for 
countries that were greatly affected by the crisis 
compared with other countries. This is also true 
when valuation changes are excluded.9
7 Prepared by Alexander Karšay.
8 See also the ECB Monthly Bulletin (October 2011).
9 Valuation changes can be calculated by taking the difference between the change in the amounts outstanding (based on market values) and 
the change in the notional stocks. Notional stocks are calculated (from a base period) as the change in the amounts outstanding accounted 
for by transactions. While most of the other changes are due to valuation effects, some changes may also have occurred because of 
reclassifi cations or improved coverage of fi nancial institutions (or fi nancial instruments).
Chart 1 Importance of short-term 
financial assets of euro area non-financial 
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The various liquidity indicators in Table A2 
in Annex 2 also suggest that NFCs’ ratios of 
short-term assets to liabilities have increased 
across euro area countries during the crisis. The 
increase is relatively large for most indicators in 
Cyprus, the Netherlands, France and Finland, 
while there has been a decline in all the liquidity 
measures in Slovakia, Slovenia, Ireland and 
Greece. The countries that consistently achieved 
relatively high liquidity ratios within these 
indicators include Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, while the opposite is the 
case for Italy, Portugal and Slovenia.
Compared with short-term fi nancial assets, 
NFCs’ proportion of short-term liabilities has 
been smaller and has changed little over the past 
decade, particularly when looking at notional 
stocks (see Table 1, Chart 2, and Table A6 in 
Annex 2). Long-term sources of funding were 
dominant during the two observed periods. 
Some moderate shifts in favour of short-term 
funding can be seen in Estonia, Ireland, France, 
Slovenia and Slovakia, while movements in 
the opposite direction have been recorded in 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Portugal.
In all euro area countries, the dominant component of short-term liabilities is loans (see Table A7). 
For long-term liabilities, shares and other equity is the largest component (see Table A8), 
Chart 2 Maturity composition 
of non-financial corporations’ financial 
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Table 1 Composition of assets and liabilities of non-financial corporations in the euro area
a) Type of asset as a percentage of total assets
Fixed assets Long-term 
fi nancial assets
Short-term 
fi nancial assets
Other 
fi nancial assets
Average from Q1 2000 to Q2 2008 40.9 35.1 9.6 14.4
Average from Q3 2008 to Q4 2012 40.4 35.0 11.5 13.2
Q4 2012 39.7 36.0 11.8 12.5
b) Type of liability as a percentage of total liabilities
Shares and 
other equity
Debt Short-term 
debt
Long-term 
debt
Other 
liabilities
Average from Q1 2000 to Q2 2008 51.9 33.8 10.0 23.8 14.3
Average from Q3 2008 to Q4 2012 48.5 37.4 9.4 27.9 14.1
Q4 2012 49.6 36.6 8.8 27.8 13.8
Source: ECB.
Notes: Total assets are the sum of fi xed and fi nancial assets. Long-term fi nancial assets include long-term loans, long-term debt securities, 
shares and other equity, and pension fund reserves. Short-term fi nancial assets include currency and deposits, short-term loans and 
short-term debt securities. Debt is defi ned as loans, debt securities and pension fund reserves. Other fi nancial assets (liabilities) include 
other accounts receivable (payable), i.e. mainly trade credit, and fi nancial derivatives.
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representing more than half of the total in all countries (except for Greece during the crisis period), 
with unquoted equity the largest individual component (see Chart 3). The second most important 
long-term liability of NFCs was long-term loans, which, on average, represented a larger proportion 
of total liabilities during the crisis than during the pre-crisis period. This change, which can also be 
seen when valuation changes are excluded, has been most pronounced in Greece, Spain, Ireland and 
Luxembourg.
IMPORTANCE OF DEBT VERSUS EQUITY
As far as the composition of fi rms’ capital structure10 is concerned, in the pre-crisis period equity 
was, on average, the largest component of corporate liabilities in all euro area countries, but 
especially in Belgium, France and Luxembourg (see Chart 3 and Table A4 in Annex 2). During the 
crisis it has remained the largest component, albeit proportionally smaller than in the pre-crisis 
period, and still accounts for nearly half of fi rms’ total liabilities. It also presents a measure of the 
underlying value (net wealth) of corporations. While quoted shares are mainly used by larger 
enterprises, unquoted equity is not traded on fi nancial markets and very heterogeneous across euro 
area countries. In all euro area countries (except for the Netherlands and Finland), unquoted equity 
accounted for more than 50% of the total equity of NFCs, on average, over the past decade. During 
this period, in most euro area countries there was a general shift away from equity and towards 
debt, related to the build-up of debt in the period prior to the fi nancial crisis, and to the weak growth 
of quoted shares and the valuation losses that have occurred during the crisis. The increase was 
most pronounced in Greece, Spain, Slovenia and Ireland, taking into account the pronounced 
negative valuation effect in equity that has occurred during the crisis. This is evident from the 
changes in notional stocks, i.e. disregarding valuation effects.
10 In this report, capital structure is defi ned as the way corporations divide their sources of funds between debt and equity.
Chart 3 Capital structure of euro area non-financial corporations
(percentage of total liabilities)
a) From Q1 2000 to Q2 2008 b) Q4 2012
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IMPORTANCE OF BANK FINANCING11
Loans from MFIs represent a key source of debt 
funding for euro area NFCs, and especially for 
SMEs (see Chapter 3). Specifi cally, they make 
up about half of the total NFC debt in the euro 
area (see Table A5 in Annex 2). They accounted 
for around 17% to 19% of total liabilities over 
the last decade. The countries where MFI loans 
to NFCs accounted for the largest proportion 
of liabilities, on average, over the period under 
review were Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, 
Austria and Slovenia. The countries where 
MFI loans made up the smallest proportion of 
liabilities over the past decade were Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg and Finland.
The proportion of euro area NFCs’ total 
liabilities accounted for by MFI loans (based 
on market values) rose in the periods 2000-02 
and 2007-08, and fell afterwards, but not 
below the lowest point of the preceding cycle 
(see Chart 4). When excluding valuation effects, 
the proportion of MFI loans rose constantly from 
2000 to 2008 until, in the course of the fi nancial 
crisis, it shrank because of the exceptionally 
weak annual growth of MFI loans. Again, there was substantial cross-country heterogeneity. From 
the middle of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2012, the proportion of the total liabilities of NFCs 
accounted for by MFI loans (excluding valuation changes) fell in 12 euro area countries, most 
strongly in Ireland.
2.2 NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS’ INTERNAL FUNDS AND FINANCING GAPS12
FIRMS’ INTERNAL FINANCING CAPACITY
Internal funds are a major source of fi nancing for NFCs. According to the “pecking order” theory, 
internal funds are preferred over external fi nancing as they do not require the payment of any risk 
premia related to, in particular, asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders 
(see Box 3).13 Several macroeconomic measures provide information about the internal funds of the 
NFC sector. The gross operating surplus measure captures fi rms’ operating income, i.e. gross value 
added minus the cost of production, in particular the cost of employees (see Chart 5). The latter 
constitutes the bulk of the cost to be deducted, accounting, on average, for 60% of NFCs’ gross 
value added over the past decade (see Chart 6). Corporate saving (retained earnings) is equal to the 
operating surplus and the fi nancial income of NFCs, after interest payments, dividends, rents and 
corporate taxation.14
11 Prepared by Paul Metzemakers and Walter Waschiczek.
12 Prepared by Petra Köhler-Ulbrich and Marie-Denise Zachary.
13 See Myers (1984), and Fama and French (2002).
14 Unlike in business accounting, here gross savings are calculated after dividend payments. Corporate saving is therefore broadly equal to 
retained earnings.
Chart 4 Loans from monetary financial 
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corporations
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At the euro area level, since 2000 there have been several distinct periods in terms of fi rms’ 
generation of internal funds. The fi rst period (2000-07) ran until the beginning of the fi nancial crisis 
and was characterised by an increase in the gross operating surplus of NFCs (from 19.2% of GDP 
in the fi rst quarter of 2000 to 20.9% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2007), mainly as a result of the 
economic boom during these years. During most of this period, retained earnings fl uctuated between 
9% and 10% of GDP. Following the onset of the crisis, and mainly during 2008 and 2009, a sharp 
reduction in gross operating surplus and gross saving was observed, related to weaker activity as a 
result of the impact of the fi nancial crisis on the real economy. Relative to GDP, the gross operating 
surplus reached its lowest level in the fi rst quarter of 2009 (19.0%) and gross savings dropped to 
8.1% in the second quarter of 2009. As a consequence, during this period corporations reduced their 
liquidity buffers and cut the cost of their employees and their dividends paid, which prevented an 
even steeper decline in corporate profi ts.
In the course of 2010 and 2011, improved business cycle conditions contributed to a rebound in 
profi tability, as indicated by the gross operating surplus and retained earnings of NFCs. Gross 
operating surplus rebounded to 19.8% of GDP in the period from the fi rst quarter to the third 
quarter of 2011, before stabilising at 19.4% in the fourth quarter of 2012, whereas retained earnings 
reached 10.4% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2010 and declined thereafter to 9.6% of GDP in the 
fourth quarter of 2012.
Across euro area countries, the average rate of growth in the gross operating surplus of NFCs was 
positive for all countries from 2000 to the second quarter of 2008, varying from 8.7% in Greece, 
6.7% in Belgium and 6.6% in Spain to 3.0% in Italy and 3.6% in Portugal (see Chart 7). During 
Chart 5 Internal funds of euro area 
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Chart 6 Annual rate of change in gross 
value added of euro area non-financial 
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the crisis period, in an environment of subdued economic activity, the annual growth rate of the 
gross operating surplus has been negative in most of the larger euro area countries, in particular in 
Italy.15 At the same time, in most countries the growth in the gross operating surplus was higher, on 
average, during the period 2011-12 than during the period from the third quarter of 2008 to 2012, 
with the notable exception of Greece and Portugal.
Growth in retained earnings has also decreased, on average, in the crisis period for euro area NFCs 
as a whole, whereas the picture is mixed at the country level. While retained earnings growth has 
decreased compared with the average pre-crisis period, especially in France, it has increased in 
other euro area countries, in particular in Spain, Ireland and Portugal. This may be partly related to 
cost-cutting measures and lower dividend payments (see Chart 8).
FINANCING GAPS
NFCs’ external fi nancing gaps can be assessed based on the ratio of net lending/net borrowing to 
GDP, which broadly measures the excess of corporate revenues over capital expenditure, in relation 
to nominal GDP.16 If corporate investment in fi nancial assets is also taken into account, this provides 
an extended measure for gauging the size of the fi nancial gap that includes the external fi nancing 
needs for both real and fi nancial investment. The fi nancing gap is typically negative for NFCs that 
need to fi nance their investments with external funds.
15 For Spain, national accounts data do not point to a decline in the gross operating surplus of NFCs during the crisis, whereas alternative 
data sources, such as data from the Spanish Central Balance Sheet Data Offi ce, point to more unfavourable developments.
16 In this report, net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) from non-fi nancial accounts broadly equals gross saving and net capital transfers minus 
gross capital formation. The net lending/net borrowing fi gure is also available from the fi nancial accounts, where it measures the balance 
between transactions in fi nancial assets and transactions in liabilities. For some countries, important statistical discrepancies between the 
two concepts exist.
Chart 7 Annual rate of change in the 
gross operating surplus of non-financial 
corporations across euro area countries
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After the bursting of the “dot-com” bubble in 2001 and a period of balance sheet consolidation, 
NFCs increased their borrowing and expanded their balance sheets from 2005 until the end of 
2008. Chart 9 shows the increase in NFCs’ net borrowing during that period, arising from elevated 
capital formation in a favourable macroeconomic environment and moderating retained earnings. 
The fi nancing gaps of euro area NFCs widened from approximately 0% in the middle of 2004 to 
-3.1% in the third quarter of 2008. In the context of the fi nancial crisis, the increase in corporate 
gross saving relative to GDP, mainly during 2010, combined with a severe decline in capital 
formation relative to GDP from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fi rst quarter of 2010, implied that 
euro area NFCs’ fi nancing gaps narrowed substantially during this period, and even turned into a 
fi nancial surplus from the fourth quarter of 2009 until the second quarter of 2011, and again in the 
second half of 2012.
Corporate investment in fi nancial assets also decreased during the fi nancial crisis, in contrast to a 
strong increase from 2004 to the fourth quarter of 2007 that was related to an intense increase in 
mergers and acquisitions activity. The fi nancing gap including fi nancial investment shows the same 
general trend as the fi nancing gap excluding fi nancial investment. However, the curve shows a 
sharper improvement from 2008 to 2010 owing to weaker investment in fi nancial assets. Compared 
with the average for the period from 2000 to the second quarter of 2008, the fi nancing gap narrowed 
by 5.5 percentage points, on average, from the fi nancial crisis until the fourth quarter of 2012.
Chart 10 shows fi rms’ net lending/net borrowing across euro area countries. First, it shows some 
structural heterogeneity, where three groups of countries can be identifi ed. The fi rst group appears to 
have a structural net lending position, before as well as during the fi nancial crisis. This group includes 
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Chart 10 Financing gap of non-financial 
corporations across euro area countries
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Greece17, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland. The second group includes countries that have a net 
borrowing position over time, such as France, Italy and Portugal, whereas the third group, which 
includes Belgium, Germany18 and Austria, appears to have a broadly balanced position over time. 
During the fi nancial crisis, fi rms’ fi nancing gaps have narrowed in most euro area countries, owing 
to lower capital formation and, in some countries, higher gross saving, cost-cutting measures and 
cuts in dividend payments, but also to higher corporate profi tability in the period 2010-11, against 
the backdrop of improving economic activity. The most pronounced change in NFCs’ net lending/
net borrowing positions occurred in Spain and Greece, where it swung from an average of -6.0% 
and 3.0% of GDP respectively before the crisis, to a surplus of 0.8% and 6.0% of GDP respectively 
in the crisis period. In these two countries, debt accumulation had, on average, been most intense 
in the pre-crisis period (see Chart 14). In the countries with a net borrowing position over time, the 
impact was similar, although much less pronounced, for example in Italy (on average -1.2% during 
the crisis, compared with a pre-crisis average of -2.0%). Portuguese fi rms have maintained a strong 
fi nancing gap, on average, during the crisis (at -6.0%), but were showing a decreasing trend up to 
the fourth quarter of 2012 (-3.0%). By contrast, fi rms in France have increased their fi nancing gap 
during the crisis (from a pre-crisis average of -1.4% to a crisis average of -1.9%).
Compared with the period 2000-07, on average, a reduction of fi nancial investment relative to GDP 
occurred in all euro area countries during the crisis, except in Belgium, probably owing to the 
importance of corporate treasury centres. Firms in Greece (with a reduction of 9.0% in the amounts 
outstanding, excluding valuation changes, of fi rms’ fi nancial assets in the fourth quarter of 2012 
compared with the second quarter of 2008), but also in Spain (-2.1%) and Luxembourg (-6.0%) 
have reduced their overall investment in fi nancial assets during the crisis period, likely because of 
liquidity needs. These developments have led to a considerable narrowing of the average fi nancing 
gap including fi nancial investment between the pre-crisis and crisis periods, in particular in Greece, 
Spain, Austria and Portugal.
2.3 EXTERNAL FINANCING OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS19 
EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL FINANCING
The use of internal and external fi nancing by NFCs should vary according to fi rms’ characteristics 
such as profi tability, following the “pecking order” theory (see Box 3), investment opportunities 
and fi nancing conditions. Broadly in line with economic theory, there is a slight negative correlation 
between euro area fi rms’ external fi nancing and their retained earnings (see Chart 11). In addition, 
at the beginning of an economic upswing, where uncertainty surrounding the business climate is 
high, fi rms often fi nance the bulk of their investment with retained earnings, before increasing their 
external fi nancing. Across the larger euro area countries, the relative importance of external and 
internal fi nancing has varied during the past decade. While fi rms’ reliance on external fi nancing 
was strong in many euro area countries before the crisis, their reliance on internal funds has become 
higher than their reliance on external fi nancing in most of the larger euro area countries during the 
crisis (with the exception of France). On average, NFCs in some euro area countries, in particular 
in Spain, even redeemed (in net terms) their external fi nancing during the crisis. Firms in Germany, 
17 At the same time, the fi nancing gap of NFCs in Greece, calculated based on the fi nancial accounts, shows a net borrowing position, on 
average, in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
18 The balanced (positive from 2004) net lending/borrowing position of NFCs in Germany before 2008 was related, inter alia, to the transfer 
of internal resources (as equity investment) to foreign affi liates of German enterprises, which moved parts of their supply chain to eastern 
Europe, in particular after EU enlargement. See Deutsche Bundesbank (2012).
19 Prepared by Petra Köhler-Ulbrich.
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the Netherlands, Austria and Finland relied more on internal than on external fi nancing in both the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods, albeit to a larger extent during the crisis (see Chart 12).
SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS IN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS’ FINANCING DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Firms can choose from a range of external fi nancing instruments, in particular equity, bank loans, 
debt securities, inter-company loans and trade credit. This provides them with some fl exibility 
in their fi nancing of working capital and investment, although smaller fi rms are generally more 
restricted in their fi nancing options.
In the pre-crisis period, at the euro area level and in most of the larger euro area countries (with the 
exception of Germany20), debt fi nancing contributed strongly to fi rms’ external fi nancing. Among 
the larger countries, this was especially the case for fi rms in Italy and Spain. During the fi nancial 
crisis, euro area NFCs’ external fi nancing growth and, in particular, debt fi nancing growth, declined 
substantially. Average corporate debt fi nancing growth declined particularly strongly between the 
pre-crisis and the crisis periods in the countries where debt fi nancing had been booming up to the 
fi nancial crisis, such as Spain and Greece, but also Ireland and Italy (see Chart 13).
As a result of fi nancial turmoil, and in the context of reduced bank credit availability and higher 
uncertainty, fi rms across countries, to a varying extent, replaced bank loans with other sources of 
20 In Germany, the pre-crisis average of equity fi nancing was strongly infl uenced by one large-scale transaction in 2000 related to the 
acquisition of a German telecommunications enterprise by a non-resident fi rm, and the related establishment of a German subsidiary.
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fi nancing.21 This has helped to mitigate the adverse effects of the fi nancial crisis on corporate 
fi nancing, and can thus be seen as a way in which NFCs coped with fi nancial tensions.22
At the euro area level, unquoted equity, inter-company loans (most of which remain intragroup) 
and debt securities played an important role in the external fi nancing of NFCs, when MFI lending 
declined and annual transactions were negative (see Chart 14). The latter was the case during two 
distinct periods: in the fi rst phase of the fi nancial crisis when economic activity was very subdued 
(2009-10) and, following a slight increase in bank lending in 2011, again in 2012 and early 2013.
The proportion of euro area NFCs’ debt fi nancing accounted for by debt securities issuance increased 
remarkably between the pre-crisis period, when it stood at 8% (based on annual transactions), and 
the crisis period, when it accounted for 50%. In particular, in the period 2009-10 and again in 
2012, the annual growth of debt securities issued by NFCs was relatively strong, suggesting that, in 
some cases, this was replacing bank loans, presumably mainly for large enterprises. The increased 
importance of debt securities in corporate fi nancing probably resulted mainly from an adverse 
shock to bank credit supply, and despite the fact that the cost of market-based debt fi nancing was 
higher than the cost of bank lending (see Box 5 in Chapter 4). The proportion of the annual debt 
fi nancing transactions of euro area NFCs accounted for by inter-company loans also increased, 
from a pre-crisis average of 26% to a crisis period average of 38%. This may be partly related 
21 While selling assets can also be a source of fi nancing, this source is not considered here in the discussion of external fi nancing. 
See Section 2.2 regarding disinvestment in fi nancial assets.
22 Evidence concerning the effects of fi rms replacing bank loans, based on the euro area accounts, is also presented in Bonci (2011).
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to a longer-term trend, as large international 
enterprises often conduct centralised liquidity 
and fi nance management within the group.23 
Trade credit and loans granted by other 
(i.e. non-MFI) fi nancial intermediaries played 
a role in the move away from MFI lending, 
following negative annual transactions since the 
third quarter of 2008, from the second quarter 
of 2010 to the second quarter of 2012, and from 
the second quarter of 2011 to the fourth quarter 
of 2012.
Across euro area countries (see Chart 15), MFI 
lending to NFCs has contracted strongly during 
the crisis in Spain, Ireland and Greece, as well 
as in Italy, Portugal and Slovenia in the period 
2011-12. By contrast, in Germany, France, 
Austria and Finland, annual MFI lending to 
NFCs mainly fell in the period 2009-2010, 
when economic activity was very subdued, and 
became positive again in 2011-12. In Cyprus, 
Malta and the Netherlands, MFI lending to 
NFCs has remained mostly positive during the 
crisis period. Differences in the decline in MFI 
lending refl ect heterogeneous developments in 
the demand for bank loans in an environment of 
weak economic activity, unfavourable housing 
market developments in some countries, heterogeneity in bank lending rates across countries, and 
supply-side factors affecting the provision of bank lending, such as the heightened risk aversion of 
banks that needed to consolidate their own balance sheets.
The way in which MFI lending has been replaced with other sources of funding during the fi nancial 
crisis has differed across countries (see Chart 15, and Table A10 in Annex 2). Besides the mostly 
circumstantial factors already mentioned, this is related to a number of structural factors that vary 
across euro area countries, such as the importance of small fi rms with limited access to market 
fi nancing, the importance of fi nancial linkages between fi rms (possibly implying the fi nancing of 
subsidiaries), and differences in traditional corporate fi nancing patterns.
First, enterprises have replaced bank loans with market-based fi nancing or fi nancing via unquoted 
equity, i.e. equity that is not traded on fi nancial markets, such as limited liabilities of unincorporated 
companies. During the fi nancial crisis, enterprises in France in particular have relied on equity 
(especially unquoted equity) for their external fi nancing, to a larger extent than before the crisis. 
They have also relied on debt securities, refl ecting the relatively high importance traditionally 
placed on market-based corporate fi nance in France. In addition to France, fi nancing via unquoted 
equity24 has been relatively important during the crisis for NFCs in Belgium and the Netherlands, 
23 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2012).
24 Financing via unquoted equity is measured as the proportion of NFCs’ total annual external fi nancing accounted for by annual unquoted 
equity.
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but also in Spain and Italy, whereas fi nancing via debt securities has become important for fi rms in 
the Netherlands and Austria.
During the fi nancial crisis, intra-sectoral fi nancing between fi rms has become important in some 
countries, as the centralised funding of fi rms may have allowed easier access to external fi nancing 
and more attractive fi nancing conditions, compared with the individual fi nancing of subsidiaries. 
In 2010-11, fi rms in Germany in particular relied, to a larger extent, on inter-company loans than 
in the pre-crisis period, whereas this was less the case in other euro area countries. In Belgium, 
inter-company loans generally play an important role in fi rm fi nancing owing to the presence of 
corporate treasury centres, which benefi t from an advantageous fi scal status. Moreover, in 2005 
Belgium introduced the risk capital allowance25, which encourages enterprises to expand their 
equity capital to optimise the use of the tax advantage. This makes Belgium an attractive location 
for multinational groups to set up their fi nance companies.
Other loans mainly include those from other fi nancial intermediaries to NFCs and refl ect, for 
example, lending by leasing companies to NFCs or fi nancial subsidiaries set up to issue debt 
securities on behalf of the enterprise group (see Box 1). These loans have displayed a very 
heterogeneous picture across euro area countries. While they have declined considerably during 
the fi nancial crisis in the Netherlands, they have remained relatively stable in Spain. In Ireland, 
other loans weakened considerably before the fi nancial crisis (in 2005), but had already recovered 
by 2009 and therefore contributed to replacing declining MFI loans. By contrast, in a number of 
countries, such as Germany, Greece and France, other loans to NFCs only began to recover in 2011, 
possibly playing a role in the replacement of bank loans from that point onwards.
As regards trade credit, which is directly linked to the exchange of goods and services, developments 
are closely related to the economic cycle (see Box 2). While in 2009 annual trade credit transactions 
were negative in a number of euro area countries, owing to the deep recession in the fi rst phase of 
the fi nancial crisis, trade credit has become more important in corporate fi nancing in some euro area 
countries since 2010, suggesting that it can act as a buffer.26 From the euro area countries for which 
data are available, trade credit payable relatively gained strength in particular in Germany, France 
and Austria. By contrast, in line with the weakness in economic activity, annual trade credit payable 
transactions have remained mostly negative during the fi nancial crisis in Spain, Portugal and 
Slovenia, and turned negative in Italy in 2012.
Finally, in some countries, NFCs’ external fi nancing has been exceptionally weak during the 
crisis, indicating very subdued economic activity, high risk aversion of lenders in an environment 
of heightened uncertainty, a decline in fi rms’ creditworthiness and constraints in the supply of 
external funds, in particular bank fi nancing. These constraints relate to higher bank funding costs in 
an adverse macroeconomic environment, where banks needed to consolidate their balance sheets. 
On average during the crisis, annual total external fi nancing transactions have been negative in 
Spain, indicating redemptions in net terms. In Greece, Estonia and Ireland, external fi nancing 
(both in terms of annual transactions and annual growth rates) of NFCs has also been negative 
25 The risk capital allowance, more commonly known as the “notional interest deduction”, allows companies liable for corporation tax to 
deduct a notional amount of interest from their tax base, calculated on the basis of their equity capital. This arrangement is unique in 
the sense that no other European Union Member State applies a general system of this type, making Belgium an attractive location for 
multinational groups to set up their fi nance companies. Such fi nance companies are funded mainly by equity stakes of the parent company, 
and provide loans to affi liated companies based in Belgium or abroad, while benefi ting from the risk capital allowance for the whole of 
their equity capital.
26 When consolidating trade credit payables with trade credit receivables, the volume of net trade credit fi nancing of the NFC sector is 
limited.
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for a number of quarters during the crisis. It remained subdued in Greece up to 2012, whereas 
it started to recover in Estonia and Ireland from the third quarter of 2010 and the fi rst quarter of 
2012 respectively. By contrast, in Italy, Portugal and Slovenia, fi rms’ external fi nancing declined 
substantially in 2012, indicating a deteriorating macroeconomic environment in these countries.
Overall, the external fi nancing composition of euro area NFCs has been deeply affected by the 
crisis. While MFI loans to NFCs have become less important, unquoted equity, other loans 
(in certain cases), debt securities issuance and, in 2010-11, inter-company loans and trade credit, 
gained importance, with considerable heterogeneity across countries.
Box 1
LOANS TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS BROKEN DOWN BY CREDITOR SECTOR – THE INTERPLAY 
BETWEEN MONETARY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND LOANS 
BETWEEN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS1
NFCs receive loans not only from monetary fi nancial institutions (MFIs), such as banks, but 
also from insurance companies and pension funds, other fi nancial institutions, other NFCs, 
governments and creditors resident in the rest of the world.2 This box compares developments 
concerning loans granted by banks to loans from other creditor sectors, in particular the other 
fi nancial intermediaries sector, and within the NFC sector.
Loans to non-fi nancial corporations, broken down by creditor sector
While loan fi nancing in the euro area can still be described as “bank-dominated”, the proportion 
of all outstanding loans granted to NFCs accounted for by bank loans decreased from 61% in 
2000 to 55% in 2012 (see Chart A).3,4 During the fi nancial crisis, MFI lending to NFCs has fallen 
continuously since the fi rst quarter of 2008 (see Chart A), becoming negative in the third quarter 
of 2009. This development followed a signifi cant increase in MFI lending to NFCs in the period 
prior to the fi nancial crisis. After the fourth quarter of 2009, the net loan transactions recovered 
modestly, turning positive in the fi rst quarter of 2011 but then negative once more in the fi rst 
quarter of 2012.5
The proportion of NFCs’ total loan fi nancing accounted for by inter-NFC loans (loans 
between NFCs resident in the euro area) increased from 20% in 2000 to 27% in 2012. Inter-
NFC loans consist largely of loans between NFCs belonging to the same enterprise group 
(“intra-group” loans), whereas there is little evidence of loans between unrelated NFCs. Intra-
group loans occur owing to the redistribution of cash fl ows. Obtaining debt fi nancing from 
outside an enterprise group may also be centralised through the enterprise that has the best 
access to capital markets. Specifi cally, the issuance of securities may be undertaken by one 
1 Prepared by Andreas Hertkorn.
2 Data on loans to NFCs by creditor sectors are available in the euro area accounts.
3 For households, the proportion of bank loans has also decreased (from 87% in 2010), but was still above 85% in the fi rst half of 2012.
4 In the euro area accounts data used in this report (as in monetary statistics), sectors are defi ned for the euro area as a whole. In other 
words, loans granted to an NFC by MFIs, other fi nancial institutions, or other NFCs resident in a different euro area country are 
recorded as MFI, other fi nancial institution, or NFC loans, respectively, rather than a loan from a non-resident.
5 The quarterly values for the net granting (transactions) of loans are smoothed for the analysis by four-quarter cumulated sums, as these 
quarterly transactions are relatively volatile.
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enterprise, which then distributes the funds within the group in the form of loans. During the 
fi nancial crisis, inter-NFC loans fell strongly after the third quarter of 2008 but have remained 
positive, dampening the decline in MFI loans. Since 2010 inter-NFC loans have recovered as 
NFCs have regained access to capital markets (for example, debt security issuance by NFCs 
had already started to recover in 2009) as their cash fl ows improved, allowing intra-group 
fi nancing to alleviate the reduction in MFI fi nancing.
The proportion of total loans to NFCs accounted for by other fi nancial institutions increased from 8% 
in 2000 to 11% in 2012. The other fi nancial institutions sector consists of a relatively diverse group 
of institutions that are engaged in fi nancial intermediation but do not take deposits from the public or 
provide insurance services. Loans from this sector to NFCs are mostly granted by fi nancial subsidiaries, 
which are set up to issue debt securities on behalf of the enterprise group. These loans are relatively 
important for some countries (e.g. Germany), where corporate bonds are often issued by other fi nancial 
institutions resident in other euro area countries.6 Other fi nancial institutions also include leasing 
companies and fi nancial vehicle corporations engaged in securitisation.7 The availability of data for the 
individual sub-categories is still limited, except for investment funds.8 Developments are thus analysed 
6 For the fi nancial accounts data used in this report, the sector and residence of the legal issuer (the fi nancial subsidiary) are recorded. 
Other data sources based on the nationality of the indirect benefi ciary of the securities issuance (e.g. the parent company) show that 
German NFCs’ total issuance of debt securities is much higher.
7 Loans by fi nancial vehicle corporations (not retained on MFI balance sheets) accounted for 1.4% of the total loans granted to NFCs 
in the fi rst half of 2012. The securitisation of loans to NFCs thus accounts for only a small proportion of loans from other fi nancial 
institutions to NFCs. 
8 Separate data are now available for investment funds and fi nancial vehicle corporations engaged in securitisation. For these 
corporations, data are available from the fourth quarter of 2009 onwards.
Chart A Loans to non-financial corporations, broken down by creditor sector
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based on the other fi nancial institutions sector as a whole, but excluding investment funds, as they 
typically do not grant loans to NFCs.9 Loans from other fi nancial institutions that are resident in the 
same country account for more than half of the total loans from other fi nancial institutions. During the 
fi nancial crisis, the total number of loans granted by other fi nancial institutions fell, from a relatively 
high level in the third quarter of 2007 until the second quarter of 2011. The increase in these loans in 
recent quarters has helped to lessen the impact of the decline in MFI loans.
The proportion of total loans to NFCs accounted for by loans from outside the euro area (“rest of 
the world”) decreased from 6% in 2000 to 4% in 2012. These loans comprise direct investment 
loans and loans from non-resident banks and other fi nancial intermediaries. However, no exact 
breakdown exists.10
The proportion of total loans to NFCs accounted for by government loans decreased from 4% 
in 2000 to 2% in 2012. Loans granted by insurance companies and pension funds accounted for 
less than 0.5% of total loans to NFCs in 2012, down from 1.2% in 2000.
Balance sheet developments of the main fi nancial creditor sectors: MFIs and other 
fi nancial institutions
Before the fi nancial crisis MFI loans to NFCs, as well as MFIs’ total fi nancial assets, 
grew broadly in line with their capital and reserves (see Chart B).11 Until 2008 their 
capital-to-assets ratio was thus fairly stable, in line with the regulatory requirements. 
Other fi nancial institutions (excluding investment funds), not being subject to the same 
regulatory requirements as banks, expanded their fi nancial assets at a similar pace to that 
of banks, but did not increase their capital and reserves to the same extent (see Chart B). 
Data concerning capital and reserves are not available for the other fi nancial institution sector but 
may be approximated by (notional) net assets, which are assets minus liabilities excluding shares 
(and excluding changes other than transactions, in order to abstract from valuation changes). 
The decline in the notional net assets-to-assets ratio, from 2000 until the third quarter of 2008, 
indicates that other fi nancial institutions increased their leverage substantially.
During the fi nancial crisis, MFIs increased their capital-to-assets ratio from 6.2% in the second 
quarter of 2008 to 8.3% in the fourth quarter of 2012 (see Chart B). This was the result of bank 
assets broadly stagnating from 2009 (also evident in loans to NFCs), whereas MFI capital 
increased continuously. The main reason behind this development is that banks were forced, 
both by market and regulatory pressure, to increase their capital-to-assets ratio owing to the 
perceived increased riskiness of bank assets, which was partly linked to the increased leverage 
of less-regulated institutions, both in the euro area other fi nancial institution sector, as well as in 
the rest of the world.
9 At the same time, while investment funds typically do not grant loans to NFCs, they do fi nance fi rms via investment, for example in 
corporate bonds.
10 Loans from the rest of the world to euro area NFCs can only be approximated, as the international investment position only identifi es 
the non-government non-MFI sector, but not the NFC sector specifi cally.
11 Capital and reserves from the MFI balance sheet item statistics are used here, as they are directly available for this sub-sector. For other 
(sub-)sectors, capital and reserves data are not available, but can be approximated by net fi nancial assets. Taking the market value of 
shares and other equity (excluding mutual funds’ shares/money market funds’ shares), or alternatively net assets, from the euro area 
accounts yields similar results, although these are also affected by valuation changes.
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Box 2
ROLE OF TRADE CREDIT AND PAYMENT DELAYS1
Trade credit granted to euro area NFCs by their creditors – mainly other enterprises in the euro 
area and in the rest of the world, but also the public sector – accounted for the third largest portion 
(10.5%) of NFCs’ total external fi nancing in the fourth quarter of 2012. At the same time, when 
consolidating NFCs’ trade credit payables with their trade credit receivables, the proportion 
of their total external fi nancing2 accounted for by net trade credit is close to zero, indicating 
that this type of fi nancing largely takes place between euro area NFCs. Over the past fi ve years 
the relative weight of trade credit remained fairly close to the euro area average in France, and 
always exceeded the euro area average in Spain and Italy. In Germany, the relative importance 
of trade credit rose above the euro area average in 2011-12, from close to the euro area average 
prior to this period. The situation varied across the smaller economies. In particular, trade credit 
remained an important source of external fi nancing in Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
At the same time, it always played a minor role in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
As a key element of NFCs’ working capital, trade credit transactions are closely linked to economic 
activity (see Chart A). In a recession, fi rms systematically reduce their purchases and inventories 
1 Prepared by François Servant and Vasileios Georgakopoulos.
2 For this purpose, total external fi nancing liabilities were netted with trade credit receivables.
Chart B Balance sheet developments of creditor sectors
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and try to offset the collapse of their sales. As 
a consequence, trade credit payable quickly 
declines. When the situation is reversed, trade 
credit increases. This link between trade credit 
and the economic cycle is apparent in most 
euro area countries. After a period of signifi cant 
growth prior to the fi nancial crisis, trade credit 
contributed negatively to the annual growth of 
euro area NFCs’ debt 3 from the third quarter 
of 2008 to the fi rst quarter of 2010. Between 
the middle of 2010 and the middle of 2012 
its contribution rose again, to an average of 
approximately 30% of the annual growth rate 
of NFCs’ debt, but turned negative again in the 
second half of 2012.
From the microeconomic point of view, trade 
credit can be considered a supply of credit, 
as well as a demand for credit. Both sides 
contribute to the fi nal impact of trade credit 
on a company.4 When granting a payment 
period to its customers (for example 45 days after invoice issuance), the fi rm offers them short-
term fi nancing. During that period the customer is allowed to postpone a cash fl ow that should 
normally have been paid out earlier. Similarly, a fi rm looking for short-term fi nancing can 
postpone its own payments to suppliers or negotiate longer payment periods with them. Trade 
credit thus appears to be an easily obtained and relatively informal form of short-term credit, 
compared with classic forms of bank credit. At the same time, by postponing a payment that is 
falling due, the fi rm waives the discount that it could have obtained, in some cases, if it had paid 
immediately.
At the fi rm level, trade credit is commonly expressed as a duration. The simplest valuation 
method consists of measuring the time period between the date of a transaction and the date of 
its fi nal payment. This method can be easily implemented at the fi rm level, but not on a larger 
scale. By calculating duration indicators such as the Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) ratio or the 
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) ratio5 based on accounting data, situations can be compared at 
an aggregated level. Empirical data provided by the Bureau Van Dijk Orbis database highlight 
that the DSO ratios of euro area NFCs developed very differently when comparing the period 
before the crisis with the crisis period itself (see Chart B). According to these data, DSO ratios 
decreased in euro area countries by 9% (i.e. fi ve days) between 2006 and 2008, except in Portugal 
3 Debt is defi ned in this box as the sum of loans, debt securities issued by NFCs, pension fund reserves of NFCs and trade credit payable.
4 For the role played by accounts receivable and payable, see Ferrando and Mulier (2013).
5 It has to be noted that these data are approximations based on accounting information. They are useful for analysing changes and the 
trend in average periods, but cannot be taken as a reference point for verifying the degree of compliance with the legal limits set for 
these periods. For a given fi rm, the DSO ratio corresponds to the average of its customers’ payment periods. It is therefore a charge, i.e. 
a fi nancing need. The DSO ratio is calculated as follows: accounts receivable outstanding divided by sales (including VAT), multiplied 
by 360. Conversely, a fi rm’s DPO ratio corresponds to the duration of the payments owed, on average, to suppliers. The DPO ratio is 
calculated as follows: accounts payable outstanding divided by total purchases (including VAT), multiplied by 360. The DSO ratio is 
expressed in terms of days of sales and the DPO ratio in terms of days of purchases. Both indicators can be calculated as a weighted 
average (by the size of each company), or as a non-weighted average (this method gives a better insight into individual behaviour). The 
fi rst method is applied in this report.
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where the ratio remained considerably above the euro area average. At the end of 2008, the crisis 
interrupted this positive trend and DSO ratios signifi cantly increased in the period 2009-10, with 
only two exceptions – France and Germany. In Germany, fi rms remained in a position to benefi t 
from a renewed shortening of their DSO ratios in 2009. The ratio rose slightly in 2010, but only 
by one day of sales. In France, the Law on the Modernisation of the Economy came into force in 
2008 and put a ceiling on payment periods, preventing any increase in the DSO ratios of NFCs 
during the crisis.
DSO ratios are often subject to an unequal balance of power between fi rms. Large fi rms are often 
in a position to negotiate better terms of payment than small or medium-sized ones. By contrast, 
small fi rms may lose important contracts if they demand shorter payment periods than their 
competitors. In other words, trade credit leads to small fi rms fi nancing large ones, despite have 
more limited access to bank credit. This disparity has continued to increase in recent years: the 
weighted DSO ratio of large companies decreased by 12% between 2006 and 2008, and rose by 
just 4% (or two days) from 2009 to 2010. At the same time, small companies’ DSO ratios barely 
changed between 2006 and 2008, and rose by 7% (or four days) between 2009 and 2010. This 
advantage in favour of large fi rms was particularly distinct between 2006 and 2010 in France, 
Finland and Italy, and also to a certain extent in Germany. In Belgium, Estonia, Portugal and 
Slovakia, the change in DSO ratios benefi ted large fi rms until 2008, but not in the period 2009-10.
In this context, the entry into force of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions may have a 
Chart B DSO ratios in Europe, broken down by size and country, 2006-10
(percentages; days of sales)
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 Small(EA)
2 Medium sized (EA)
3 Large companies (EA)
2006-2008 2009-2010 2006-2008 2009-2010
EA BE DE EE ES FR IT AT PT SK FI EA BE DE EE ES FR IT AT PT SK FI
level of DSO ratio (right-hand scale; in days of scale) 
change in DSO ratio (left-hand scale; growth rate in percentage within each period)
change in DSO ratio (left-hand scale; growth rate in percentage within each period)
Sources: Bureau Van Dijk Orbis database and ECB calculations.
Notes: DSO ratio calculated as a weighted ratio. EA denotes euro area. A large company has operating revenue of at least €10 million, 
total assets of at least €2 million, and at least 150 employees. A medium-sized company has operating revenue of at least €1 million, 
total assets of at least €2 million, and at least 15 employees. A small company is any company not covered by the previous two defi nitions. 
Number of companies in 2010 (in legal units): euro area – 1,593,000; Austria – 2,000; Belgium – 11,000; Germany – 20,000; Estonia – 
27,000; Spain – 376,000; Finland – 67,000; France – 555,000; Italy – 350,000; Portugal – 152,000; Slovakia – 22,000.
31
ECB
Occasional Paper No 151
August 2013
2 CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE, 
F INANCING AND 
LEVERAGE OF 
NON-F INANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS 
IN THE EURO AREA
2.4 LEVERAGE OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 27
CORPORATE INDEBTEDNESS AND LEVERAGE MEASURES
Analysing balance sheet structures gives potential lenders valuable information about the 
creditworthiness of borrowers (fi rms). From a macroeconomic perspective, indicators are typically 
produced by comparing selected debt positions of the sectoral balance sheet with a given income 
stream (e.g. the GDP or gross operating surplus of the respective sector), in order to evaluate to 
what extent the corporate sector is able to repay its debt when it falls due and, consequently, how 
vulnerable it is to the volatility of the generated income stream.28 Other indicators compare debt 
with (fi nancial and non-fi nancial) assets to assess corporate indebtedness. This is important because 
assets can be sold by a fi rm in order to generate funding liquidity. In addition, they can serve as 
collateral and, hence, contribute positively to fi rms’ available fi nancing.29 Debt can also be analysed 
with reference to the equity position of corporations. The debt-to-equity ratio at market value 
can be used as a measure of corporate debt relative to the expected income stream generated by 
a fi rm, giving shareholders a picture of the perceived market value of a fi rm. Finally, the interest 
environment and the maturity profi le of fi rms’ balance sheets also contribute to lenders’ assessments 
of the perceived sustainability of borrowers’ debt management decisions.
The debt-to-GDP ratio of the euro area NFC sector increased rapidly over the period under review, 
from 69% in 1999 to 104% in the second quarter of 2010 (see Chart 16). Since then it has only 
changed slightly, standing at 103% in the fourth quarter of 2012. The increase in debt was marked 
by several phases, with the fi rst phase mirroring the build-up of debt during the “new economy” 
boom. After a period of relatively stable levels of indebtedness up to 2004, corporate debt increased 
signifi cantly, peaking in 2010. The data show that the debt-to-GDP ratio of euro area NFCs has 
been broadly similar to the ratio of non-fi nancial fi rms in the United States, and somewhat lower 
than that of NFCs in the United Kingdom (see Chart A1 in Annex 2).30
The data also show a wide variation in the debt-to-GDP ratio of individual euro area countries 
(see Chart 16, and Table A11 in Annex 2). Both the interquartile range31 and the maximum and 
27 Prepared by Felix Geiger and Manuel Rupprecht.
28 In simplifi ed terms, the solvency of borrowers is typically measured according to the net present value approach, which is calculated at the 
individual fi rm level as the sum of all expected net cash fl ow streams generated by the fi rm. It should be noted that most macroeconomic 
indicators rely on a concept that measures the current income stream (e.g. GDP or gross operating surplus) rather than the expected 
income stream. Based on a dividend discount model, the current market price of equity can be used as an alternative to approximate the 
expected income stream for shareholders.
29 However, it can be diffi cult to generate liquidity with certain assets. While non-fi nancial assets are typically relatively illiquid, it may also 
become diffi cult to use fi nancial assets, such as loans or even debt securities, as a means of generating liquidity, depending on overall 
market conditions (in particular market liquidity).
30 For an international comparison, see Chapter 4 of this report. See also European Central Bank (2009), and European Central Bank (2012).
31 The interquartile range is defi ned as the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile.
visible impact on disparities, as the Law on the Modernisation of the Economy has had in France 
since 2008. Henceforth, in accordance with the directive, Member States have to ensure that, in 
transactions between fi rms, the creditor is entitled to interest for late payment (Article 3(1)), and 
that the payment period fi xed in the contract does not exceed 60 calendar days6 (Article 3(5)). 
In addition, in the case of late payment, the creditor is entitled to obtain from the debtor a fi xed 
sum of at least €40 (Article 6(1)). Member States had to implement regulations to comply with 
the directive by 16 March 2013.
6 Unless otherwise explicitly agreed in the contract and provided it is not grossly unfair to the creditor.
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minimum fi gures widened across countries during the last decade. In particular, from the fi rst 
quarter of 2005 onwards, there has been substantial dispersion in the 75th percentile of the 
distribution of euro area countries, mainly mirroring debt dynamics in Luxembourg, Belgium 
(largely due to inter-company loans), Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, and Portugal. In Germany, France, 
Italy, Slovakia, and the Netherlands, the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio was rather subdued. In 
the fourth quarter of 2012, the NFC sector in Luxembourg recorded the highest debt-to-GDP ratio 
(303%), whereas the value was lowest in Slovakia (47%). Similar dynamics can be observed when 
comparing the indebtedness of NFCs with gross operating surplus, which is a more appropriate 
measure of the income generated by the NFC sector (see Chart A2 in Annex 2).32
In order to analyse levels of indebtedness across different sectors of economic activity, bank loans, 
i.e. the main debt component, are compared with the sector’s gross value added (see Chart 17, and 
Table A12 in Annex 2).33 At the euro area level, the ratio of MFI loans to gross value added 
increased for most of the main sectors until the period 2008-09, and has since subsided. Firms in the 
construction and real estate services sector owed more money to banks, on average, than fi rms in 
other sectors. This was a result of both higher indebtedness ratios in 2003 (the starting point of the 
data series) and the intense accumulation of debt during the past decade in an environment of 
32 Although the ratio of debt to gross operating surplus is more informative than the debt-to-GDP ratio, at least from an economic point of 
view, the former indicator is available less frequently than the latter at the level of individual countries. Therefore, both measures are taken 
into account in the analysis.
33 Information on bank loans represents the only available data concerning the leverage of fi rms across different sectors of economic 
activity. Sectors are defi ned following the NACE rev.2 classifi cation, see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
Glossary:Statistical_classifi cation_of_economic_activities_in_the_European_Community_(NACE)/de.
Chart 16 Euro area NFCs’ debt-to-GDP ratio
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Chart 17 Ratio of MFI loans to gross value 
added across euro area sectors of economic 
activity
(percentages)
85
100
115
130
145
160
20
30
40
50
60
70
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
all sectors (left-hand scale)
industry (left-hand scale)
wholesale and retail trade (left-hand scale)
services other than real estate (left-hand scale)
construction and real estate services (right-hand scale)
Source: ECB.
Notes: Sectors are defi ned according to the NACE rev.2 
classifi cation. Data are based on the amounts outstanding MFI 
loans and the four-quarter moving sum of the gross value added.
33
ECB
Occasional Paper No 151
August 2013
2 CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE, 
F INANCING AND 
LEVERAGE OF 
NON-F INANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS 
IN THE EURO AREA
booming housing markets in a number of euro 
area countries. In the construction and real 
estate services sector, euro area NFCs’ ratios of 
MFI loans to value added only began to fall in 
2010, owing to the bursting of the housing 
market bubble in some euro area countries and 
exceptionally weak value-added growth in the 
period 2009-10. Nevertheless, the decrease in 
the ratio was more pronounced in this sector 
than in other sectors from its peak until the end 
of 2012.
The accumulation of debt in the construction 
and real estate services sector was particularly 
strong, up to its peak, in Ireland, Cyprus and 
Malta and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in Spain, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia. 
Similarly, the peak in the ratio of MFI loans to 
value added in this sector was highest in Ireland 
and Luxembourg, but it was also very high in 
Spain, Cyprus, Malta, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. In turn, the decrease in the ratio of MFI 
loans to value added in the construction and real 
estate services sector from its peak until 2012 was strongest in Ireland, but was also considerable 
in Estonia, Spain, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal. By contrast, indebtedness ratios in this sector 
remained at moderate levels in Germany (even falling slightly from the pre-crisis period to the crisis 
period), as well as in Belgium, Greece and Slovakia. In the industry sector, the ratio of bank loans 
to value added was considerably above the euro area average in Spain and Italy, but the increase 
during the past decade remained relatively contained and the ratio has since declined from its peak. 
By contrast, during the period under review the ratio of MFI loans to value added was lowest in the 
industry sector in Germany and Ireland. Compared with the industry and construction sectors, in all 
euro area countries there have, in general, been lower levels of indebtedness in the wholesale and 
retail trade sectors, as well as in the services sectors.
When comparing corporate debt with the asset side of NFCs’ balance sheets, further information 
about fi rms’ leverage emerges. In the euro area, the ratio of debt to total assets (total assets are 
defi ned as fi nancial assets plus fi xed assets) reveals periods when fi rms’ leverage increased, and 
also periods of signifi cant deleveraging (see Chart 18). After a prolonged period of consolidation 
between 2003 and 2007, the ratio increased during the fi nancial crisis, reaching a peak of 38%. 
Since then some slight deleveraging has been observed, but the ratio has remained high. As the 
amount of fi xed assets outstanding is not available on a quarterly basis for most euro area countries, 
the ratio of debt to total liabilities can be used as an approximation of the ratio of debt to total 
assets.34 Across euro area countries, a degree of heterogeneity was already evident before the 
fi nancial crisis, but the amount of variation increased from the second quarter of 2008 onwards, at 
least for some countries (see Chart 19, and Chart A3 in Annex 2). The increase in leverage from 
34 Compared with the ratio of debt to total assets, the ratio of debt to total liabilities does not cover the net worth of fi rms, defi ned as total 
assets (including both fi nancial and fi xed assets) minus total liabilities. However, at the euro area level, the ratio of debt to total liabilities 
mostly reveals a similar pattern to that shown by the ratio of debt to total assets during the period under review.
Chart 18 Ratios of debt to total assets and 
debt to total liabilities of euro area NFCs
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2007 onwards was particularly evident in Greece, Slovenia and Luxembourg whereas, during the 
same period, the leverage ratio fell in Estonia.
NFCs’ debt-to-equity ratios are closely related to the composition of their capital structure 
(see Chart A4 and Table A11 in Annex 2). In this respect, similar developments can be observed for 
this leverage measure as for the ratio of debt to total assets. Across countries, debt-to-equity ratios 
differed widely within the period under review (see Chart A5 in Annex 2).35 Among the larger euro 
area countries, leverage ratios were relatively moderate in 1999. In 2007 the ratios of Germany, 
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands were between 65% and 80%, while they were signifi cantly below 
the euro area average in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, refl ecting differences in the 
capitalisation of NFCs across countries. In the context of the fi nancial crisis, heterogeneity among 
the countries substantially increased against the background of macroeconomic rebalancing in 
some euro countries. In the fourth quarter of 2012, Greece recorded the highest leverage ratio 
among euro area countries, at 152% (resulting from substantial losses on equity), whereas 
Luxembourg recorded the lowest, at 50%.
Given that the fi nancial accounts are based on the market valuation principle, fl uctuations in leverage 
can either be a refl ection of transactions in the form of net equity issuance and changes in debt 
fi nancing, or they can stem from valuation effects on the outstanding amount of debt and/or equity 
(holding gains or losses owing to changes in market prices or other changes, e.g. write-downs in debt 
positions). In order to disentangle both components, the calculation of “notional” amounts outstanding 
makes it possible to derive a “notional” debt-to-equity ratio that refl ects cumulated debt and equity 
transactions based on an initial debt-to-equity ratio. Chart 20 depicts this decomposition for the euro 
area average by displaying the contribution of valuation effects and transactions to leverage dynamics. 
35 The comparison of debt-to-equity ratios across countries is affected by differences in the valuation of unquoted equity.
Chart 19 Ratio of debt to total liabilities of NFCs across euro area countries
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It becomes clear that the spikes in the debt-to-equity ratio in 2003 and 2009 resulted from large equity 
price drops. Moreover, the consolidation period between 2003 and 2007 is the result of holding 
gains rather than an active attempt by NFCs to increase their equity relative to their debt. Indeed, an 
inspection of the contribution of transactions to changes in the debt-to-equity ratio suggests that a 
“leverage cycle” exists, with leverage ratios increasing between 2004 and 2007 and falling afterwards. 
Between the third quarter of 2009 and the third quarter of 2011, a gradual deleveraging process can be 
observed that was based on the net impact of transactions, i.e. debt redemption and equity issuance.
The existence of a leverage and credit cycle can also be examined at the country level. Among the 
larger euro area countries, the build-up of debt based on “active” leverage is clearly evident in Spain 
and Italy (see Chart 21). For the smaller countries (in particular Greece and Ireland), a high build-up 
of debt occurred, largely owing to transactions (see Table A13 in Annex 2). Interestingly, this 
increase in leverage was accompanied by holding gains in equity in some countries, which limited 
the overall increase in leverage in the run-up to the fi nancial crisis. The trend reversed in 2008 when 
NFCs cut spending and debt fi nancing because of the substantial downturn in economic activity 
and the tightening of lending conditions by funding suppliers, in particular banks. However, 
deleveraging in terms of net equity issuance and debt redemption was hampered by an environment 
of falling equity prices (see the examples of Spain and Italy in Chart 21). Leverage has continued to 
increase since 2008 for many euro area countries, except Ireland.
ASSESSING THE VULNERABILITY OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS’ DEBT
The maturity structure of assets and liabilities on NFCs’ balance sheets provides valuable 
information about their vulnerability to shocks, in particular changes in fi nancing conditions 
(see Table A11 in Annex 2). Weaker fi rms tend to depend on short-term funding. If short-term 
Chart 21 Changes and contribution 
to changes in the debt-to-equity ratio 
of NFCs at the country level
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Chart 20 Changes and contribution 
to changes in the debt-to-equity ratio 
of euro area NFCs
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funding accounts for a large proportion of total funding, it may be diffi cult to renew this funding 
in a stressed market environment and may give rise to liquidity shortages (refi nancing risk). 
At the euro area level, the proportion of NFCs’ total debt accounted for by short-term debt has 
remained relatively stable, at between 33% and 24% in the period 1999-2012 (see Chart 22). 
From this perspective, NFCs appear to be relatively well protected against sudden changes in 
short-term fi nancing conditions. In addition, across euro area countries, both the interquartile 
range and the distance between maximum and minimum values narrowed over time. The most 
recent data (from the fourth quarter of 2012) show that Belgian NFCs are the most dependent 
on short-term funding (38% of total funding), largely owing to inter-company loans which are 
most likely not subject to changes in fi nancing conditions, followed by fi rms in Greece, Malta, 
Slovakia and Slovenia (all 30% to 31%). Companies in Finland are the least dependent on short-
term funding (6% of total funding).
Another important factor for an assessment of the sustainability of debt is the debt service burden of 
NFCs, which reveals the proportion of their income that needs to be used for servicing debt 
(i.e. interest payments and debt repayments).36 In the euro area, the interest payment burden of 
NFCs, i.e. the ratio of NFCs’ gross interest payments to gross operating surplus, rose from 15% in 
the fi rst quarter of 2000 to 22% in the fourth quarter of 2008, before falling back to 13.9% in the 
fourth quarter of 2012 (see Chart 23). Again, there is substantial variation across euro area countries; 
this variation became more pronounced in the run-up to the fi nancial crisis in an environment of 
36 Owing to data limitations, measures of debt repayments are not included in the calculations.
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Chart 23 Interest payment burden of NFCs
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rising interest rates. Firms in Belgium, France, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, as well as in other euro 
area countries, had to deal with an increase in the percentage of their income that had to be used for 
interest rate payments in the period 2006-08, whereas the interest rate burden for fi rms in Germany, 
Italy, Ireland and Greece remained subdued. Between 2009 and 2010 the burden declined markedly 
again for most countries.
Despite the fact that short-term funding continues to account for a moderate percentage of total 
funding, interest rate risks prevail if long-term debt is fi nanced at fl oating rates rather than at fi xed 
rates. This limits fi rms’ ability to act when the market environment changes. Conversely, a larger 
proportion of debt at variable rates has allowed companies to benefi t from the decline in market 
reference rates (such as the EURIBOR) during the crisis. Chart 24 depicts the proportion of total 
outstanding bank loans accounted for by short-term and long-term MFI loans at fl oating rates. 
Between 2010 (the start of the data series) and 2012 the euro area average only increased marginally, 
from 55% to 56%.37 Across euro area countries in 2012, NFCs in Germany and France were the 
least exposed to interest rate risks, with short-term loans accounting for 37% and 38% of total 
loans, respectively. By contrast, in Finland and Slovenia this fi gure was slightly more than 80% – 
signifi cantly higher than the euro area average in the period under review, making fi rms in those 
countries particularly vulnerable to (unexpected) interest rate changes. Between 2010 and 2012 the 
change in the proportion of total outstanding bank loans accounted for by short-term loans and 
long-term MFI loans at fl oating rates was most pronounced in Malta (a 46 percentage point increase) 
and Spain (a 13 percentage point increase).
Overall, corporate debt vulnerability indicators have shown some improvement during the crisis, 
as the interest payment burden of NFCs has declined from its peak in the period 2008-09 and 
37 The rise in the amount of short-term loans and loans at fl oating rates (as a percentage of all MFI loans to NFCs) is confi rmed when looking 
at new business volumes of loans.
Chart 24 Proportion of MFI loans at variable rates in total MFI loans to NFCs
(percentages; ranking following 2012 values)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
DE FR CY BE IE EA NL ES LU AT GR SK PT EE IT MT SI FI
  
level in 2010 
level in 2012
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on amounts outstanding. MFI loans at variable rates refer to short-term MFI loans and long-term MFI loans at 
fl oating rates. Owing to data limitations, only loans granted by the MFI sector are considered in the calculations. The average value for 
each year is shown. EA denotes euro area.
38
ECB
Occasional Paper No 151
August 2013
their refi nancing risk has remained contained owing to the fact that short-term debt accounts for 
a relatively small proportion of total debt. However, fi rms have been more exposed to the risk of 
potential interest rate increases than to refi nancing risks, because of the fact that MFI loans fi nanced 
at variable lending rates have accounted for a higher percentage of total outstanding bank loans; 
this percentage increased marginally during the crisis at the euro area level, but varied considerably 
across countries.
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3 FIRMS’ FINANCING ENVIRONMENT AND DETERMINANTS OF THEIR FINANCIAL DECISIONS 38
The previous chapter provided an in-depth analysis of country-level differences over the past decade 
in the euro area corporate sector’s capital structure, internal and external fi nancing, and leverage. 
The country-level differences that have emerged mask, however, important heterogeneities across 
fi rms. Focusing on these heterogeneities is crucial to a better understanding of the different degree 
of intensity with which fi nancing problems and uncertainty have affected individual fi rms during 
the recent crisis, and of the lingering vulnerabilities that stem from corporate fi nancing challenges.
This chapter highlights fi rms’ decisions regarding their capital structure, cash management and 
investment. Many theories suggest a number of fi rm-specifi c characteristics, such as fi rm size, age 
and business specialisation, which could play a role in their decision-making. Additionally, certain 
characteristics of the institutional and fi nancial environment are also relevant. These are related to 
country-level factors, such as the development of fi nancial markets, the types of relationship between 
fi rms and investors, the tax burden and the enforcement of creditors’ and shareholders’ rights.
The assessment of the effectiveness of policy measures aimed at enhancing access to credit has to 
take into consideration the high levels of heterogeneity that currently exist among fi rms, as fi rms 
may react very differently to shocks depending on their characteristics. From this perspective, 
policies that foster the internal growth of fi rms via more effi cient product and factor markets 
(inter alia, by reducing fi nancial constraints and providing better access to capital) are instrumental 
in reallocating resources towards better performing fi rms and thus increasing the aggregate level of 
competitiveness of the euro area.
The analysis in this chapter relies largely on a dataset based on information from the balance sheets 
and profi t and loss accounts of a large number of NFCs in the euro area. The period under analysis 
is 2000-2010. Section 3.1 provides several reasons as to why fi rm-level data provide critical 
information on fi rms’ behaviour that complements traditional macro analysis. The section contains a 
brief overview of the theoretical discussions concerning the determinants of fi rms’ capital structure 
decisions (see Box 3). Section 3.2 presents an econometric analysis that confi rms the relevance 
of most fi rm-specifi c determinants of leverage identifi ed by the economic literature; it also 
highlights the effects of the fi nancial and institutional environment on fi rms’ decisions about their 
fi nancial structure. Section 3.3 investigates cash-holding policies across fi rms of different sizes. 
Traditionally, small fi rms keep larger cash buffers on their balance sheets, and are more cautious 
than large fi rms. The crisis has exacerbated this phenomenon, and small fi rms’ cash holdings have 
become even more dependent on volatile cash fl ows and the availability of collateral. Section 3.4 
provides an overview of the investment decisions of fi rms, and of how these decisions are linked 
to their fi nancial position. During the crisis, their fi nancial position seems to have become a more 
signifi cant factor for investment, especially for smaller fi rms. Section 3.5 describes the dynamics 
of an indicator of fi nancing gaps (defi ned as the gap between a fi rm’s external fi nancing needs and 
how much external fi nancing it actually has access to), as derived from recent fi rm survey data. In 
this context, Box 4 investigates whether the recent lending policies across euro area countries have 
been justifi ed by the deterioration in the fi nancial situation of fi rms.
38 Coordinated by Annalisa Ferrando.
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3.1 ANALYSING THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRMS’ FINANCIAL DECISIONS 39
Empirical analyses of fi rms’ fi nancial structure and of the determinants of their fi nancial decisions 
usually rely on micro data, which mainly include individual fi rms’ balance sheets and profi t and 
loss accounts. Micro data can be used to take into account differences related to fi rm-specifi c 
characteristics and evaluate their role in fi rms’ fi nancial decisions, whereas individual features are 
hidden when aggregate fi gures are considered (and macro data are mainly infl uenced by larger 
fi rms).40 In this sense, micro data need to be used to consider the effect of heterogeneity among 
fi rms, and also to test certain theoretical models (see Box 3).
In particular, size, age and economic sector are likely to play a key role in determining fi rms’ 
corporate fi nance decisions, while the fi nancial and institutional environment of the country where a 
fi rm is located is also a key determinant of its behaviour. Moreover, some fi rms’ fi nancial decisions 
(e.g. level of leverage, cash management and investments) are infl uenced by the development of 
their profi tability ratios or by other characteristics of their balance sheets.
Micro data also make it possible to evaluate the importance of fi rms’ characteristics and balance 
sheet data to these indicators. For example, micro data show the percentage of fi rms with 
no leverage, which is relevant to an evaluation of the role played by fi rm- and country-level 
characteristics on the amount of leverage a fi rm has. Another important aspect in analysing fi rms’ 
cash management decisions is the role played by fi rms’ size. Finally, balance sheet data are useful 
when comparing fi rms’ fi nancial structure and the development of their fi nancial fl ows with their 
investment decisions, which represent the main contribution of NFCs to GDP growth.
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the information contained in the Bureau van 
Dijk Amadeus database (see Annex 3). The main advantage of this data source is that it includes 
comparable fi nancial information for public and private companies in different countries. 
The information consists of the main components of fi rms’ balance sheets and their income 
statements; it also includes other characteristics that are relevant to the analysis, like a fi rm’s sector, 
age, number of employees, and whether it is listed or not.
39 Prepared by Antonio De Socio.
40 The main differences between the national accounts data used in Chapter 2 and the fi rm-level data are listed in Box 6 of Annex 3.
Box 3
WHY DOES THE CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE MATTER? A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
OF THE THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS1
The starting point for all analyses of the capital structure of corporations is the thesis by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), which suggests that, given perfect capital markets and a neutral 
tax system, capital structure has no infl uence on a fi rm’s value and the cost of capital. If the 
restrictive assumptions on which this theory is based are loosened, one can identify those factors 
that infl uence corporate fi nancing structures. For instance, the “trade-off” theory stresses that 
companies set a target level of leverage at which the tax advantages resulting from the additional 
1 Prepared by Alexander Karšay and Walter Waschiczek.
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debt just offset the costs arising from potential fi nancial distress. The “pecking order” theory 
(Myers and Majluf (1984); Myers (1984)) highlights the infl uence that asymmetrical information 
between investors or lenders and company management can have on capital structure. Because 
asymmetrical information increases fi nancing costs, companies prefer internal fi nancing to 
external fi nancing, and because debt fi nancing entails lower costs and no outside shareholders, 
companies prefer debt to equity if external funds are necessary. The above theories suggest a 
number of fi rm-specifi c characteristics that should play a role in determining a corporation’s 
capital structure. Empirical studies tend to fi nd that leverage 2 is affected negatively by fi rm-level 
profi tability and growth opportunities, and positively by fi rm size (e.g. book value of assets) and 
asset tangibility. Industry effects also play a role, as fi rms’ debt ratios differ according to their 
respective industries. Whereas most of these effects are roughly in line with the trade-off theory, 
the profi tability effect is suggestive of a pecking order in fi nancial decisions. Studies also often 
fi nd that fi rms converge towards a target debt ratio, which corresponds with the trade-off theory.
From a stability perspective, one aspect to consider is the relationship between leverage and 
the probability of default. With rising indebtedness, borrowers’ ability to repay becomes 
progressively more sensitive to drops in income and sales and, especially in the case of fl oating-rate 
debt, increases in interest rates (Cecchetti et al. (2011)). Moreover, in an economic downturn, the 
pressure of debt service costs is likely to cause highly leveraged fi rms to cut back investment 
(and, possibly, production and employment) more severely than less-leveraged fi rms; thus high 
leverage may make the economy less stable (Bernanke and Campbell (1988)). From a conjunctural 
point of view, high leverage might lead to a debt overhang (Myers (1977)). If a fi rm has taken on 
too much debt, it might fi nd itself in a situation where it cannot take on additional debt to fi nance 
future projects, even if these projects could generate a positive net present value, because the 
profi t to be expected from them would be used to service existing liabilities. For the economy as 
a whole, the ensuing investment cuts might lead to a dampening of economic growth.
Recent studies (for example De Jong et al. (2011); Almeida and Campello (2010)) stress that 
verifying capital structure theories should focus on joint tests of various theories that are able 
to discriminate between the different theoretical predictions. De Jong et al. (2011) establish that 
the pecking order theory better explains debt issuance, whereas the trade-off theory is better 
at predicting debt repurchase decisions. However, Byoun (2008) fi nds that, as fi rms approach 
their target leverage ratios, the speed of adjustment is faster when there is a fi nancing defi cit 
at below-target leverage and a fi nancing surplus at above-target leverage. In addition, 
adjustment speeds are higher when fi rms have above-target leverage levels than when they have 
below-target levels. Moreover, fi rms facing a fi nancial defi cit (surplus) tend to increase 
(decrease) debt regardless of its level relative to the target. Thus both theories’ elements appear 
to be valid. Finally, Lemmon and Zender (2010) provide evidence in favour of the pecking order 
theory. After distinguishing fi nancially constrained from unconstrained fi rms, they show that the 
latter fi ll their fi nancing defi cits almost entirely with debt, while the former (typically smaller 
fi rms) resort to a larger extent to equity issuance, owing to debt capacity concerns and their 
pronounced growth prospects.
The above results can be complemented by survey evidence on managerial views (Brounen 
et al. (2006)) of capital structure considerations. Elements of both main theories receive some 
support. In line with the trade-off theory, volatility of earnings is an important factor, as are 
2 Leverage is usually defi ned as a ratio of long-term/total debt to assets, where a market or book value of assets might be applied.
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the tax advantages of debt, potential costs of bankruptcy and reputation effects. Firms also 
have a target debt-to-equity ratio in most cases. However, the preference for internal fi nance 
is also clearly confi rmed, as fi rms tend not to issue debt when recent profi ts are high (and vice 
versa). Indeed, the most important factor in debt decisions is fi nancial fl exibility (i.e. restricting 
debt and the debt service burden so that enough internal funds are available for new projects), 
which is also in line with the fi ndings of Fama and French (2002) – that fi rms set leverage and 
dividend pay-outs below optimum values in order to reduce the likelihood of having to issue 
risky securities or forego profi table investments. However, there is a lack of decisive conclusions 
regarding the trade-off between external equity and debt or the role of asymmetric information. 
Nevertheless, some additional vital determinants of capital structure can be identifi ed. When 
shares are overvalued, the owners of the company can obtain a relatively large amount of fi nance 
(which can be used profi tably) for only a small share of their business. Industry leverage ratios 
are probably seen as a benchmark, in that fi rms in a given industry do not prefer to be seen by 
investors or banks as too different/risky compared with their competitors. Furthermore, company 
owners also pragmatically analyse how much of their profi ts they will have to forego when 
they give up part of their ownership by issuing additional shares, i.e. they do not automatically 
take the net present value of capital expansion into account when deciding whether to issue 
new equity.
Since the mid-1990s there has been an increase in the amount of literature that investigates 
the infl uence of country-specifi c institutional factors on corporate capital structure.3 Several 
studies (Fan et al. (2010); Rajan and Zingales (1995)) have found that tax regimes signifi cantly 
determine the costs associated with equity and debt. When the tax gain from leverage is positive, 
fi rms tip their capital structures towards more debt. In those taxation systems where fi rms are 
taxed on their profi ts and individuals are taxed on their personal income, it is cheaper for both 
fi rms and investors to fi nance with debt than with equity. A number of comparative analyses 
have highlighted the importance of legal factors. For example, cross-country differences in the 
legal origin (that is, from which traditions the laws in a country are derived) may infl uence the 
capital structure of the corporate sector (Bancel and Mittoo (2004); Fan et al. (2010)). In general, 
commercial laws come from two broad traditions: common law, which is English in origin, 
and civil law, which derives from Roman law. Companies in countries whose legal system is 
based on common law tend to have more equity. Similarly, the quality of law enforcement is 
also correlated with a higher equity ratio (De Jong et al. (2008); Giannetti (2003)). One aspect 
that has been consistently signifi cant is the differing legal position of creditors in the event 
of a company’s insolvency (Fan et al. (2010); De Jong et al. (2008)). In countries where the 
bankruptcy law provides strong incentives to maintain the activity of the bankrupt fi rm, the 
leverage ratio is usually lower than where the law supports creditor rights. The legal position 
of lenders is also partly linked to the structure of the fi nancial system (or, more generally, the 
capital supply), which can also infl uence fi nancing policies. While no systematic difference in 
the level of leverage in bank- or market-oriented countries has been found (Fan et al. (2010); 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)), Fan et al. (2010) point out that the volume of bank deposits and the 
existence of a deposit insurance scheme are positively correlated with leverage. Concerning the 
size of capital markets, Giannetti (2003) found a positive correlation between fi rm leverage and 
the size of the bond market, but a negative relationship with stock market size. Finally, De Jong 
et al. (2008) have demonstrated that country-specifi c factors can also infl uence corporate capital 
structure indirectly, through their impact on the effect of fi rm-specifi c factors.
3 Given the scope of this report, the ensuing discussion of institutional determinants concentrates on the fi ndings concerning developed 
countries.
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3.2 DETERMINANTS OF FIRMS’ LEVERAGE 41
The aim of this section is to analyse the considerable degree of heterogeneity in euro area fi rms’ 
decisions regarding one key aspect of their capital structure, namely the proportion of their assets to 
be fi nanced with debt. The economic literature on fi rms’ capital structures identifi es a large number 
of factors that can explain the different levels of leverage among fi rms (see Box 3). Some of these 
factors are fi rm specifi c, such as profi tability, the volatility and predictability of internal funds, the 
types of asset that should be fi nanced and the willingness of entrepreneurs to accept new equity 
investors that could claim control rights. Other factors are common to fi rms of the same sector, such 
as the amount of working capital and fi xed assets required to run the fi rm’s productive processes. 
Finally, the fi rm’s degree of leverage could also depend on the characteristics of the institutional 
and fi nancial environment, including typically country-level factors such as the development 
of fi nancial markets, the types of relationship between fi rms and investors, the tax burden and 
structure, and the strength of the enforcement framework for creditor and shareholder rights.
The analysis is based on fi rm-level balance sheet data from the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database. 
The sample used in this section has approximately 12.6 million annual observations of 2.4 million 
fi rms in 17 countries between 2001 and 2010.42
Salient features about fi rm-level leverage in this 
dataset are as follows. Throughout the sample 
period, about one third of fi rms do not show any 
fi nancial debt; micro fi rms 43 and young fi rms 
account for 38% and 40% of these fi rms, 
respectively. The median level of leverage 44 for 
indebted fi rms, mirroring the dynamics of the 
aggregate data described in the previous chapter, 
increased steadily between 2001 and 2008, by 
8 percentage points to 22%, as a consequence of 
favourable conditions in credit and fi nancial 
markets. During the crisis the indicator declined 
to 20%, primarily refl ecting the weak dynamics 
of MFI loans (see Chart 25).
Around the median levels the dispersion of 
fi rms’ leverage increased over time: in 2008 the 
quartile of least-indebted fi rms had a leverage 
ratio of less than 8% (3 percentage points higher 
than in 2001), whereas for the most indebted 
fi rms the leverage ratio was higher than 42% 
(11 percentage points higher than in 2001).
41 Prepared by Juan Carluccio, Antonio De Socio, Annalisa Ferrando, Paolo Finaldi Russo and Guillaume Horny.
42 See Annex 3 for a description of the database and for methodological notes.
43 The size classifi cation is derived from the European Commission’s defi nition, and includes four categories of fi rm: micro, small, medium 
and large. For a detailed description, see Annex 3. Young fi rms are fi rms that are less than three years old.
44 Leverage is defi ned as the sum of short- and long-term fi nancial debt, divided by total assets. Another measure of leverage, calculated as 
the ratio between fi nancial debt and the sum of fi nancial debt and shareholder equity, has been used as a robustness check, and the results 
presented hereafter remain substantially unchanged. See Annex 3 for a detailed description of the variables used in this section.
Chart 25 Leverage of euro area non-financial 
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Among indebted fi rms, the median level of leverage decreases with fi rms’ age and sales 45 
(see Charts 26a and 26b). This evidence, taken together with the high proportion of young and 
small fi rms without any fi nancial debt, confi rms the commonly held view that young and small 
companies face larger obstacles to borrowing funds and that, once they borrow, they rely heavily on 
bank debt to fi nance their business. Firms with low or high operating profi tability tend to be less 
leveraged than fi rms with intermediate operating profi tability, pointing to the presence of a 
non-linear relationship between indebtedness and profi ts 46 (see Chart 26c). Chart 26d shows that 
leverage increases with the proportion of tangible assets, which may be explained by the use of 
45 Very similar results have been found using the distribution of fi rms’ total assets instead of sales. See Chart A6 in Annex 3.
46 The change in the slope is around the eighth quantile, where the profi tability indicator is worth about 7%.
Chart 26 Leverage of euro area non-financial corporations, broken down by firms’ 
characteristics
(percentages)
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these assets as collateral or, more broadly, because tangible assets make borrowing fi rms more 
attractive to external investors; in this case too there are signs of a non-linear relationship between 
the two variables.47
In all these cases, even if the association between leverage and observed fi rm characteristics is 
fairly robust, the dispersion around the central values of the distribution is always high, especially 
for the youngest fi rms and micro fi rms, as well as for fi rms with low levels of tangible assets, 
suggesting that none of these factors, when taken individually, could be considered suffi ciently 
indicative of leverage decisions.
Looking at the sectoral distribution of leverage among indebted fi rms, Chart 27a shows that the 
median level is higher for accommodation and food services and retail trade fi rms. The highly 
leveraged sectors are typically characterised by a large number of micro fi rms. The ranking 
is relatively constant throughout the period, but the differences between industries increased 
immediately before and during the crisis. A notable exception is the construction and real estate 
sector, whose leverage increased during the decade under analysis (see Chart A7 in Annex 3). 
The increase is particularly marked in Spain and Greece (13 percentage points and 9 percentage 
points between 2001 and 2008, respectively), but there is also a more general increase in leverage 
at the country level.
47 The change in the slope is around the seventh quantile, where the proportion of tangible assets is about 6%.
Chart 27 Leverage of euro area non-financial corporations
(percentages)
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a) Broken down by economic sector b) Broken down by country
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Overall, differences in fi rms’ leverage patterns between countries seem more important than those 
between industries. In this sample, considering only indebted fi rms, the median level of leverage in 
the countries with highly leveraged fi rms, such as Germany, Greece and Malta, is double the median 
level of leverage of countries with less-leveraged fi rms, such as France, Slovakia and Luxembourg 
(see Chart 27b).48 The countries’ rankings changed somewhat throughout the period, as the impact 
of the leveraging and deleveraging process was felt during the period under examination. The 
ranking among the largest countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, remained fairly stable, 
whereas Spanish and Greek fi rms showed a substantial increase in leverage over time, in line with 
the aggregate data, while leverage levels decreased in Germany and the Netherlands.
The heterogeneity of fi rms’ leverage choices was further assessed through a decomposition of the 
total variance of leverage by pooling all countries’ data together. This analysis shows that leverage 
varies more across different sectors (75% of the total variance) than over time (25%).49 A further 
analysis of variance, in which industry, country, size and year dummies are considered, provides 
two main insights: fi rst, the leverage variation explained by these factors accounts for little more 
than 10% of the total variance; and second, country dummies are the most relevant, accounting for 
more than two thirds of the explained variance.50
Overall, these results indicate that several different factors infl uence fi rms’ leverage choices, 
and that the institutional or fi nancial environment plays an important role. In the next paragraph, 
a multivariate econometric analysis is presented, with the aim of identifying the most signifi cant 
factors and providing a better understanding of the reasons behind the structural differences 
between countries.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FIRMS’ LEVERAGE
The econometric approach followed in this section encompasses micro and macro data, as both are 
relevant for fi rms’ leverage decisions. First, the analysis presented over the previous pages confi rms 
that some individual characteristics identifi ed by corporate fi nance theory are also important for 
unlisted companies. Second, a link should be made between the relevance of the institutional and 
fi nancial environment summarised in Box 1, and the importance of country differences shown in 
Chart 27b.
On the basis of the data used in the analysis, the econometric model should deal with two different 
issues: a) the dependent variable (individual fi rms’ leverage) is equal to zero for approximately one 
third of fi rms, as a signifi cant number of fi rms have no fi nancial debt; and b) some of the explanatory 
variables are measured at the country level, and are therefore not unique among fi rms in the same 
country.51 Several methods are available to manage these issues. In line with Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) and applied works in the literature on wages,52 a two-step estimation approach was taken, 
where the fi rst step is based on a pooled Tobit model that covers the lack of leverage for many 
48 This descriptive analysis of the distribution considers only indebted fi rms; a further difference between countries stems from the number 
of corporations with positive leverage. See Box 6 in Annex 3 for a detailed comparison between country-level debt indicators based on 
individual fi nancial statements and fi nancial accounts.
49 Graham and Leary (2011) achieve similar results by decomposing the total variance of leverage using “between industries”, “within 
industries” and “within fi rms” components.
50 The results are similar even if the analysis is run on a sub-period (2005-10) in which changes in the sample composition of some small 
countries are less relevant.
51 When variables defi ned at different levels are mixed, the usual procedures used to compute the standard errors in independent observations 
underestimate the true standard deviations (Moulton (1986)). The computation of the standard errors must, therefore, be adjusted to yield 
a correct assessment of the statistical signifi cance of the coeffi cients.
52 A similar procedure is used by Solon et al. (1994) and Card (2001), among others.
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fi rms,53 and the second stage focuses on country-level variables.54 The fi rst step is a pooled Tobit 
model for the period 2001-10,
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where the covariates are a vector of variables defi ned at different levels:
Xi
0 are time constant or nearly time invariant dummies (size, age and industry);
Xit
1 are fi rm-level time-varying fi rm characteristics 55 (profi tability, asset tangibility, growth, 
liquidity), which have a one-year lag to reduce endogeneity problems;
X2c(i)t include time-varying country dummies, each one indicating a given country for a given year.
56
The estimated coeffi cients of these country-year dummies represent the dependent variable 
of the second stage of this analysis, which aims to identify the determinants of cross-country 
heterogeneity. The rationale for this approach is that, in order to assess the impact of institutional 
and fi nancial country-level characteristics, a measure of leverage comparable at the macro level 
must be obtained, by cleaning the leverage dynamic from the heterogeneity at the micro level 
(i.e. owing to differences in the industry composition, profi tability and growth opportunities). The 
estimated coeffi cients of the country-year dummies of the fi rst step provide a corrected measure of 
the differences of leverage among countries, fi ltering out the infl uence of all the micro variables 
included in the estimated equation. The second stage is based on an ordinary least squares 
regression, which includes year dummies (Tt) and characteristics of the institutional, economic and 
fi nancial environment of each country (Wit).57
[Xc(i)t
2 ] ?Wit
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The results of this analysis are reported in the fi rst three columns of Table 2, and in Table 3.58 The 
fi rst step shows that, conditional on all other covariates and in relation to micro fi rms, small fi rms 
have approximately 3.5% more leverage, medium fi rms have 6.0% more, and large fi rms have 7.9% 
53 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are inconsistent in such a setting (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). The existing approaches to 
managing unobserved heterogeneity in Tobit models employ standard random effects or Chamberlain-like transformation (see Wooldridge 
(2002)). Including fi xed effects similar to those used in linear models is still an active research area. In order to assess how robust the 
results reported in this report are to fi rm-level unobserved characteristics, linear models were estimated for chart data with fi xed effects. 
The results are in line with those reported in the tables.
54 Alternatively, a model could be estimated that involves both the micro and macro variables. The direct estimates of the standard errors 
of the coeffi cients associated with variables defi ned at the macro level would, however, be biased. Several methods exist to adjust the 
estimated standard errors, such as cluster methods. However, here a two-step approach was preferred, for two reasons. First, it yields 
unbiased estimates, and second, it is more transparent than cluster procedures, whose behaviour in applied work is currently a matter 
of debate in the econometric literature. It must be emphasised that the two-step approach described in this analysis is not related to 
instrumental variable procedures aimed at handling endogeneity problems, such as two-stage least squares.
55 See Annex 3 for a description of these variables and for some additional descriptive statistics.
56 The interactions are only included if, for each country and year, there are at least 50 fi rms with positive leverage.
57 As a preliminary evaluation of the role played by country characteristics, two pooled Tobit models were also estimated. The fi rst included 
time-varying and constant fi rm-level characteristics and year dummies, and the second also included country dummies. The Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) were used to test how well the two models fi t the data. The latter 
model fi ts the data better, because both AIC and BIC are lower.
58 Sector dummies are not included in Table 2, but they are signifi cant; the econometric analysis confi rms that the most leveraged 
corporations are in the construction and accommodation and food sectors. Even if lagged variables and missing values entail a loss of 
a large number of observations, the sample used in the estimation (about 7.5 million observations) does not differ signifi cantly from the 
whole sample in terms of composition and debt weight. The mean leverage is 0.8 percentage points lower than in the whole sample; no 
single country, industry, fi rm size or year causes a difference in the mean leverage of more than 1.9 percentage points.
48
ECB
Occasional Paper No 151
August 2013
more. This fi nding is in line with the empirical evidence that smaller fi rms might have less access to 
external sources of fi nance (either in terms of bank loans or fi nancial market instruments), which is 
refl ected in the high proportion of these fi rms without any debt. The conditional relationship 
between a fi rm’s age and its leverage indicates a fi ve-year threshold. Firms that have existed for 
fewer than fi ve years are more leveraged than older ones, with those that have existed for more than 
25 years being the least leveraged. This confi rms the descriptive results that show that young fi rms 
rely more on external fi nancing and their leverage is approximately four percentage points higher 
than that of older fi rms.
Since continuous variables are expressed as percentages, their coeffi cients directly indicate the 
relationship between leverage and fi rm characteristics. All of the characteristics of fi rms that vary over 
time are signifi cant. Firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets (which can be used as collateral) 
on the balance sheet, and with higher growth in terms of operating revenues (a proxy for fi rms’ 
Table 2 Leverage and firm characteristics: econometric results
Model for the whole period Model before and during the crisis
Full sample 
(2001-10)
Effect of one 
standard 
deviation
Before 
the crisis 
(2001-08)
Effect of one 
standard 
deviation
During 
the crisis 
(2009-10)
Effect of one 
standard 
deviation
Change in 
the effect
Size
Micro Ref. Ref. Ref.
Small 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.037*** +
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Medium 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.057*** -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Large 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.050*** -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age
Less than two years 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.092*** +
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Between two and fi ve years 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.102*** +
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Between fi ve and ten years 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.055*** +
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Between ten and 25 years 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.027*** +
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
More than 25 years Ref. Ref. Ref.
Tangibility 0.231*** 0.056 0.234*** 0.049 0.207*** 0.023 -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profi tability
Positive -0.162*** -0.020 -0.165*** -0.017 -0.135*** -0.007 -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Negative 0.315*** 0.016 0.316*** 0.014 0.313*** 0.007 =
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Operating surplus growth 0.016*** 0.007 0.018*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.001 -
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Cash to total assets -0.369*** -0.076 -0.362*** -0.085 -0.424*** -0.039 +
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Observations 7,496,446 7,496,446
Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the fi rm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The column entitled “Model 
before and during the crisis” reports the results of a model where the explanatory variables interact with pre-crisis and crisis indicators. 
The model is estimated with the sample covering the whole time period.. The column “Change in the effect” indicates signifi cant increases 
(+) or decreases (-) in the absolute values of the coeffi cients during the crisis. (=) indicates no statistically signifi cant change. Comparisons 
have been performed at the 5% level.
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fi nancing needs for investment and working capital), have higher levels of leverage.59 Leverage is 
lower for fi rms with a higher proportion of liquid assets (which can be used for fi nancing expenses in 
place of debt). In order to deal with the non-monotonic relationship between leverage and profi tability 
mentioned in the descriptive analysis, two variables were included: the fi rst takes the value of the ratio 
between operating profi ts and assets if positive, and is otherwise equal to zero; the second, on the 
other hand, takes the value of the ratio if it is negative, and is otherwise equal to zero.
The results confi rm the presence of asymmetries in the effect of fi rms’ profi tability on their 
leverage: the indicator tends to be smaller both for fi rms with higher operating profi ts (confi rming 
the hypothesis of the pecking order theory – that profi table fi rms prefer to use internal funds) and 
for fi rms with higher operating losses (which are more likely to be subject to credit rationing by 
fi nancial intermediaries).60 The third column in the table reports a standardised measure of the 
economic relevance of each explanatory variable expressed as the effect on the leverage of a shift 
by one standard deviation. The most economically relevant variables seem to be fi rms’ liquidity and 
tangibility of assets: an increase of one standard deviation is related to a decrease (increase) of 8 (6) 
percentage points in leverage.
The country-year fi xed effects (not reported in the table) are all statistically signifi cant. The relative 
ranking of the countries is similar to that derived using the simple mean of leverage at the country level 
for each year. This suggests that heterogeneity 
in fi rms’ characteristics is not the only source 
of differences in leverage across countries, thus 
confi rming the importance of an analysis of the 
effect of country characteristics on leverage. 
The main results of the second-step estimation 
are presented in Table 3. The values of the 
dependent variables are the coeffi cients of the 
macro time-varying dummies obtained from 
the fi rst step, which can be seen as corrected 
measures of the difference in leverage 
among countries for a given year, once 
fi rms’ characteristics are controlled for. The 
explanatory variables are specifi c country 
characteristics: corporate statutory tax rate, 
development of the equity market (measured by 
the ratio between the value of listed shares and 
GDP), legal rights protection (measured by the 
“Strength of legal rights” index) and ease of 
bankruptcy (measured by the time limit, in 
years, for a creditor to recover debt).61 As further 
59 Unlike in the case of profi tability, once fi rms without debt are taken into account, the relationship between leverage and the share of 
tangible assets is strictly linear; robustness checks aimed at investigating whether a non-linear relationship exists confi rm this evidence.
60 The results are not infl uenced by collinearity; even if the correlation between some variables (e.g. profi tability and liquidity) is positive, 
it is never above 25%.
61 The sources of data are the European Commission (taxation), fi nancial accounts (development of equity market), the World Bank, and the 
“Doing Business” project (legal system). Apart from taxation, the mean of these variables over time is used, in order to evaluate the effect 
of structural differences. Since World Bank data are only available from 2004 onwards, the mean is also extended to previous years. Other 
variables were tested, including the development of bond markets and the relevance of bank loans, but they were not always signifi cant. 
As an alternative to legal rights protection, protection of investors was used, providing similar, but less robust, results.
Table 3 Relationship between leverage 
and country characteristics
Variables Dependent 
variable: 
Country-year 
fi xed effects 
from step 1
Effect of one 
standard 
deviation
Taxation 0.539*** 0.041
(0.126)
Quoted Shares to GDP (average) -0.065*** -0.032
(0.014)
Legal rights index (average) 0.017*** 0.032
(0.005)
Insolvency years index (average) -0.036** -0.029
(0.015)
Constant 0.008
(0.112)
Observations 116
Adjusted R2 0.291
Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB 
calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The control variables are bank lending 
rates, nominal GDP growth and time dummies.
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controls, year dummies were included to take into account the dynamics over time, and nominal 
GDP growth and interest rates on bank loans were included to control for economic and fi nancial 
development across countries.62
The outcome of this second step confi rms that institutional characteristics infl uence fi rm leverage at 
the country level. A higher corporate tax rate (a measure of the debt tax shield – the fi scal advantage 
of an increase in debt owing to interest deductibility) and stronger protection of legal rights 
(a measure of the protection of creditors rights) are positively related to leverage. The development 
of equity markets (which provides a source of funds from shareholders) and a longer bankruptcy 
process (which makes it more diffi cult for creditors to recover their funds) are negatively related to 
leverage.63 The third column in the table presents a standardised measure of the economic relevance 
of each explanatory variable, expressed as the effect on the leverage of a shift by one standard 
deviation. The most economically relevant variable seems to be taxation, hence the fi scal incentives 
toward debt, as an increase of one standard deviation is related to an increase of four percentage 
points in the dependent variable (a corrected measure of the differences in leverage across 
countries).64 The absolute value of the effect of the other variables is around three percentage points; 
since they only change across countries, this measure of variation is only infl uenced by structural 
differences.
IMPACT OF THE CRISIS
In order to evaluate the possible impact of the crisis on fi rms’ levels of leverage, in this section the 
analysis is replicated using a slightly different specifi cation. In both the fi rst and second steps, the 
explanatory variables were accompanied by dummy variables indicating whether the observation 
is before or during the crisis. This allows the covariates to have different levels of infl uence on the 
level of leverage before the end of 2008 and afterwards, while not altering the set of country-time 
dummies.
The results are reported in Table 2 from the fourth column onwards. While the indicators of all 
the coeffi cients of the Tobit analysis remain unchanged in the two sub-periods, the strength of the 
impact of fi rms’ characteristics shows some differences. For example, the results indicate a wider 
discrepancy between the leverage of fi rms of different ages during the crisis. On the contrary, 
differences owing to fi rm size seem to become smaller during the crisis, and the coeffi cients of the 
time-varying fi rm characteristics show that almost all of these variables had a more limited impact 
after 2008. To sum up, the coeffi cients of the variables measuring profi ts, growth and tangibility 
are closer to zero during the crisis, and so provide less information about fi rms’ leverage. Cash is a 
notable exception, however. Indeed, the coeffi cient of fi rms’ liquidity increases, indicating a higher 
negative infl uence on leverage; it is possible that the reduced availability of liquid assets during the 
crisis made their effects on leverage relatively more important.
62 The estimated coeffi cients are not reported in the table. Both GDP growth and interest rates are positively related to leverage, and confi rm 
that it is pro-cyclical. The positive relation with GDP confi rms the pro-cyclical nature of debt, as in periods of higher growth leverage 
increases. The coeffi cient of interest rates, which is related to the risk of borrowers, probably captures the positive correlation between 
fi rms’ indebtedness and risk of bankruptcy. Additionally, real GDP growth and real interest rates on bank loans were tested, but they were 
not signifi cant. Real interest rates are only signifi cant when infl ation is added, which is the same as including nominal interest rates. Also, 
the spread between bank lending rates and the EURIBOR was considered, but this had little effect on the results.
63 These results are robust to several checks. They do not change if Cyprus is not included (because estimated values are only available for 
the period 2008-10, and are based on fewer than 105 fi rms per year), if the value of equity market developments is allowed to change over 
time, or if only disposable values for World Bank data are used.
64 The importance of taxation confi rms the results found by Bartholdy and Mateus (2008), and Pfaffermayr et al. (2008), who used data 
about manufacturing fi rms from a similar dataset. More generally, the fi ndings for taxation and other institutional factors are in line with 
the results of De Socio and Nigro (2012).
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3.3 FIRMS’ CASH MANAGEMENT POLICIES 65
This section looks at the determinants of a fi rm’s cash holdings. Like households, fi rms hold cash 
for two main reasons. First, they need cash to carry out transactions, i.e. to make payments without 
incurring the costs involved in converting non-cash assets into cash. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, fi rms hold cash as a precautionary measure, to cover against the risk of potential cash 
shortfalls; this ties in with the “pecking order” theory which explores fi rms’ decision-making with 
regard to their sources of fi nancing (see Box 3).
Within this framework, fi rms’ cash holding decisions have provided the basis for many recent 
studies, which serve as tools for analysing fi nancing constraints. If a fi rm does not face fi nancing 
constraints, it has no need to hold cash for future investment needs; hence, its cash holdings 
should not depend on either cash fl ow or cash fl ow volatility. However, if fi rms do face fi nancing 
constraints, they can decide to hold more cash to hedge against the possibility of falling short of 
cash in the future and, hence, not being able to engage in valuable investment projects. 
Chart 28 illustrates the development of the 
aggregate cash holdings ratio, calculated using 
a large sample of euro area fi rms observed 
between 2000 and 2010.66 It shows that euro 
area NFCs hold a non-negligible part of their 
assets in the form of liquid assets, in spite of 
the associated opportunity costs. Over the past 
decade, the cash holding ratio for euro area 
fi rms has fl uctuated somewhat, increasing in the 
early 2000s and subsequently decreasing, only 
to increase again in the late 2000s, in the context 
of high uncertainty and diffi culties in accessing 
external fi nancing.
By breaking down fi rms by size,67 differences in 
the level and the development of cash holdings 
can be seen. Large fi rms’ cash holdings are 
substantially lower, suggesting that these fi rms 
have easier access to external fi nancing and use 
cash more effi ciently. The steep decline in micro 
fi rms’ cash holdings before the crisis could be 
related to improvements in their access to credit. 
More recently, in the context of continued weak 
economic activity, fi rms might have increased 
65 Prepared by Luísa Farinha, Annalisa Ferrando and Carmen Martínez-Carrascal.
66 These fi gures are based on the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database, which has already been used in the previous section to analyse 
leverage. After data fi ltering, an unbalanced panel of approximately 1.5 million fi rms was obtained. See Annex 3 for the description of the 
database and the methodological notes.
67 In line with the European Commission defi nition, fi rms can be classed as micro, small, medium or large, according to the number of 
employees, turnover and total assets. See Annex 3 for the precise defi nition used in this report. Approximately 72% of the observations 
correspond to micro fi rms, while approximately 26% correspond to small and medium sized fi rms, with large fi rms comprising only 1.5% 
of all observations.
Chart 28 Euro area non-financial corporations’ 
cash holding ratio, broken down by size
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their cash balances in response to more diffi cult access to external fi nancing or as a result of a 
decision to defer their investment projects, unrelated to the existence of fi nancing constraints.
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LINK BETWEEN SIZE, CASH HOLDINGS AND CASH HOLDING 
DETERMINANTS
The need to hold cash as a precaution suggests that cash holdings are positively linked to cash 
fl ow volatility for fi rms that have a more limited access to external fi nancing (see, for example, 
Opler et al. (1999) or Han and Qiu (2007)).68 Nevertheless, there are other theoretical hypotheses 
which can be used to identify additional factors affecting fi rms’ cash holding decisions: fi nancial 
leverage (linked to the opportunity cost of holding cash); net working capital (a cash substitute); 
tangible assets (a measure of access to external fi nancing); and the sales growth rate (a measure of 
growth opportunities). The main focus of this section is then analysing the relationship between 
cash holdings, cash fl ow and cash fl ow volatility, as these factors can help to identify potential 
diffi culties in fi rms’ access to external fi nancing.
Table 4 presents the mean values of the fi rm-level variables used in the analysis, broken down by 
fi rm size. These fi gures suggest that cash holdings and cash fl ow volatility decrease with fi rm size.69 
The level of net working capital held by micro fi rms and small fi rms tends to be higher than that 
of medium-sized and large fi rms, while the opposite can be said of fi nancial leverage. The ratio 
between cash fl ow and total assets, and the sales growth are not likely to differ signifi cantly across 
fi rm size. The proportion of total assets accounted for by tangible assets is slightly higher in the 
case of large fi rms. At the fi rm level, there is also wide dispersion in the cash holding ratio, and 
its distribution appears to be strongly positively skewed (i.e. a few fi rms have a large cash holding 
ratio, but most are more moderate), which is also refl ected by the fact that the mean is almost twice 
the median. This distribution is shifted towards higher values for smaller fi rms.
In order to assess the relationship between cash holdings and several indicators of a fi rm’s fi nancial 
situation, it is useful to perform a bivariate analysis. The chosen indicators are among those 
68 For a review of recent studies analysing the impact of fi nancial frictions on corporate cash holdings, see also Denis (2011).
69 The variables described in this section are: cash holdings, defi ned as the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets; cash fl ow 
volatility, measured by dividing the standard deviation of a fi rm’s cash fl ows in the four previous years by the average cash fl ow over the 
same period; net working capital, defi ned as the ratio of stocks, accounts receivable and other current assets, minus accounts payable, cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets; fi nancial leverage, defi ned, as in the previous section, as the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to 
total assets; and sales growth, the rate of growth of operating revenues.
Table 4 Means of the firm-level variables, by firm size
(percentages)
Cash/TA CF/TA CFV NWC/TA FINLEV TANG/TA Sales growth
Micro 19.3 8.6 6.5 15.4 16.6 22.3 7.9
Small 12.8 7.7 4.0 12.8 16.6 22.0 9.7
Medium 9.1 7.2 3.4 6.6 19.9 23.1 9.5
Large 7.9 7.9 3.3 9.4 19.3 25.5 9.1
Total 17.5 8.3 5.6 14.4 16.8 22.3 8.4
Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: “Cash/TA” is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; “CF/TA” is the ratio of cash fl ow to total assets; “CFV” is the 
cash fl ow volatility, measured by dividing the standard deviation of a fi rm’s cash fl ows in the four previous years by the average cash fl ow 
over the same period; “NWC/TA” is the net working capital, defi ned as the ratio of current assets, other than cash and cash equivalents, 
minus the accounts receivables, to total assets; “FINLEV” is the fi nancial leverage defi ned, as in the previous section, as the ratio of 
short-term and long-term debt to total assets; “TANG/TA” is the fi xed tangible assets divided by total assets; and “Sales growth” is the 
rate of growth of operating revenues.
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Chart 29 Relationship between firms’ cash holding ratio and its determinants
(median values, percentages)
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presented in Table 4: cash fl ow, cash fl ow volatility, net working capital, leverage and tangible 
assets. Charts 29a-29e compare the median cash holding ratio for different corporate groupings, 
defi ned on the basis of alternative variables that are expected to infl uence cash holding levels. Each 
chart presents the median cash holding ratio for fi rms with low, medium and high levels of the 
chosen fi nancial indicator.70 Starting with net working capital, Chart 29a shows that fi rms with 
high levels of short-term assets, other than cash and its equivalents, have substantially lower cash 
holding ratios than fi rms with intermediate or low levels of short-term assets, which can be seen as 
close substitutes for cash holdings. At the disaggregated level, this is also observed in all fi rm sizes, 
but there are some differences in the relationship between cash holdings and net working capital; 
the link between them seems to be non-linear in micro fi rms and small fi rms, but this is not the case 
for medium and large fi rms (see Chart A8 in Annex 4).
Similarly, the descriptive analysis points towards there being a positive relationship between cash 
holdings and cash fl ow (see Chart 29b), although the relationship seems stronger for SMEs than 
for large fi rms (see Chart A9 in Annex 4). As cash fl ow correlates with growth opportunities, this 
positive link could partly refl ect the impact of growth opportunities on cash holdings, which might 
be greater for SMEs (see, for example, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) or Han and Qiu (2007)).
By contrast, there is a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage, a fi nancial 
indicator which increases the opportunity cost of holding cash,71 for all fi rm sizes (see Chart A29c, 
and Chart A10 in Annex 4). Cash holdings are also negatively related to the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets. Again, the link seems stronger for micro fi rms and small fi rms (see Chart A29d, 
and Chart A11 in Annex 4), which suggests that their access to external fi nancing is more strongly 
linked to collateral availability than is the case for large fi rms (as a result, fi rms with lower levels of 
assets eligible to be used as collateral might have higher cash holdings for precautionary reasons). 
Finally, this descriptive analysis points towards a clear relationship between cash holdings and cash 
fl ow volatility (see Chart 29e). When the analysis is carried out separately for each fi rm size, the 
link appears to be particularly strong for micro and small fi rms (see Chart A12 in Annex 4). 
THE LINK BETWEEN CASH HOLDINGS AND CASH HOLDING DETERMINANTS: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The determinants of cash holdings can also be analysed using regression analysis. The following 
equation is estimated, in line with the available literature:72 
Cashit ? 1CFit ? 2CFit *Dcrisist ? 3spreadct ? 4 spreadct *Dcrisist ? 5CFVit 1?
6CFVit 1*Dcrisist ? 7NWCit 1 ? 7NWCit 1*Dcrisist ? 7TAit 1 ? 7TAit 1
8SalesGrowthit 1? 8SalesGrowthit 1
9FDebtit 1 ? 9FDebtit 1*Dcrisist ? i ? t ? Sc ? it
*Dcrisist ?
*Dcrisis ?
 (1) 
70 For example, Chart 29a depicts the median cash holding ratio for fi rms within the top, median and bottom deciles of net working capital 
(the closest substitute for cash holdings). The median decile (which includes fi rms between the 45th and 55th percentiles) can be regarded 
as representative of the behaviour of an average fi rm of that size, in terms of net working capital, while the top (bottom) decile includes the 
10% of fi rms with the highest (lowest) value of this ratio.
71 On the other hand, higher leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy; hence, fi rms might try to reduce the probability of experiencing 
fi nancial distress by holding more cash. The negative link between cash holdings and leverage tends to remain when only short-term and 
long-term liabilities, rather than total indebtedness, are considered.
72 See, for instance, Martínez-Carrascal (2010).
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where Cash is the ratio between a fi rm’s holdings of cash and cash equivalents, and total assets; 
spread is the difference between the average lending rate to NFCs 73 and the market interest rate, 
measuring, at the country level, a fi rm’s opportunity cost of holding cash; CF is the ratio between a 
fi rm’s cash fl ow and total assets; CFV is a fi rm’s cash fl ow volatility, measured by dividing the 
standard deviation of a fi rm’s cash fl ows in the four previous years by the average cash fl ow over 
the same period; NWC is the ratio between net working capital and total assets; FDebt is the ratio 
between a fi rm’s fi nancial debt and total assets; TA is the proportion of a fi rm’s total assets 
accounted for by tangible fi xed assets; SalesGrowth is the growth rate of a fi rm’s sales, which 
captures a fi rm’s growth opportunities; αi , θt and Sc are a fi rm specifi c effect, a time effect, a sector 
effect and a country effect respectively; εit is the error term; Dcrisis is a dummy that takes the value 
1 from the year 2008 onwards and, otherwise, is equal to 0.
Table 5 presents the results of the econometric analysis. These results were obtained with a fi xed 
effects generalised least squares (GLS) estimator that takes unobservable fi rm-level heterogeneity 
into account. Since the role of cash holding determinants may have changed during the crisis 
(for example, determinants linked to liquidity constraints may have become more relevant), the 
specifi cation is carried out allowing for the fact that determinants may have a differential impact on 
cash holdings during the crisis period 2008-10. 
The fi rst two columns of Table 5 show the estimated coeffi cients and respective p-values obtained 
when estimating equation (1) using information on all fi rms in the sample. In these estimates, 
dummy variables, that take the value of 1 where the fi rm belongs to the size class being modelled, 
and 0 for all other size classes (micro fi rms are omitted), were added as regressors. The coeffi cients 
associated with these dummies are negative and statistically signifi cant. The absolute value of the 
magnitude of these coeffi cients decreases with fi rm size, suggesting that, all other factors being 
equal, cash holdings decrease with fi rm size. This, together with the descriptive evidence presented 
above, was the main reason behind the use of separate models for each fi rm size.
Cash fl ow and cash fl ow volatility positively affect cash holdings. Given that precaution constitutes 
a reason for holding cash, this may indicate that some fi rms have restricted access to external 
fi nancing. The results also suggest that this link has strengthened during the fi nancial crisis, as 
the incremental effects of these fi nancial variables – given by the estimated coeffi cient – are 
positive and statistically signifi cant. Leverage is negatively related to cash holdings, and its impact 
has intensifi ed during the crisis, increasing by almost 30%. This may be related to the increasing 
pressure for fi rms to deleverage. In the case of the spread, a negative and signifi cant coeffi cient was 
also obtained, but the results suggest that the negative link between both variables has diminished 
during the crisis, as fi rms have been holding increasingly less cash. Nevertheless, as the spread is 
measured at the aggregate level and a distinction is only made between small and large loans, it 
might not entirely capture the heterogeneity across fi rms; therefore, its effect should be interpreted 
with caution. As expected, the estimated coeffi cient for the ratio of tangible assets to total assets is 
negatively related to cash holdings, suggesting that the access to external fi nancing is strongly linked 
to the availability of collateral. The effect of this variable has been more signifi cant during the crisis 
(it has increased by 7%), underlining the increasingly important role that collateral availability 
has had in recent years in promoting access to external fi nancing. In line with expectations, fi rms 
holding a higher level of assets which can be considered as cash substitutes (and, therefore, those 
with a higher net working capital), hold less cash.
73 For each country and year, a different lending rate for small (less than €1 million) and large loans (more than €1 million) was used. The 
latter was used as the opportunity cost of holding cash for large fi rms, and the former the cost for all other fi rms.
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The remaining columns of Table 5 show the results of a separate estimation of the model for micro 
fi rms, SMEs and large fi rms. In line with expectations, the results indicate that the cash holdings of 
SMEs and micro fi rms are more affected by cash fl ow and cash fl ow volatility than those of large 
fi rms.74 The positive relationship between cash holdings and cash fl ow and cash fl ow volatility for 
SMEs indicates that the cost of a cash shortage is higher for fi rms with better investment 
opportunities. During the crisis, the link has intensifi ed for smaller fi rms, while it has remained 
unchanged for large fi rms. More specifi cally, the impact of cash fl ow volatility on cash holding 
ratios has increased by 20% for SMEs and by 60% for micro fi rms. These results suggest that, for 
large fi rms, access to external fi nancing has not been signifi cantly affected by the crisis, while 
concerns over a more restricted access to fi nance may have been leading smaller fi rms to accumulate 
74 Note that, in the case of large fi rms, the positive effects of cash fl ow are more likely to be the result of existing correlation between cash 
fl ow and investment opportunities, as a negative relation between sales growth and cash holdings is estimated.
Table 5 Cash holdings and firm characteristics (econometric results)
All Large fi rms SMEs 
(excluding micro)
Micro fi rms Statistical 
difference 
Large fi rms 
compared 
with SMEs
Statistical 
difference 
SMEs 
compared with 
micro fi rms
coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value p-value p-value
CF/Total assetsit 0.162 0.00 0.075 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.005
CF/Total assetsit* Dcrisis 0.043 0.00 0.006 0.582 0.033 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.004 0.000
Spreadit -0.445 0.00 0.113 0.460 -0.745 0.000 0.068 0.231 0.000 0.000
Spreadit* Dcrisis 0.172 0.00 0.925 0.000 0.298 0.000 -0.080 0.057 0.000 0.000
CFVit 0.095 0.00 0.066 0.001 0.100 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.023 0.017
CFVit* Dcrisis 0.046 0.00 0.015 0.527 0.020 0.010 0.052 0.000 0.217 0.000
NWC/Total assetsit-1 -0.024 0.00 -0.043 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000
NWC/Total 
assetsit-1*Dcrisis -0.016 0.00 -0.002 0.555 -0.018 0.000 -0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial debt/
Total assetsit-1 -0.036 0.00 -0.023 0.000 -0.030 0.000 -0.036 0.000 0.018 0.000
Financial debt/
Total assetsit-1*Dcrisis -0.010 0.00 0.005 0.144 -0.003 0.015 -0.016 0.000 0.008 0.000
Tangible asssets/
Total assetsit-1 -0.123 0.00 -0.085 0.000 -0.101 0.000 -0.129 0.000 0.007 0.000
Tangible asssets/
Total assetsit-1*Dcrisis -0.008 0.00 0.001 0.840 -0.008 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.033
Sales growthit-1 0.005 0.00 -0.004 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sales growthit-1*Dcrisis -0.006 0.00 0.000 0.969 -0.004 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.040 0.000
Dummy small fi rms -0.0005 0.09
Dummy medium-sized 
fi rms -0.0027 0.00
Dummy large fi rms -0.0115 0.00
Dummy small* Dcrisis -0.0078 0.0000
Dummy medium sized* 
Dcrisis -0.0102 0.0000
Dummy large*Dcrisis -0.0095 0.0000
Notes:Estimations by random-effects GLS regressor with robust standard errors; all equations include time, economic sector and 
country dummies.
Spreadit: opportunity cost of holding cash measured by the difference between the average lending rate to NFCs in each country and a 
market interest rate.
CF/Total assetsit=Cash-Flowt/(0.5*Total assetsit+0.5*Total assetsit-1).
CFVit: standard deviation of fi rms’ cash-fl ows in the four previous years divided by the average cash-fl ow over the same period. 
The null hypothesis of the test of the statistical difference between coeffi cients of different sizes is that the coeefi cients are equal.
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more cash in response to higher cash fl ow volatility or cash fl ow levels. The positive link between 
growth opportunities (proxied by sales growth) and cash holdings has diminished during the crisis, 
both for SMEs and micro fi rms. 
The results also indicate that higher levels of leverage, brought about by increasing the opportunity 
cost of holding cash, are negatively related to cash holdings for all fi rm sizes, the link being stronger 
in the case of smaller fi rms. Surprisingly, the estimated coeffi cient for the spread measuring the 
opportunity cost of holding cash is negative and signifi cant only in the case of SMEs. The estimated 
coeffi cient for the ratio of tangible assets to total assets is larger, in absolute terms, for micro fi rms 
and SMEs. This may suggest that smaller fi rms’ access to external fi nancing is more strongly linked 
to the availability of collateral than that of large fi rms, in line with the evidence found in Coluzzi, 
Ferrando and Martínez-Carrascal (2012). According to these results, the link between cash holdings 
and collateral has strengthened during the crisis period for SMEs and micro fi rms (it has increased 
by 7.7% and 4.4% respectively), while it has not changed signifi cantly for large fi rms. Finally, in 
line with expectations, fi rms of all sizes holding a higher level of assets which can be considered as 
cash substitutes (and, therefore, those with a higher net working capital) hold more cash.
3.4 FIRMS’ INVESTMENT DECISIONS 75
In this section, the focus is on the link between the fi nancial positions of fi rms, as described in 
the previous sections, and their investment plans. In particular, the role of indebtedness, the debt 
servicing burden, cash fl ow and cash holding in explaining a fi rm’s capital formation is analysed, 
along with the extent to which this role depends on fi rm size.
In recent years, a large body of literature has provided evidence that credit market imperfections, 
such as asymmetric information problems, result in a wedge being created between the cost of funds 
raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (i.e. retained earnings). 
This wedge (the “external fi nance premium”) depends on the borrower’s fi nancial position, meaning 
that a fi rm’s fi nancial situation is relevant to its investment decisions.76 In particular, higher debt 
servicing payments or leverage, or lower cash fl ow or cash holdings will have a negative impact on 
a fi rm’s creditworthiness and, everything being equal, will increase the external fi nance premium 
and reduce the demand for external fi nancing.
The fi nancial crisis led to an unprecedented drop in aggregate investment in the euro area in 2009; 
gross fi xed capital formation declined by 13% in real terms between 2008 and 2009. A strand of the 
analysis of the latest fi nancial crisis indicates that supply-driven credit contraction, not linked to 
decreased borrower creditworthiness, had a real effect on fi rms, forcing them to reduce investment.77 
However, additional adverse developments in the real economy may have brought about reductions 
in credit, largely driven by a contraction in demand. A second strand of the analysis focuses more 
on the detection of the demand shocks that led to the decreased cash fl ows, loss of investment 
opportunities and weakened balance sheets.78
75 Prepared by Annalisa Ferrando and Carmen Martínez-Carrascal.
76 See Martínez-Carrascal and Ferrando (2008) for a review of the literature.
77 Buca and Vermeulen (2011) fi nd, in particular, that the drop in bank credit has brought about real effects for private euro area fi rms 
and has not simply led to a weakening of fi rms’ balance sheets. Gaiotti (2013) then fi nds that the impact of bank credit availability on a 
fi rm’s investment is time dependent and most signifi cant in periods of contraction in economic activity, particularly at the beginning of a 
recession.
78 This is the result of Kahle and Stulz (2011) who argued that demand shocks and increased uncertainty were the major causes of the 
reduction in investment for public US fi rms in 2009.
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While the issue of whether the collapse of investment in 2009 was caused mostly by cyclical supply 
or demand factors, or by an abnormal decline in credit supply – unlinked to credit fundamentals – is 
still open to debate, it is recognised that a fi rm’s fi nancial position affected its real decisions.
In this section, the focus is on four indicators of a fi rm’s fi nancial position: cash fl ow, cash holdings, 
leverage and debt servicing payments. Their relationship with investment has been analysed 
at length, notably in the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988) on the cash fl ow sensitivity of 
investment as an indicator of fi nancially constrained fi rms; that of Meyers (1977) on debt overhang 
models predicting that a debt burden may be so large that a company cannot take on additional debt 
to fi nance future projects, even those that are profi table enough to enable the fi rm to reduce its debt 
levels over time; and, fi nally, that of Whited (1992), who found that fi rms with higher leverage 
and a higher ratio of interest expenses to cash fl ow have a higher investment cash fl ow sensitivity. 
Finally, as explained in Section 3.3, fi rms that face fi nancing constraints may decide to increase 
their fi nancial cushion, or cash holdings, in order to hedge future investment.
The section particularly focuses on differences in the link between the fi nancial position and 
investment ratio of fi rms of varying sizes. There are compelling reasons as to why the external 
fi nance premium increases as fi rm size decreases and, hence, as to why fi nancial factors appear to 
have a large impact on investment decisions – this is mainly due to the specifi cities of their fi nancing. 
First, small fi rms are often believed to be more opaque and to have a higher risk of failure than large 
fi rms. Second, small fi rms are often young and have not had the time to build up a track record 
and reputation. Small fi rms more frequently have recourse to banks for their external fi nancing 
needs, although from the bank’s perspective (i.e. on the supply side), the costs involved in assessing 
and setting appropriate risk premia, and the relatively high costs involved in monitoring risk, may 
hinder the fl ow of funds to small fi rms. This all then suggests that small fi rms’ credit sources 
tend to dry up more rapidly during economic downturns than those of large fi rms (Fazzari et al. 
(1988), Duchin et al. (2010)), thereby more severely hampering small fi rms’ investment. 
THE LINK BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL PRESSURE INDICATORS 
The descriptive analysis in this section is based on the same fi rm-level dataset, derived from 
the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database, used previously in the analyses of the determinants of 
leverage and cash holdings. The fi nal sample used here is relatively small owing to the fact that the 
investment ratio – defi ned as the change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total 
assets – is not always available for all the fi rms in the sample.
A simple way to obtain evidence of how a fi rm’s fi nancial position affects its investment is to plot 
how the investment rate varies across fi rms facing different degrees of fi nancial pressure. For this 
purpose, Charts 30a-d compare the median level investment ratio for three corporate groupings, 
which are defi ned on the basis of fi rms’ fi nancial positions. 
Chart 30a shows the development of the median investment rate for fi rms with high cash fl ow to asset 
ratios (above the 90th percentile), medium cash fl ow (fi rms for which this ratio stands between the 
45th and the 55th percentiles) and low cash fl ow (lower decile).79 There is a clear relationship between 
cash fl ow and a fi rm’s demand for capital, as fi rms with a higher level of cash fl ow with respect to 
their assets show higher investment rates. Chart 30b shows that fi rms with higher levels of liquidity on 
their balance sheets at the start of a given year show higher investment rates in the same year.
79 In order to reduce any possible endogeneity, the comparison is made between investment rates and measures of the indicators lagged 
one period.
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Although debt may have some desirable properties in that it allows projects to be fi nanced in the 
absence of internal resources, the repayment commitment may have an overall negative infl uence 
on fi rms’ spending decisions and their ability to raise new funds. The descriptive evidence shown 
in Charts 30c and 30d seems to point in this direction: fi rms that have high levels of debt or 
high interest payment ratios have the lowest investment rates. In addition, there is a non-linear 
relationship between fi nancial pressure and fi xed capital formation; fi rms with low leverage or 
interest payment burdens have similar investment ratios, while highly leveraged fi rms or those that 
bear a high interest payment burden have much lower investment ratios. This may suggest that 
there is a threshold above which fi nancial pressure becomes more relevant in that it conditions 
fi rms’ investment decisions in a more signifi cant manner, and below which fi nancial pressure is less 
relevant as a determinant of fi xed capital formation decisions. Interestingly, this non-monotonic 
relationship between investment and the ratio of interest payments to earnings may be weakening 
Charts 30 Development of investment ratio and measures of financial position
(median values; percentages)
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Notes: In Chart 30c, “i.p.” stands for “interest payment”. The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high cash fl ow, cash 
holdings and interest payment burden (above the 90th percentile); medium cash fl ow, cash holdings and interest payment burden (between 
the 45th and 55th percentiles); and low cash fl ow, cash holdings and interest payment burden (lower decile). Given that over 50% of 
companies show zero leverage, the groupings in Chart 30d are defi ned as follows: no leverage, low leverage (25% of indebted companies 
with the lowest leverage) and high leverage (25% of indebted companies with the highest leverage).The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change of tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets. Cash fl ow is the ratio of post-tax profi ts plus the depreciation of 
fi xed assets to total assets; cash holdings are defi ned as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; the interest payment burden 
is defi ned as the ratio of interest payments to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation plus fi nancial revenues to total 
assets; and leverage is defi ned as fi nancial leverage divided by total assets.
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during the crisis as, from 2009 onwards, the investment rates of fi rms with a low and medium 
interest payment burden also differ.
In Annex 5, the differences in the investment rates of fi rms facing different degrees of fi nancial 
pressure in the major euro area countries (Charts A13-A17) and across fi rm size (Charts A18-A22) 
are reported.
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON INVESTMENT RATES AND FIRMS’ FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 
In the recent context of higher risk aversion and greater diffi culties for credit institutions in raising 
funds, a fi rm’s fi nancial position is likely to have played a more relevant role in determining its 
access to external fi nancing and in explaining both the recent decline in investment rates and the 
historic magnitude of the collapse in investment in 2009.
In an effort to explore the role played by a fi rm’s fi nancial position, Charts A23-A26 in Annex 5 
compare the development of investment rates of fi rms that showed a high degree of fi nancial 
pressure in 2008, i.e. just before the strong decline in investment. Chart A23 shows the investment 
rates for the micro, small, medium and large fi rms that, in 2008, had a high, medium or low cash 
fl ow. For all fi rm sizes, the percentage decline in investment rates in 2009 was the highest for fi rms 
facing higher fi nancial pressures, although it was more marked for smaller fi rms. Moreover, the 
investment rate of micro companies in the highest decile of the ratio of interest payment to earnings 
distribution showed an 88% (2.4 percentage points) decline in 2009 while, for those in the lowest 
decile, the decline was more moderate (33% or 2.8 percentage points). For large fi rms, the reduction 
was more evenly distributed, although the decline was sharper for those bearing a higher interest 
payment burden (i.e. 45% as opposed to 31%, where the decline was of 10 percentage points as 
opposed to 9.3 percentage points respectively). The decline in investment rates was larger for the 
micro and small companies that showed lower shares of trade credit on their balance sheets before 
the collapse (i.e. 85% and 71%, showing a decline of 2.6 percentage points and 11.8 percentage 
points respectively). This was not the case for medium and large fi rms, and therefore suggests that 
smaller fi rms may have used trade credit as a substitute for bank lending during the crisis, in order 
to avoid more substantial declines in their investment rates at a time when access to bank loan 
fi nancing was more diffi cult (see Chart A27 in Annex 5 80). 
Interestingly, the evidence in the charts also indicates that the thresholds above which fi rms’ 
fi nancial positions become relevant determinants of their investment rates could have changed 
during the crisis. This increases their relevance as a factor conditioning fi xed capital formation in 
the case of smaller fi rms. While small fi rms with low and medium debt levels and interest payment 
ratios had similar investment ratios in the years prior to the crisis, the decline in investment rates 
has been more acute for fi rms under an intermediate level of fi nancial pressure. Hence, fi nancial 
pressures seem to have become a more discriminatory factor with regard to investment for smaller 
fi rms during the crisis, as their relationship now seems more monotonic. 
Table 6 presents non-parametric results for the relationship between investment and fi nancial 
pressure in 2008. In line with the descriptive exercise above, fi rms are grouped into three subsets, 
depending on whether they show a low, intermediate or high level of fi nancial pressure, according 
to a given indicator, before the investment collapse in 2009. For each of these corporate groupings, 
a cross-sectional average of the investment rate in the period 2007-08 is computed and subtracted 
from the investment rate in 2009. A test is then performed to check whether there are differences in 
80 Chart A28 in Annex 5 shows the impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a fi rm’s fi nancial position across countries.
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the decline of investment rates across fi rms with different fi nancial positions before the investment 
collapse. The results in Table 6 indicate that, for micro fi rms and small fi rms, the decline was 
more signifi cant for those with lower cash holdings, lower cash fl ow and a higher interest payment 
burden. The results were similar for medium fi rms, except in the case of interest payment burdens, 
where the decline was less signifi cant for fi rms with a high interest payment burden. The decline in 
investment rates for large companies was not statistically different for fi rms facing different degrees 
of fi nancial pressure, according to these indicators. For all corporate groupings, more indebted 
companies have adjusted their investment rates to a greater extent. Similarly, in the case of micro 
fi rms and small fi rms, the decline in investment rates was greater for fi rms with lower shares of 
trade credit on their balance sheets; this was not the case for medium and large fi rms. This may well 
signal that, in a context of increasingly diffi cult access to external fi nancing, smaller fi rms relied on 
trade credit to a greater extent in order to avoid sudden adjustments in their spending levels.
3.5 ANALYSIS OF FIRMS’ FINANCING DECISIONS USING SURVEY DATA 81
Two main approaches to identifying fi nancially constrained fi rms can be found in the literature. 
As in Fazzari et al. (1988), many papers use data from balance sheets and fi nancial statements, 
together with a priori assumptions to distinguish fi nancially constrained and unconstrained fi rms. 
These assumptions typically rely on arguments related to information asymmetries and information 
costs, implying that smaller and younger fi rms are more likely to be fi nancially constrained. Such 
a classifi cation, however, is rough and imperfect (Beck et al. (2006)). A second strand of the 
literature uses fi rms’ answers to specialised surveys in which fi rms directly report their perception 
of fi nancing constraints and/or the outcome of their application for external fi nancing. In particular, 
81 Prepared by Ladislav Wintr, Annalisa Ferrando and Fergal McCann.
Table 6 Test on the mean decline in investment rates for different corporate groupings, 
broken down by size
Firms with low 
cash holding 
in 2008
Firms with high 
cash holding 
in 2008
Probability that 
both means are 
equal
Firms with low 
cash fl ow in 2008
Firms with high 
cash fl ow in 2008
Probability that 
both means 
are equal
micro -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 0.02
small -0.14 -0.06 0.00 -0.15 -0.12 0.00
medium -0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.18 -0.14 0.00
large -0.11 -0.09 0.24 -0.12 -0.14 0.26
Firms with zero 
leverage in 2008
Firms with high 
leverage in 2008
Probability that 
both means are 
equal
Firms with low 
interest payment 
burden in 2008
Firms with high 
interest payment 
burden in 2008
Probability that 
both means 
are equal
micro -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 0.00
small -0.08 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 0.00
medium -0.12 -0.16 0.00 -0.11 -0.15 0.97
large -0.11 -0.14 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 0.77
Firms with low 
trade  credit 
in 2008
Firms with high 
trade credit 
in 2008
Probability that 
both means 
are equal
micro -0.09 -0.07 0.00
small -0.17 -0.09 0.00
medium -0.14 -0.13 0.20
large -0.09 -0.08 0.23
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data on credit applications allow credit demand to be disentangled from supply-side considerations. 
Moreover, when cross-country survey data are available, their use can greatly improve the 
identifi cation of credit supply restrictions in one particular country, by using neighbouring countries 
as benchmark cases. Beck et al. (2006, 2008) show that age, size and ownership structure are indeed 
important predictors of a fi rm’s fi nancing obstacles. Moreover, fi nancial, economic and institutional 
developments seem to alleviate fi nancing constraints. Coluzzi et al. (2012) fi nd signifi cant sectoral 
differences, with fi rms in the manufacturing and construction sectors being the most constrained. 
However, the importance of the economic sector and fi rm size varies substantially across studies 
and countries.82 
In this section, the information derived from the survey on the access to fi nance of SMEs in the euro 
area (SAFE) is considered. The survey has been conducted every six months since 2009, covering a 
sample of more than 7,000 fi rms in the euro area.83 First, the cross-country differences in external 
fi nancing needs and availability in the euro area are assessed. Second, following Ferrando et al. 
(2013), fi rms’ responses to the change in fi nancing needs and availability are combined in order to 
construct an indicator of the fi nancing gap.84 Third, focusing more on the infl uence of credit supply 
on the availability of external fi nancing for SMEs, the issue of whether changes in lending policies 
during the latest fi nancial crisis were justifi ed by a worsening of demand factors is investigated 
more extensively.
FINANCING NEEDS AND AVAILABILITY
To assess changes in fi nancing needs and availability, questions 5 and 9 of the SAFE survey 
respectively are used. These questions ask fi rms to assess whether their fi nancing needs for various 
fi nancing instruments and the availability of the respective instruments have increased, remained 
unchanged or decreased during the previous six months. Since the third wave, which covered the 
period from March 2010 to September 2010, six fi nancing instruments have been considered, among 
which the three most popular (bank loans, bank overdrafts and trade credit) have been chosen.85
Charts 31-33 show the net percentages 86 of changes in fi nancing needs and availability in terms of 
bank loans (see Chart 31), bank overdrafts, credit lines and credit card overdrafts (see Chart 32), 
and trade credit (see Chart 33). As regards bank loans, Chart 31 shows a declining trend in the net 
percentage of fi rms reporting an increase in fi nancing needs over the previous six months, for the 
euro area as a whole, since 2010. In some countries, however, needs remained high (as in Greece 
and Italy) or were rising (as in Portugal). As for bank overdrafts (see Chart 32), fi rm needs slightly 
increased over the survey period at the euro area level, masking higher needs in Italy, Greece and 
France. In the case of trade credit (see Chart 33), the net percentage of fi rms reporting an increase in 
their needs remained broadly unchanged in the sample period. 
Charts 31-33 also show whether the increasing fi nancing needs coincide with an improved supply 
of external fi nance. It appears that, while the external fi nancing needs have followed an upward 
trend at the euro area level since 2010, the availability of all three types of external fi nancing has 
82 See Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011), and Ferrando and Mulier (2013). 
83 Although the survey was only started in 2009, it conveys useful information about the impact of the fi nancial and economic crisis on the 
access to fi nance, as seen by SMEs. For further details see:
 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html
84 The fi nancing gap indicator based on the SAFE survey differs from the fi nancing gap indicator based on the euro area accounts, 
as presented in Section 1.2.
85 The remaining fi nancing instruments, i.e. equity and debt securities, among others, are considered as inapplicable by a large number of fi rms.
86 Net percentages are defi ned as the difference between the percentage of fi rms reporting an increase and those reporting a decrease in a 
specifi c instrument over the six months preceding the moment in which the survey was carried out.
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been decreasing. Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
stand out as the countries showing the largest 
decline in the availability of external fi nancing 
in the last survey wave between October 2012 
and March 2013. The availability of external 
fi nancing has also been worsening signifi cantly 
in Italy and the Netherlands since 2011; although, 
a slight recovery can be seen in the period since 
the last quarter of 2012.
The evidence presented so far suggests 
potentially large fi nancing mismatches, although 
it is not clear whether fi rms reporting increasing 
fi nancing needs considered the availability of 
external fi nance to be increasing or decreasing. 
To avoid any potentially biased conclusions, the 
indicators of both fi nancing need and availability 
at the fi rm level have been combined and an 
indicator of fi nancing gap changes, in line with 
Ferrando et al. (2013), has been constructed. For 
each of the three fi nancing instruments 
considered, the indicator of a perceived 
fi nancing gap change takes the value of 1 (-1) if 
the need increases (decreases) and availability 
Chart 31 Need for and availability 
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Notes: Data refer to SMEs only. Net percentages are defi ned 
as the difference between the percentage of fi rms reporting an 
increase for a given instrument and those reporting a decrease. 
The period represented is 2010-12 and all data refer to the 
six months preceding the moment in which the survey was 
carried out. Data for bank overdrafts are available from 2010. 
EA denotes euro area.
Chart 32 Need for and availability of bank 
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Chart 33 Need for and availability of trade 
credit
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decreases (increases). If fi rms perceive only a one-sided increase (decrease) in the fi nancing gap, 
the variable is assigned a value of 0.5 (-0.5).87 A positive value suggests an increasing fi nancing gap.
Chart 34 depicts changes in the composite fi nancing gap indicator, which is the average change 
in the fi nancing gap for the instruments relevant to each fi rm.88 It shows that the fi nancing gap 
for the euro area generally increased throughout the sample period. However, it increased by a 
smaller amount in the last quarter of 2012.89 After the third quarter of 2010, there was an increasing 
mismatch between fi nancing needs and availability in most countries, except in Germany, Austria 
and Ireland.90 However, the results have to be interpreted with caution as, fi rst, they refl ect fi rms’ 
perceptions and, second, countries with the largest fi nancing gap were among those showing the 
fastest growth in credit given to NFCs before the crisis. While the perceived fi nancing gap in these 
countries may refl ect a healthy adjustment process and a move towards sustainable credit growth 
rates, the survey shows a deterioration of banks’ willingness to supply loans to SMEs. The results 
support the view that small corporations have found access to bank credit more diffi cult, especially 
in Greece, Portugal and Italy throughout the crisis.
87 For more details on the construction of the fi nancing gap indicator, see Ferrando et al. (2013).
88 The composite measure FinGapi of the perceived change in the overall gap in the external fi nancing of an individual fi rm i is the average 
of the fi nancing gap indicators taken across instruments relevant to the respective fi rms (i.e. those with previous experience with the 
specifi c fi nancing instrument):
?FinGapi ? InstrGapj,i
OvD
j=BL
?
k
where k equals the number of relevant external fi nancing instruments and j includes bank loans, trade credit, equity, debt securities and 
bank overdrafts, where relevant.
89 Changes in the fi nancing gap indicator cannot be readily cumulated because the SAFE survey does not have a panel structure and the 
possible answers to the questions are fi xed (increase/decrease/no change).
90 Ireland still records relatively large increases in the fi nancing gap change indicator. Results for small countries should be interpreted with 
caution owing to the small number of fi rms in the survey sample.
Chart 34 Changes in the composite financing gap indicator
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As the SAFE survey does not provide information about the quality of potential borrowers, the 
issue of whether these banking practices went beyond justifi ed credit risk considerations cannot 
be assessed. In the box below, the issue of whether the recent lending policies across euro area 
countries were justifi ed by the deterioration in fi rms’ fi nancial situations and, hence, in demand is 
examined.
Box 4
IDENTIFYING RESTRICTIVE LENDING PRACTICES IN THE EURO AREA USING DATA FROM THE SAFE 
SURVEY
Survey data has enjoyed a prominent role in the literature on fi nancial constraints as it provides 
direct information on the credit constraints faced by fi rms. In particular, data on credit 
applications allows credit demand to be disentangled from supply-side considerations in that 
if, when controlling for a set of borrower-side explanatory factors, the likelihood of credit 
restrictions in one country remains positive and signifi cant, it is said that there is evidence of 
supply-side credit tightening. In this box, the biannual SAFE data for four waves of the survey, 
covering the period between September 2010 and September 2012, are used to identify credit 
supply restrictions across eleven euro area countries.1 The dependent variable (bank rejection) 
in the analysis is a dummy which takes the value 0 when a fi rm has successfully applied for a 
bank loan or an overdraft, or has received more than 75% of the desired amount, and the value 
of 1 when a fi rm has applied for a bank loan but its application has been rejected. Rejected fi rms 
include those rejected outright, those offered less than 75% of the desired amount, and those 
which refuse the loan offer owing to unfavourable attached conditions. 
There are then two stages to the methodology.2 In stage one, the dependent variable (bank 
rejection) is used in a probit regression of the form:
Pr(bank rejection ijkt) = fn(fi rm size, turnover, subsidiary dummy, age dummy, change in 
internal funds, change in capital position, change in credit history, sector dummies, Φ_jt) (1)
Where bank rejection ijkt is the credit condition response of fi rm i in country j in sector k at time t.
The explanatory variables are categorical and found in the SAFE survey data. The sector 
dummies are: mining, construction, industry, wholesale and retail, transport, real estate and 
services. Φ_jt, the key variable in the equation, is a vector of the country-time specifi c dummies. 
The probit model in (1) is estimated with standard errors clustered within each country-time 
period, and the coeffi cients of each of the Φ_jt variables relative to Germany, from March 2010 
to September 2010, are retrieved. These can be thought of as the probability of a fi rm’s request 
for credit being rejected in a given country-time period, when controlling for a set of proxies for 
fi rm performance and riskiness. Table A reports the estimated results from stage one. Firms with 
fewer employees have a higher probability of having their application for a bank loan rejected in 
the period under consideration. At the same time, the availability of capital, and improvements 
1 The 11 euro area countries are: Belgium, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland. The fi rst three waves of the survey (from 2009 to mid-2010) are not used, owing to a large increase in the sample size in the 
smaller countries from the fourth wave onwards.
2 See Holton et al. (2012).
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in a fi rm’s credit history, reduce the likelihood of a rejection. The country-wave fi xed effects are 
highly statistically signifi cant in all but two cases. 
It is plausible that borrower characteristics are not representative of the full information set held 
by a bank making a lending decision. The broader economic prospects are also likely to impact 
on bank lending, above and beyond the SME characteristics identifi ed in (1). Stage two of the 
procedure takes the coeffi cients for each Φ_jt variable and relates them to the following set of 
macro-factors:
Φ_jt = Domestic demand, the ratio of private debt to GDP, ten-year government bond yields, 
expected default frequency, credit standards, credit standards reasons.3 (2)
These variables should depict the macroeconomic environment faced by SMEs in each country 
between 2010 and 2012. They should control for economic factors (“domestic demand”) and 
the impact of leveraged individuals and fi rms on the overall willingness of banks to lend (“the 
ratio of private debt to GDP”), as well as banks’ funding costs (related to sovereign costs, 
ten-year government bond yields,). “Expected default frequency” (EDF) is a measure of the 
forward-looking probability of default of large companies in each country, which translates into 
an implied risk of default. “Credit standards” is a measure of the increasingly tightened credit 
standards taken from the bank lending survey, while banks’ responses to the impact of the “risk 
on collateral demanded” and the “industry-specifi c outlook”, also taken from the bank lending 
survey, are used as proxies for macroeconomic prospects.
Table B shows the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Countries with domestic 
economies that are performing better are associated with lower probabilities of rejection, while 
3 “Domestic demand” is equal to the sum of consumption, government expenditure on goods and services, and gross domestic 
fi xed capital formation. “Private debt” is the total indebtness of the private sector and comprises loans and debt securities. Data on 
“ten-year government bonds” are taken from Thomson Reuters, while the “expected default frequency” (EDF) is the median value of 
the distribution provided by Moody’s KMV. “Credit standards” is a variable derived from the ECB’s bank lending survey; when this 
variable is increasing, it shows that banks are reporting an increased tightening of credit standards. Banks also reported, again in the 
bank lending survey, that both “risk on collateral demanded” and the “industry-specifi c outlook” have an impact on credit tightening; 
when these two variables are increasing, the impact is greater. All fi gures are taken from the end of the six-month period.
Table A Marginal effects from the firm-level stage one probit regression. Dependent variable: 
bank rejection dummy
Ln(Employment) -0.012** Unchanged internal funds -0.043***
(0.005) (0.011)
Turnover under 2m -0.030* Improved credit history -0.129***
(0.017) (0.012)
Turnover 2-10m -0.055*** Unchanged credit history -0.128***
(0.021)  (0.012)
Turnover 10-50m -0.068** Improved capital position -0.059***
(0.033) (0.015)
Subsidiary dummy 0.014 Unchanged capital position -0.060***
(0.025) (0.013)
Age > 10 years -0.001*
(0.000)
N 6,565 Pseudo R2 0.1233
The vector of 44 country-wave fi xed effects and seven sector fi xed effects are included in the specifi cation.
Notes: t statistics are given in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. “m” stands for million. The dependent variable is the bank 
rejection dummy. 
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countries with a more leveraged private 
sector are associated with higher probabilities 
of rejection. In the univariate estimation, 
government bond yields, EDF, the “risk on 
collateral demanded” and tightening owing to 
the “industry-specifi c outlook” also increase 
the probability of bank rejection, as predicted. 
When all factors are included in a single 
model (see column (8) in Table B), the only 
macro variables with a signifi cant expected 
coeffi cient are domestic demand and the ratio 
of private debt to GDP.
The residuals from the OLS estimation are 
plotted in order to show that a tightening of 
bank lending policies can be inferred from 
the survey data. These residuals represent 
bank rejection unexplained by relevant 
macroeconomic factors, once borrower 
characteristics have been taken into account, 
and are plotted in Chart A. The country waves 
with a positive residual are the markets in 
which rejection remains higher than predicted 
by the model. 
Table B Impact of macro variables on the probability of bank rejection, Φ_jt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Domestic demand change -0.146*** -0.0971**
(-5.30) (-2.49)
Ratio of private debt to GDP 0.522*** 0.407***
(6.64) (3.74)
Ten-year government bond 0.0475*** -0.0289
(4.39) (-0.83)
Expected default frequency 0.0795*** 0.0395
(3.65) (0.66)
Credit standards 0.00262 -0.000005
(0.96) (-0.00)
Risk on collateral demanded 0.0113*** 0.00345
(3.68) (0.76)
Industry-specifi c outlook 0.00491* -0.00345
(1.84) (-0.77)
Constant 0.189*** -0.856*** -0.0571 0.0928 0.181* 0.0259 0.0904 -0.483**
(3.23) (-5.21) (-0.62) (1.18) (1.91) (0.29) (0.83) (-2.11)
N 40 40 43 43 43 43 43 40
R2 0.4254 0.5371 0.3197 0.2450 0.0222 0.2485 0.0762 0.6682
Notes: t statistics are given in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The sample size is smaller in columns (1), (2) and (8) owing 
to missing information for Greece.
Chart A Bank rejections at the country 
level unexplained by borrower and 
macroeconomic factors
(residuals from OLS estimation)
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4 FIRMS’ FINANCING CONDITIONS, INDEBTEDNESS AND THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT91 
How did fi nancing conditions and debt patterns for the corporate sector interact with the 
macroeconomic environment, prior to and during the fi nancial crisis? To what extent did this 
interaction add to instability? Has the corporate sector’s behavioural response to various shocks 
been a mitigating factor or a fi scal drag for the euro area economy during the fi nancial crisis? 
In attempting to shed light on these issues, the assessment in this chapter is centred on two distinct, 
yet interrelated, parts. In Section 3.1, the relevance of the intermediation process in the banking 
system in determining the terms and conditions for corporate sector fi nancing is acknowledged. The 
emphasis is on economic activity in the broad sense and the fact that the latest fi nancial crisis serves 
as a stark reminder of the importance of fi nancing and credit frictions for investment decisions. 
Banks’ balance sheet and capital positions, and borrower credit risk are considered to be relevant 
supply-side factors in the provision of bank credit during the crisis. In particular, credit supply 
factors are found to account for almost one-third of the contraction in real GDP at the peak of the 
crisis. At the same time, in such periods of tightening bank lending conditions, the substitutability of 
bank credit with alternative sources of fi nancing (see Chapter 1) appears to have prevented an even 
more pronounced contraction in investment and, hence, in economic activity. More importantly, 
the ECB’s monetary policy has proved to be effective in containing any disorderly deleveraging of 
banks and thus in avoiding an even more abrupt credit crunch. 
In Section 3.2, the focus is primarily on the corporate sector’s debt cycle from a medium-term 
perspective. The latest euro area crisis is fi rst contextualised with regard to broader international 
and historical crisis episodes. The result shows that the key aspect to understanding the severity 
of the crisis and future economic patterns is the particularly intense accumulation of debt in some 
euro area economies. A number of economic factors played a role in the formation of such a debt 
overhang. Subdued uncertainty, widespread under-pricing of risk and loose fi nancing conditions in 
some countries appear to have created a self-reinforcing feedback loop in which macroeconomic 
imbalances (in the form of excessive borrowing in the corporate sector and over-investment in 
selected euro area economies) built up. As predicted by theoretical insights and empirical evidence, 
the excessive rise in leverage sowed the seed for the fi nancial crisis and conditioned the severity of 
the downturn; investment (and output) losses were generally commensurate with the intensity of 
corporate debt accumulation prior to the crisis. Indebtedness ratios began to decline only later on in 
the recession, and the decline has been sharper in those euro area countries which had experienced 
intense debt accumulation in the run-up to the crisis. Nonetheless, there is signifi cant heterogeneity 
across countries in terms of the level of indebtedness and also in the pace of deleveraging during 
the crisis. Further deleveraging of NFCs is expected in the future in the euro area, specifi cally 
in selected countries, as fi rms attempt to repair their balance sheet vulnerabilities. The extent to 
which the corrective adjustments represent a drag on the economy in the transition towards more 
sustainable debt levels depends primarily on the macroeconomic channels through which the 
adjustment process may occur. Reduction of indebtedness brought about by bank constraints on 
the provision of new credit or corporate decisions to scale back investments could prove to be very 
costly for the economy at large.
91 Coordinated by Giacomo Carboni.
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4.1 FINANCING CONDITIONS AND THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
In this section, the focus is on the role of the banking system as an intermediary and its importance 
in determining the terms and conditions for corporate sector fi nancing. This is particularly the case 
for the euro area, where bank-based fi nancing is the predominant source of external debt fi nancing. 
The recent banking crisis has led to tight credit supply restrictions which, in turn, have weighed 
heavily on economic activity. At a time of tight bank credit conditions, a fi rm’s ability to shift 
from bank credit to other fi nancing instruments has helped to mitigate disruptions to corporate 
investment patterns, and economic activity more broadly.
BANK INTERMEDIATION AND THE GREAT RECESSION92
When characterising bank intermediation and lending activity, the latest fi nancial crisis is of 
particular relevance, given the importance of fi nancing and credit frictions for investment decisions 
and economic activity more broadly. Financial frictions, in their multifaceted forms, make credit 
market conditions key drivers of the business cycle, not merely a refl ection of changing economic 
dynamics, as implied by the standard Modigliani-Miller paradigm (1958). In the literature on credit 
market frictions, two distinct and yet complementary perspectives are typically identifi ed: the bank 
lending channel and the balance sheet channel.93 This distinction is based on the premise that 
fi nancial frictions are situated primarily on the side of fi nancial institutions or borrowers (i.e. fi rms 
or households), with both affecting credit supply decisions. This theoretical distinction is used here 
in organising selected empirical evidence on the euro area. The investigation focuses on the extent 
to which credit supply factors, determined by the balance sheets of lenders or borrowers, affect the 
provision of bank credit and, hence, economic activity.
THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL 
When examining credit market frictions through the bank lending channel, it holds that banks’ 
balance sheet conditions have a substantial infl uence on the volumes, price and non-price conditions 
for bank credit. A standard formalisation of the bank lending channel focuses on the perceived 
creditworthiness of fi nancial institutions in relation to their capital base. Intuitively, more capitalised 
banks are perceived to have stronger incentives to carefully monitor loans and, hence, face a lower 
cost for non-deposit funding and a smaller external fi nance premium. As banks are highly leveraged 
institutions, adverse shocks to funding and capital positions are magnifi ed on the asset side of their 
balance sheets, which may lead to a sharp contraction in credit, which subsequently has an adverse 
impact on economic activity. The central role played by banks’ capital with regard to lending 
behaviour is refl ected in the regulatory requirements that stipulate that banks must operate with a 
minimum amount of capital (and liquid assets). Moreover, changing risk perceptions and the 
increasing tolerance towards bearing borrower risk may amplify these credit supply shifts. The 
relevance of these types of transmission channel has emerged as a result of the latest fi nancial crisis, 
in which liquidity has dried up, the interbank market collapsed and losses mounted, signifi cantly 
impairing the intermediation process. Market measures of default probabilities of euro area and 
international banks increased substantially immediately after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in 
autumn 2008, as did stock market volatility; fi nancial stock market indices plummeted. In the case 
of euro area banks, the EDF then climbed in the second half of 2011, as the European sovereign 
debt crisis escalated in the large euro area economies. This (perceived) increase in risk has brought 
about increasingly adverse fi nancing conditions for euro area banks. On the price side, the cost of 
92 Prepared by Giacomo Carboni, Elaine Caruana and Demetris Kapatais.
93 See, for instance, the seminal work by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) on the bank lending and balance sheet channels.
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private fi nancing for euro area banks reached a record high in the post-Lehman period, receding 
again until the beginning of 2010, only to then mirror the fl uctuations in the European sovereign 
debt crisis (see Chart 35).94 Crucially, the rise in risk aversion and the decline in confi dence in bank 
assets have, at times, impaired the transmission of monetary policy rate impulses to the funding 
costs of banks. It is precisely to ensure the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism, 
by alleviating liquidity and funding tensions for banks, that, during the crisis period, the ECB has 
complemented its existing interest rate instrument with a wide range of non-standard measures, 
as analysed at the end of this section. 
The fi nancial crisis has led to signifi cant changes in banks’ funding patterns (see Chart 36): 
interbank liabilities, as a proportion of a bank’s total assets, have fallen substantially since the third 
quarter of 2008, as has the issuance of debt securities. By contrast, the recourse to central bank 
funding has increased considerably with respect to the pre-crisis period. Overall the introduction 
of non-standard Eurosystem refi nancing measures largely compensated for severe constraints in 
access to wholesale market funding.
94 The cost of private fi nancing for banks includes fi nancing via both deposits and the issuance of debt securities, but excludes Eurosystem 
fi nancing, which is not shown in the chart. Given that banks pay a lower interest rate for credit provided by the Eurosystem, the increasing 
recourse to Eurosystem fi nancing has partly compensated for the increase in the cost of private fi nancing.
Chart 35 Composite cost of deposit Funding 
and non-secured market debt Funding 
for banks
(percentages per annum; monthly data)
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Notes: The data comprise the weighted average of deposit rates 
on new business and the cost of market debt funding. The outlier 
(2008-09) has been smoothed out. The most recent data are taken 
from November 2012. EA denotes euro area.
Chart 36 Main liabilities of euro area credit 
institutions
(three-month fl ows in EUR billions; adjusted for seasonal and 
calendar effects)
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THE BORROWER BALANCE SHEET CHANNEL
The borrower balance sheet channel is based on 
a situation in which lenders are not able to 
assess borrowers’ creditworthiness, properly 
monitor their investments and/or fully enforce 
their debt repayments. In such an environment, 
sounder borrower balance sheet conditions, in 
the form of greater net worth, may mitigate 
credit market frictions by enhancing borrowers’ 
creditworthiness, bringing more “skin in the 
game”, more valuable pledgeable collateral and, 
hence, lowering the external fi nance premium. 
An amplifi cation mechanism is set in motion, 
whereby initial adverse shocks to borrowers’ 
balance sheets, via their effects on the cost 
of external fi nancing, constrain investment 
(and consumption) and thus, in a self-reinforcing 
loop, cause the next-period value of collateral 
to deteriorate. This amplifi cation mechanism 
is commonly referred to as the “fi nancial 
accelerator”.95 
Amplifi cation mechanisms that build on real fi nancial interactions have been operating during the 
latest fi nancial crisis, triggered by borrowers’ soaring credit risk. Since the onset of the crisis, the 
median probability of default for euro area NFCs has increased signifi cantly, and the high quantile 
has been trending upwards very strongly (see Chart 37). In particular, peaks in the probability of 
corporate sector default were recorded during the post-Lehman period, and in concomitance with 
the intensifi cation of sovereign debt tensions, particularly from the second half of 2011. Overall, 
developments in the default probability have been mirrored by a marked deterioration in the net worth 
and profi tability of euro area NFCs. As documented in Chapter 1, euro area NFCs’ debt-to-equity 
ratio increased substantially during the crisis as a result of signifi cant equity valuation losses; this 
was most pronounced in Greece, Spain and Ireland.
BANK-BASED FINANCING AND THE IMPACT OF SUPPLY-SIDE AND DEMAND-SIDE FACTORS
As outlined above, banks’ balance sheet and capital positions, and borrowers’ credit risk affect 
banks’ decisions regarding credit provision. Nonetheless, making a conceptual distinction between 
supply-side and demand-side factors in credit markets is often diffi cult; for instance, banks’ 
perception of the risks associated with potential borrowers can lead to credit rationing. At the 
same time, borrower-specifi c situations, also associated with creditworthiness, can infl uence the 
demand for loans, as borrowers may address their balance sheet problems by reorganising and/or 
scaling down their operations in a way that reduces their need for external fi nancing. In addition to 
borrower-specifi c situations (such as their balance sheets and income), the general macroeconomic 
conditions and availability (i.e. access to and price of) of alternative fi nancing sources, such as 
market debt and internal fi nancing, are crucial factors affecting the demand for loans. 
95 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Note that the fi nancial sector as such is not central to 
the balance sheet channel, nor is monetary policy, despite the fact that the balance sheet channel is often explained on the premise that 
a monetary policy shock hits the economy. In fact, any disturbance affecting borrowers’ net worth can give rise to such a propagation 
mechanism.
Chart 37 Expected default frequency of 
listed euro area non-financial corporations
(percentages)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
25% quantile
median
75% quantile
Sources: Moody’s KMV and ECB calculations.
Notes: The chart shows the probability of default within the next 
twelve months. The data are based on a sample of listed euro area 
non-fi nancial fi rms. The latest observation is for December 2012.
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The empirical distinction between supply-side and demand-side factors in credit markets is even 
more challenging to defi ne; nevertheless, it is crucial. Indeed, economic policy implications tend 
to differ depending on whether loan developments remain subdued because of impairments on the 
side of banks, or because of weak demand owing to limited spending and investment opportunities.
The stylised facts, or historical regularities, of the business cycle provide a useful reference point 
for the assessment of loan developments. Between 1980 and 2012, loans to the corporate sector 
tended to be closely aligned with GDP and real gross capital formation (see Chart 38). In the sample 
under consideration, real bank credit growth is positively correlated with real GDP growth, with the 
strongest correlation (70%) emerging when the loan growth rate lags the economic cycle by, 
on average, three quarters (see Chart 39).96 This lag suggests the relevance of aggregate demand in 
determining loan developments across regular business cycles. More specifi cally, the lagging 
pattern of loans around the troughs in economic activity may refl ect a situation in which fi rms fi rst 
turn to internal funds during the recovery phase, and only subsequently become more reliant on 
external fi nancing. 
However, the relevance of supply-side and demand-side factors in determining loan developments 
varies over time according to the shocks to the economy. Moreover, feedback loops arise whereby, 
for instance, deleveraging pressures on banks – caused by the erosion of their capital base – may 
lead to credit constraints, which, in turn, weigh negatively on investment and output. This then 
has an adverse effect on the corporate sector’s demand for external fi nancing. This streamlined 
typology of the propagation channel shares some features with the developments observed during 
the latest crisis in the euro area and, more broadly, in all advanced economies to varying degrees. 
96 A similar correlation between real bank credit and real GDP emerges when considering the series’ deviation from their respective long-
term trends, as estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter. Moreover, empirical evidence for Germany suggests that various measures of 
the dynamics of credit given to the NFC sector signifi cantly lag real GDP growth by two-to-three quarters (see Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2011)).
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A signifi cant contraction in bank lending to 
NFCs has been seen during the crisis, with the 
annual growth rate of loans to NFCs (adjusted 
for sales and securitisation) falling from a peak 
of 15% in the fi rst quarter of 2008 to 2.8% in the 
second quarter of 2009, before turning negative 
and bottoming out at -2.1% in the fi rst quarter of 
2010 (see Chart 40). Despite recovering slightly 
thereafter, loan growth has remained weak in 
the majority of euro area countries. 
In attempting to disentangle the contribution of 
supply-side and demand-side factors, relevant 
information can be extracted from surveys, such 
as the ECB’s bank lending survey and the SAFE 
survey. On the supply side, an important 
indicator, as seen in the bank lending survey, is 
the net tightening of credit standards, which is 
made up of three components: “perception of 
risk”, “balance sheet constraints” and 
“competition”.97 At the onset of the crisis, and 
particularly in 2008, the role of balance sheet 
constraints in the net tightening of credit 
standards was the greatest it had been since the 
creation of the bank lending survey, refl ecting the importance of bank vulnerability in shaping the 
terms and conditions of bank lending activity. The impact of the “perception of risk” factor on the 
net tightening of credit standards was also greater at the peak of the crisis. These two factors have 
become closely aligned during the crisis. Between 2009 and mid-2011, the tightening of credit 
standards gradually diminished, as did the role of balance sheet constraints. However, as the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe intensifi ed during the second half of 2011, the role of balance sheet 
constraints rose once again. The relevance of supply-side factors is further shown by the increased 
recourse to market-based funding sources during the crisis, often with unfavourable conditions, as 
documented in the next section. In addition, on the basis of the investment behaviour of 
manufacturing industries in six euro area economies,98 Buca and Vermeulen (2011) fi nd that fi rms 
which are more dependent on bank fi nance reduced investment to a much larger extent than those 
which were less dependent on bank fi nance.
At the same time, the results of the bank lending survey point to the fact that the demand for loans 
has also plummeted since the start of the crisis and has weighed heavily on loan development. 
Demand for loans remained negative until early 2010, then turned positive and remained so until 
the second quarter of 2011, before declining again thereafter as a result of diminishing economic 
prospects and an intensifi cation of the European sovereign debt crisis. Factors weighing negatively 
on loan demand include an uncertain economic environment, contracting economic activity, 
97 The “perception of risk” factor summarises banks’ assessment of the impact of macroeconomic conditions on borrowers’ risk profi les 
and creditworthiness; the “balance sheet constraints” factor proxies the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission; and the 
“competition” factor includes competition from other banks, non-banks and market fi nancing.
98 The euro area countries considered in the assessment are Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. Using data on US fi rms, 
Becker and Ivashina (2011) also fi nd that the contractionary effects of loan reduction are larger for fi rms which are excluded from bond 
markets.
Chart 40 MFI loans to non-financial 
corporations, and related survey indicators 
during the crisis
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and a higher propensity among fi rms to retain 
earnings. Notably, weak demand for loans 
also showed the need for the corporate sector 
to repair its balance sheet after the excessive 
leverage accumulated in the run-up to the crisis, 
a pattern explored in more details in the next 
section. 
According to the SAFE survey, the main factor 
affecting bank loan availability for SMEs in 
most euro area countries was the general 
economic and fi rm-specifi c outlook. Purely 
supply-side factors (i.e. those related to the 
willingness of banks to provide loans) are also 
considered to be important. The signifi cant role 
played by both supply-side and demand-side 
factors in determining credit developments 
during the crisis is consistent with the fi ndings 
of Del Giovane et al. (2010), which are based on 
the Eurosystem’s bank lending survey, as well 
as on micro data on loan quantities and prices 
for the participating Italian banks.99
Despite the marked tightening of credit 
standards, lending rates on loans to NFCs declined substantially between autumn 2008 and 
mid-2010 (see Chart 41). This was the result of various key ECB interest rate cuts, as well as 
the launch and implementation of non-standard monetary policy measures during the crisis 
period. Aggregate bank retail rates generally responded sluggishly to changes in monetary 
policy rates in euro area countries. From mid-2010 to the end of 2011, in a general context of 
re-pricing of risk, composite euro area lending rates for NFCs increased, largely owing to the impact 
of the sovereign debt crisis on benchmark interest rates and banks’ funding conditions. It was only at 
the beginning of 2012 that composite euro area lending rates for NFCs started to recede gradually, 
refl ecting the cuts in the key ECB interest rates in November 2011 and December 2011, and the 
non-standard monetary policy measures announced by the ECB. Nonetheless, the decline in corporate 
lending rates in 2012 masks the existence of diverging patterns across countries, as shown by the 
wide interquartile range in Chart 41. These developments primarily refl ect the emergence of fi nancial 
fragmentation associated with the sovereign debt crisis in some euro area jurisdictions.
As mentioned throughout the section, the Eurosystem has adopted a variety of policy measures in 
line with the severity of the circumstances in the different phases of the crisis. It has complemented 
the standard interest rate instrument with a set of non-standard measures, exceptional in nature, 
scope and magnitude. The guiding principle behind these policy interventions was to safeguard the 
effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism, so as to maintain price stability over the 
medium term. When the interbank market was not functioning correctly, unlimited liquidity was 
provided in an effort to mitigate the risk that shortages of liquidity and funding for banks would 
have triggered an abrupt deleveraging process and, hence, a credit crunch. At a time of fi nancial 
99 Del Giovane et al. (2010) fi nd that a quarter of the total supply effect can be attributed to costs related to the banks’ balance sheet 
position, and the rest to their perception of credit risk.
Chart 41 Cost of lending indicator on loans 
to non-financial corporations in the euro 
area
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Notes: The cost of lending indicator is calculated by aggregating 
short-term and long-term rates using a 24-month moving average 
of new business volumes. The latest data are for December 2012. 
The shaded area denotes the interquartile range, while the solid 
line denotes the euro area average.
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fragmentation, the adoption of the Outright 
Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme has 
addressed the excessive risk premia in some 
sovereign debt markets associated with the 
(perceived) risk of a euro area break-up.
The question then arises regarding the extent to 
which credit supply factors, of the types 
discussed so far, have an impact on real 
economic activity during the crisis. To address 
this issue, three macroeconomic models are 
considered: a theory-driven dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model, a data-
driven structural vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model, and a model which makes direct use of 
survey information contained in the bank 
lending survey (BLS panel VAR). The DSGE 
model formalises the fi nancial frictions within 
the structural relationships using a relatively 
large set of variables, as dictated by the 
economic theory.100 The structural vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model identifi es credit 
supply shocks, as well as shocks to aggregate 
demand and supply, by imposing sign restrictions based on economic theory.101 The BLS panel 
VAR model quantifi es the impact of credit supply factors by relying on the cross-sectional 
information generated by the BLS results for the individual euro area country.102 Overall, the three 
models suggest that credit supply factors had a limited impact on economic activity between 2007 
and the fi rst quarter of 2008. However, by the fourth quarter of 2008, the impact had become much 
more signifi cant. At the peak of the crisis, in the fi rst half of 2009, the models predict that credit 
supply factors accounted for a contraction of almost 2 percentage points in real GDP growth, and 
for approximately one-third of the overall contraction.103
THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF CORPORATE DEBT INSTRUMENTS, AND THE MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT104 
Developments in bank credit are intrinsically linked to fi rms’ ability to diversify in their alternative 
sources of fi nancing, as a way of gaining some fi nancial fl exibility, as documented in Chapter 1. 
100 See Darracq-Pariès et al. (2011). The DSGE model comprises the following set of fi nancial frictions: the bank capital channel (with capital 
accumulated from retained earnings, and adjustment costs related to the bank capital structure which are dependent on the regulatory 
regime); imperfect interest rate pass-through on lending rates for households and NFCs; and the fi nancial accelerator mechanism for 
household loans for house purchases (housing wealth used as collateral) and for NFC loans (capital stock used as collateral), which 
allows for endogenous default rates. The model is estimated for euro area data using Bayesian likelihood methods. We consider 15 
key macroeconomic factors over a quarterly time series, from the fi rst quarter of 1986 to the second quarter of 2008. The factors are: 
output, consumption, non-residential fi xed investment, hours worked, real wages, CPI infl ation rate, three-month short-term interest 
rates, residential investment, real house prices, mortgage loans, NFC loans, households deposits, bank lending rates on mortgage loans 
and on NFC loans, and deposit rates on household deposits.
101 Specifi cally, the SVAR model is estimated on real GDP, the GDP defl ator, loans to NFCs, the EURIBOR and the bank lending spread for 
the euro area as a whole, using quarterly data from the fi rst quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2012.
102 The BLS Panel VAR follows the methodology suggested by Darracq-Pariès and De Santis (2013), which itself draws on Ciccarelli, 
Maddaloni and Peydró (2010).
103 For a detailed description of a model-based methodology of this type, see the box entitled “Analysis of the impact of credit supply factors 
on economic activity using structural models”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, January 2011.
104 Prepared by Felix Geiger and Manuel Rupprecht. 
Chart 42 Impact of credit supply factors on 
real annual GDP growth rates across model 
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As bank credit conditions tighten, substituting bank credit with other sources of fi nancing could 
be seen as a tool for mitigating the fi nancial constrains restricting investment, as investigated 
in Box 1 and supported by the evidence in Buca and Vermeulen (2011), as briefl y illustrated 
above.105 The fi rst issue to be addressed is then whether the observed degree of substitution in 
the euro area during the crisis is in line with the predictions made on the basis of historical 
regularities.106 Limiting the analysis to debt instruments, fl ows of loans and debt securities can 
be compared with the counterfactual of the same variables, as predicted by a reduced-form 
model and conditioning on real GDP developments from the fourth quarter of 2008 onwards.107 
The conditional forecasts are intended to capture “normal” developments in loan and debt security 
fl ows, in line with past fi nancing patterns. The main fi nding is that the degree of substitution 
appears larger than that predicted by historical regularities from 2010 onwards, namely during 
the period of sovereign debt market tensions in selected euro area economies. However, during 
the fi rst stage of the crisis, the substitution of loans with debt securities seems to be in line with 
historical regularities. 
Interestingly, since the beginning of 2008, the recorded substitution of bank credit with bond 
issuance by NFCs has gone hand in hand with a widening spread between the cost of bond issuance 
and that of bank fi nancing. Moreover, this 
spread persisted both when the two cost 
indicators fi rst increased and when they 
subsequently declined (see Chart 43).108 A 
similar pattern is observed for the majority of 
euro area countries. Moreover, a negative 
relationship between changes in bond 
transactions and bond fi nancing costs for NFCs 
can be seen across euro area countries. Countries 
with the lowest rise in fi nancing costs were 
those with the highest increase in net bond 
transactions (see Chart 44). Viewed through the 
lens of substitutability, Chart 45 documents the 
change in the reliance on bond fi nancing relative 
to MFI fi nancing, and the change between the 
spread of bond fi nancing costs and MFI loan 
rates. Substitution was most pronounced in 
those countries where the difference between 
the cost of corporate bond fi nancing and MFI 
lending rates on loans increased. In Ireland and 
Spain particularly, the relative importance of 
bond fi nancing gained prominence as MFI loans 
were redeemed during the sample period 
105 In addition, in bypassing the intermediation process of banks, the substitution of bank credit with alternative sources of fi nancing has 
clear implications for the functioning and assessment of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
106 Notably, euro area developments should be interpreted with caution, as they may mask cross-country heterogeneity, as illustrated in 
Chapter 1. Throughout 2012, for instance, euro area bond fi nancing was largely infl uenced by the large bond issuance in France, while 
weak bank credit at the euro area level primarily resulted from adverse developments in Italy and Spain.
107 The model specifi cation is a dynamic factor model estimated from the fi rst quarter of 1992 to the third quarter of 2008, using a large set of 
quarterly macroeconomic, fi nancial and fl ow-of-fund variables for the euro area. The adopted model is described in Giannone et al. (2012).
108 The increase in debt fi nancing costs was also refl ected in the widening spreads between riskier loans and bonds with different investment 
grades. Bond investors, like banks, were hit by the macroeconomic shock caused by the fi nancial crisis. Losses on their capital position 
then meant that they needed additional risk premia in order to absorb the measured default risk (see Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)).
Chart 43 Comparison of bank financing 
and bond financing, and the nominal cost 
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between the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2012. In Germany and Portugal, 
however, substitution between bond and bank fi nancing was moderate and accompanied by a 
subdued increase in the spread between bond fi nancing costs and MFI loan rates.109
109 In terms of equity fi nancing during the fi nancial crisis, the link between price and cost is less clear. In most euro area countries, net equity 
transactions did not change signifi cantly after the third quarter of 2008, with the exception of fi rms in Belgium, Finland and Ireland.
Chart 44 Change in bond financing 
and associated change in the nominal 
cost of market debt
(x-axis: change of average annualised bond transactions 
between the period 2004Q1-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2012Q4;
y-axis: change of average nominal cost of bond fi nancing 
between the period 2004Q1-2008Q2 and 2008Q3-2012Q4)
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Chart 45 Substitution of bank financing 
in the euro area
(x-axis: change of average annualised bond transactions 
between the period 2004Q1-2008Q2 and 2008Q3- 2012Q4;
y-axis: change of average nominal cost of bond fi nancing 
between the period 2004Q1- 2008Q2 and 2008Q3- 2012Q4)
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Box 5 
MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF CORPORATE DEBT INSTRUMENTS1
This box discusses some alternative theoretical explanations of the corporate debt instrument 
behaviour shown in Chart 43, namely the substitution of bank loans with debt securities, and 
the concomitant widening in the gap between the cost of market fi nance and the cost of bank 
fi nance.2 It also provides an assessment of the implications of debt substitutability for aggregate 
activity and fi nancial stability.
The evidence on corporate debt observed during the crisis is surprising when considered in 
conjunction with the well-established literature that captures the endogenous choice between 
bank fi nance and market fi nance (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Repullo and Suarez 
(2000)). In these models, fi rms differ in their available net worth and are able to divert resources 
1 Prepared by Fiorella De Fiore (ECB). 
2 Substitution between bank fi nance and bond fi nance emerges as a noticeable feature of the fi nancial crisis, as is the case when looking 
at the experience of the United States (Becker and Ivashina (2011), and Adrian et al. (2012)).
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away from projects and towards private activities. Assuming that bank fi nance is more intensely 
monitored than bond fi nance, these models deliver a distribution of fi nancing choices such that 
fi rms with large levels of net worth raise bond fi nance, fi rms with intermediate levels of net 
worth raise bank fi nance, and fi rms with little net worth do not obtain credit. One implication is 
that a contraction in net worth, as observed during the crisis, leads to a shift from bond fi nance to 
bank fi nance, which contradicts the evidence.
In recent literature, alternative arguments to explain the facts observed during the fi nancial crisis 
have been put forward. One explanation is that the shift from loans to bonds was the result of 
NFCs optimal fi nancing choices in the face of a negative bank supply shock (De Fiore and Uhlig 
(2011)). The mechanism is described in a model where fi rms differ in their productivity and in 
their risk of default on debt, and where they optimally choose the external fi nancing instrument 
(i.e. loans or bonds). Loans differ from bonds because banks are able to acquire information on 
a fi rm’s productivity prospects, while dispersed bond holders are not. As information acquisition 
is costly, bonds are cheaper – although riskier – than loans. The model produces a distribution 
of fi rms’ fi nancing choices (i.e. the choice between cash or debt) and choice of debt instruments 
(i.e. loans or bonds), which changes endogenously over time. Firms with a relatively high risk 
of default choose not to raise external fi nance. Firms with a relatively low risk choose to issue 
bonds. Only fi rms with an intermediate risk approach banks, as they value the further information 
banks can provide before deciding whether to obtain loans and produce. A shock which reduces 
the effi ciency of banks as fi nancial intermediaries relative to the market increases the cost of 
banking and induces a shift from loans to bonds. A larger proportion of fi rms with a high risk of 
default fi nd the cost of external fi nancing too high and choose not to produce. A larger proportion 
of fi rms with intermediate levels of risk fi nd it optimal to shift to bonds. Bond fi nance then 
becomes more costly, as the average risk of default for the larger pool of market-fi nanced fi rms 
is higher. The cost of bank fi nance rises owing to higher bank costs and a composition effect 
in the average risk of bank-fi nanced fi rms. Overall, as in the data, the average increase in bond 
yields exceeds that in lending rates. 
An alternative explanation builds upon the observed pro-cyclical behaviour of bank leverage. 
Adrian et al. (2012) propose a model where banks follow a “Value-at-Risk” approach, i.e. banks 
choose the composition of their assets and liabilities in such a way as to ensure that the probability 
of default never exceeds a certain desired level. Under this constraint, a bank’s optimal choice is 
to deleverage sharply during a fi nancial crisis, when the default risk of NFCs rises, and thus to 
contract lending. Given that the demand for credit from NFCs has limited elasticity, risk-averse 
bond investors need to be encouraged to increase their credit supply. This requires an increase in 
the spreads on corporate bonds. 
These alternative theoretical channels differ not only in the mechanisms at work but also in their 
assessment of the macroeconomic implications of an adverse bank supply shock. In De Fiore 
and Uhlig (2012), such a shock has a minimal effect on investment and output owing to the 
possibility for NFCs to shift promptly between the two sources of external fi nancing, leaving 
leverage largely unchanged. Adrian et al. (2012) use a partial equilibrium approach, which is not 
suitable for quantifying the aggregate implications of the shock on real activity. Nonetheless, in 
their model, small variations in the default risk lead to large movements in spreads because these 
also refl ect the investors’ changing valuation of risk. 
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A fl exible fi nancial system in which NFCs can easily substitute one debt instrument for another 
can help to mitigate the adverse effects of fi nancial shocks on economic activity. In the model 
proposed by De Fiore and Uhlig (2012), the effects of a bank supply shock on investment and 
output are greatly amplifi ed when NFCs cannot move from bank fi nance to bond fi nance. These 
results are consistent with evidence obtained by Becker and Ivashina (2011) using data on 
US fi rms. The effects of a reduction in loan supply on investment are found to be statistically 
positive and signifi cant for fi rms that raise debt fi nance and have access to both the bond and 
loan markets. For fi rms excluded from bond markets, the contractionary effect is even greater. 
Some supporting evidence also exists for the euro area, as illustrated above with the fi ndings by 
Buca and Vermeulen (2011). 
Changes in the composition of corporate debt also have implications for fi nancial stability. Aoki 
and Nikolov (2012) use a simple model with bank and bond fi nance to examine the effects of 
debt substitutability on the likelihood and real effects of fi nancial crises caused by large banking 
sector losses. They argue that, in a bank-dominated economy, loan market competition is low 
and the profi tability of safe activities is high. Banks do not fi nd it attractive to invest in risky 
assets, since more traditional activities have a high return. Finance is expensive but the banking 
system is stable. When capital markets expand, (safe) loan spreads decline, loan volumes expand 
and output grows. However, there is a darker side to credit expansion: returns from risky assets 
become more attractive, bank risk-taking increases and the chances of a fi nancial crisis increase.
The theory and evidence discussed in this box suggests two main conclusions with regard 
to corporate debt structure. First, it plays an important role in determining the response of 
investment and real activity to bank supply shocks. Second, it changes the incentives for banks 
to take on risk and thus affects the probability of boom/bust cycles and fi nancial crises.
4.2 CORPORATE SECTOR INDEBTEDNESS AND MACROECONOMIC PATTERNS: 
A MEDIUM-TERM PERSPECTIVE
In this section, an attempt is made to shed light on the debt cycle of the corporate sector from 
a medium-term perspective, with specifi c emphasis on the latest fi nancial crisis. The approach 
will be threefold. First, the latest euro area crisis is placed within the broader international and 
historical context of crisis episodes; the aim is to derive a set of empirical regularities, draw lessons 
from them, and infer policy responses which are also valid in today’s circumstances. Second, the 
run-up to the latest euro area crisis is analysed in terms of debt accumulation, identifying selected 
propagation channels and describing the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. Third, the 
corrective adjustments needed in the future are investigated, deleveraging pressures identifi ed and 
alternative typologies of deleveraging patterns explored. While the section is primarily empirical, 
both theoretical and empirical literature is used as a guide, providing facts and evidence.
INDEBTEDNESS AND THE MACROECONOMICS OF CRISIS EPISODES: THE EURO AREA CRISIS FROM 
AN INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE110 
In terms of severity, duration and scale, the recession experienced in the euro area, and in most 
advanced economies, in the late 2000s was the major downturn in several decades. The global 
fi nancial panic that followed the failure of several major fi nancial institutions resulted in the severe 
malfunctioning of fi nancial markets and heightened global uncertainty, which, in turn, led to 
110 Prepared by Giacomo Carboni.
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a deep and sharp downturn in real economic activity, with falling consumption and investment, 
and a marked decline in trade. When placing the latest episode within the broader international 
and historical context of major economic downturns a main consideration stands out. While many 
factors may well have contributed to the emergence and severity of these episodes, both theoretical 
insights and empirical evidence appear to point to the role played by debt accumulation in the 
run-up to the crisis. While improving welfare when at moderate levels, debt does add to instability 
when excessive, and hence weighs negatively on the economy. Indeed, literature dating back to the 
seminal contributions from, for instance, Fisher (1933), Kindleberger (1978) and Tobin (1989), has 
identifi ed leverage, in the form of excessive credit, as a major source of macroeconomic instability 
and fi nancial fragility. More recently, a number of empirical papers have focused on the role of 
debt accumulation and debt levels in shaping macroeconomic performance, by considering a pool 
of countries across a number of decades.111 As a result of these considerations, some evidence 
on indebtedness and other selected macroeconomic variables affecting crisis episodes is briefl y 
illustrated, with particular emphasis on developments in the corporate sector. The general idea 
is to investigate economic regularities associated with severe economic downturns, draw lessons 
from them, and infer possible policy responses of some validity in the current circumstances. 
The assessment considers recessions in 15 advanced economies between 1960 and 2012, drawing 
extensively on a dataset compiled by Schularick and Taylor (2012). Notably, Schularick and 
Taylor (2012) analyse the behaviour of money, credit and macroeconomic indicators over a 
remarkably long time period from 1870 to 2008. The countries considered are Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.112
In considering fi nancial crises from a broader comparative perspective, the analysis distinguishes 
between normal business cycle recessions, milder fi nancial crisis recessions and systemic fi nancial 
crises. The classifi cation of these episodes, as well as the determination of the associated turning 
points, draws on the works by Jorda et al. (2012), Laeven and Valencia (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009b) and Kamisky and Reinhart (1999). Overall, 54 recessions are identifi ed in the dataset, of 
which 40 normal business cycle episodes, nine milder fi nancial crises, and fi ve severe (systemic) 
fi nancial crises (the “Big Five” crises identifi ed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)).113 Owing to the 
limited availability of data on historical episodes, two main limitations arise. First, as data for bank 
credit to the corporate sector are not always readily available, the assessment will consider fi rst 
bank credit given to the non-fi nancial private sector as a whole. Bank credit to the corporate sector 
are considered for selected historical episodes for which the data series are available. Second, 
as data on sources of fi nancing, other than bank credit, are often unavailable, debt is represented by 
bank credit.114 
Chart 46 portrays the increase in the ratio of bank credit to GDP around the peaks in economic 
activity identifi ed above. Together with the developments in the latest euro area crisis, the chart 
shows the “average cycle”, obtained by taking the average of all identifi ed downturns, which 
include normal recessions, systemic fi nancial crises (“Big Five” crises), and milder fi nancial crises. 
The grey area shows the interquartile range, a measure of the dispersion around the “average 
cycle”. While the run-ups to crises have often been characterised by rising debt levels, the extent 
of debt accumulation in the latest euro area crisis has been remarkable. This is evident by the fact 
that the current debt build-up in the euro area is outside the inter-quartile range and is, in fact, more 
111 See, for example, Jorda et al. (2012), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Cecchetti et al. (2011).
112 Relative to the country sample considered by Schularick and Taylor (2012), the present assessment also includes Finland.
113 The crisis episodes are listed in Table 1 of Annex 6.
114 Nonetheless, the relevance of other sources of fi nancing for past crisis episodes may be limited.
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intense than the average developments across 
the “Big Five” fi nancial crises. Provided that 
historical similarities can be used as a guide, 
further downward adjustment of the credit-to-
GDP ratio is to be expected for the euro area, as 
investigated in the following sections.
Chart 47 depicts the level of real GDP before and 
after major economic downturns. The striking 
point emerging from the chart is the severity 
of the latest euro area recession, even when 
measured against a wide range of historical 
and international crises. First, euro area real 
GDP has declined sharply during the latest 
recession, by around 5.6% from the pre-crisis 
peak to the trough. Second, the euro area 
economy levelled off only modestly after the 
trough and still stands around 2.8% below the 
pre-crisis peak. 
The growth rates for real loans in the euro area 
have developed broadly in line with the pattern 
of systemic fi nancial crises (see Chart 48). 
Notably, the subdued loan dynamics seen in 
Chart 48 Real loan growth rates across 
cycle peaks
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Chart 46 Ratio of bank credit given 
to the private sector to GDP across cycle peaks
(as a percentage relative to the level recorded at the GDP peak)
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Chart 47 Real GDP level across cycle peaks
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the euro area after the trough are consistent with the average of the “Big Five” fi nancial crises. 
Similarly, the real investment growth rate for the euro area has developed broadly in line with the 
average of the “Big Five” fi nancial crises in the run-up to the crisis (see Chart 48). Nonetheless, the 
drop in euro area investment immediately after the start of the crisis is very severe (see Chart 49). 
While the subsequent rebound was somewhat quicker than in previous crises, more recent evidence 
suggests that the levelling off will not continue. 
Chart 50 focuses more specifi cally on the indebtedness of the corporate sector, where indebtedness 
is measured by bank loans, and relates the latest experience of euro area economies to the fi nancial 
crises in Finland and Japan in the 1990s. These countries are among the “Big Five” for which 
data on bank credit to the corporate sector are available. Interestingly, Finland and Japan are 
polar opposite cases of post-crisis adjustment and the deleveraging process, as documented in the 
following sections. To emphasise the cross-country relevance of the latest euro area crisis, the 
interquartile range is shown for euro area countries. Finally, the patterns for Spain and Ireland are 
also included, as they represent cases of the largest sustained pre-crisis debt accumulation in the 
corporate sector among euro area economies, especially when compared with Finland. 
4.3 DEBT ACCUMULATION AND MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE EURO AREA 
GREAT RECESSION115
This section attempts to shed light on the connection between the pattern of corporate sector 
indebtedness and the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. Theory and evidence point to 
115 Prepared by Giacomo Carboni and Uroš Herman.
Chart 49 Real investment growth rates 
across cycle peaks
(percentages)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
interquartile range
average for the “Big Five” crises
average cycle  
euro area (current)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5t
Sources: ECB, national sources and ECB calculations.
Notes: The data for historical episodes are taken from the dataset
compiled by Schularick and Taylor (2012). Period t represents 
the start of a crisis.
Chart 50 Ratio of bank loans to the 
corporate sector to GDP across cycle peaks
(as a percentage relative to the level recorded at the GDP peak)
40
60
80
100
120
40
60
80
100
120
interquartile range (euro area current)
Ireland
Japan (1992)
Finland (1991)
euro area (current)
Spain (current)
t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Sources: ECB and ECB calculations.
83
ECB
Occasional Paper No 151
August 2013
4 F IRMS ’  F INANCING 
CONDIT IONS , 
INDEBTEDNESS AND 
THE MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT
the fact that debt accumulation may not be problematic per se. In fact, by transferring resources 
across time, individuals and states of nature, debt accumulation can improve welfare when kept 
at sustainable levels. However, when excessive and used to fi nance less profi table investments, 
debt adds to fi nancial instability. As a guide through the latest euro area crisis, the assessment 
draws on the theoretical insights provided by, for instance, Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky 
(1992). In all such work, the boom phase is characterised by a large accumulation of credit, and 
excessive investment; it is fuelled by a sizeable over-valuation of fi nancial and real assets, and often 
associated with periods of moderate volatility and low pricing of risk. 
DEBT VULNERABILITY PRIOR TO THE GREAT RECESSION 
While remaining broadly stable between 2001 and 2004, corporate sector indebtedness rose 
markedly in the euro area and in many advanced economies in the years preceding the fi nancial 
crisis, as documented in Chapter 1 (see also Chart 51 below). Such debt accumulation was primarily 
in the form of bank credit, while debt issuance remained broadly stable.116 As is often the case, such 
a build-up of bank credit was preceded by, or went together with, a process of fi nancial innovation 
in the banking industry.117 This process was characterised by a rapid expansion of securitisation and 
increasing reliance on market-based funding, which allowed banks to offl oad risk and increase their 
leverage. At the same time, the heterogeneous pattern across euro area countries suggests that 
country-specifi c developments did play an important role in fuelling credit expansion and, hence, 
led to excessive debt levels. These excessive debt levels are illustrated in Chart 51 for the year 2008 
by means of three alternative indicators: the deviation from the historical average, from the euro 
area median, and from the long-term trend, as estimated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter. 
116 Credit accumulation prior to the crisis was not confi ned to the euro area corporate sector alone; it was in fact common across sectors and 
advanced economies.
117 The Nordic crises of the early 1990s are an example of systemic crises preceded by fi nancial innovation and liberalisation, as briefl y 
illustrated in the following sections.
Chart 51 Corporate sector indebtedness indicators at the outbreak of the crisis
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Sources: ECB and ECB calculations.
Notes: The historical average is calculated using data from the fi rst quarter of 1995 to the second quarter of 2008. The underlying 
long-term trend has been extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter and annual data from the sample period 1995-2011 (where the 
smoothing parameter is set at 100). EA denotes euro area.
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Positive sizeable deviations for the three benchmarks are recorded for Ireland, Spain and, to a lesser 
extent, Portugal, thus indicating excessive indebtedness. A more formal test, based on Mendoza 
and Terrones (2008), confi rms the evidence of a credit boom in Spain and Ireland.118 
Overall, such excessive debt levels at the outset of the crisis clearly rendered these economies 
particularly vulnerable to adverse feedback loops during the downturn. By contrast, fi rms in 
Germany, Belgium and Finland appear to be in a sound position with regard to indebtedness. 
SUBDUED VOLATILITY AND EMERGING MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CRISIS  
As noted above, theoretical insights and narrative evidence on fi nancial crises characterise the 
expansionary phases preceding periods of fi nancial instability as times of subdued uncertainty and 
low pricing of risk, in which there is a certain euphoria with regard to real and fi nancial asset prices, 
and over-optimism with regard to income and wealth prospects, which again fuels the provision of 
credit and investment. Some of these aspects appear to be confi rmed by evidence from the latest 
euro area fi nancial crisis.
In the years leading up to the crisis, volatility in 
fi nancial markets was particularly subdued both 
domestically and internationally, by historical 
standards (see Chart 52). The euro area implied 
stock and bond market volatilities plateaued at a 
low level between the end of 2004 and the 
beginning of 2007, before following a 
fl uctuating upward trend thereafter. Similarly, 
in the United States, the implied stock market 
volatility declined from mid-2002 to a historic 
low at the beginning of 2005, and remained 
broadly constant until the bubble burst. US 
implied bond market volatility lagged stock 
market volatility. Such subdued fi nancial market 
volatility was accompanied by low-cost debt 
issuance for the euro area corporate sector; 
between 2005 and the second quarter of 2007, 
euro area corporate bond spreads remained, on 
average, at around 60 basis points. This was 
substantially below the average of 100 basis 
points recorded between 2001 and 2004, 
and below the level prevailing during the 
fi nancial crisis.119
Although beginning to rise from the end of 
2005, the real cost of bank credit also remained 
at rather favourable levels in the years leading 
up to the crisis. Simple cross-country evidence 
from euro area economies points to a link 
118 Mendoza and Terrones (2008) defi ne a credit boom as the period in which the credit ratio exceeds its long-term trend by a certain 
threshold. The long-term trend is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter, where the smoothing parameter is set at 100, as is typical 
for annual data. The threshold value is calibrated at 1.75.
119 The underpricing of risk and its effect on fi nancial pro-cyclicality is discussed in Borio and Zhu (2012).
Chart 52 Subdued volatility in the run-up 
to the financial crisis
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Notes: The implied government bond market volatility is a 
measure of uncertainty surrounding the German short-term 
(up to three months) and US ten-year government bond prices. 
It is based on the market values of related traded options 
contracts. Bloomberg uses the implied volatility of the closest 
at-the-money strike prices for both puts and calls, on the basis of 
near-month expiry futures. The implied stock market volatility 
series refl ects the expected standard deviation of percentage 
changes in stock prices over a period of up to three months, 
as implied in the prices of options on stock price indices. 
The equity indices to which the implied volatilities refer are 
the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 for the euro area, and the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 for the United States.
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between the subdued real cost of bank credit and credit accumulation in the run-up to the crisis 
(see Chart 53).120 By reducing interest rate burdens for borrowers, low lending rates imply a lower 
probability of default in the short term. As a result, in searching for yield, banks are tempted to 
extend credit and soften lending standards to borrowers with uncertain prospects, which are 
possibly less creditworthy. While low lending rates may decrease the credit risk evaluation in 
banks’ portfolios in the short term, and thereby encourage the extension of credit, they may raise 
credit risk in the medium and longer term.
Together with credit patterns, developments in investment are another key factor to consider when 
assessing the emergence of potential macroeconomic imbalances which are closely associated with 
the corporate sector. Evidence shows that countries which experienced a high debt-to-GDP ratio 
(and high levels of debt accumulation) in the three years prior to the crisis were also characterised 
by a high investment-to-GDP ratio (see Chart 54).121 In essence, this evidence appears to point to a 
pattern of excessive borrowing associated with over-investment, often concentrated in the real 
estate sector. During the latest crisis in euro area countries such as Ireland and Spain, the surge in 
real estate sector investment interacted with, and was fuelled by, rising housing demand, and 
fi nanced itself with soaring household debt. Since bank credit was fi nancing both corporate sector 
investments in the real estate sector and household mortgages, the subsequent housing bust 
translated into a banking crisis.
120 However, the strength of such a link is primarily infl uenced by the observations for Spain and Ireland.
121 This is consistent with the econometric evidence described in Chapter 4 of the October 2009 World Economic Outlook (Abiad (2009)); 
in essence, this evidence links high investment shares prior to the crisis with the severity of the output loss during the crisis, when looking 
at several banking (and currency) crisis episodes across high-, middle- and low-income economies.
Chart 54 Investment share compared with 
the debt-to-GDP ratio prior to the crisis
(x-axis: debt-to-GDP ratio in percentages; y-axis: investment 
share as a percentage of GDP)
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Sources: ECB and ECB calculations.
Notes: The investment share is the average of the ratio between 
real gross fi xed capital formation and real GDP, calculated over 
the period between the fi rst quarter of 2005 and the second 
quarter of 2008. The debt-to-GDP ratio prior to the crisis is the 
average of the ratio between corporate debt and nominal GDP 
over the period between the fi rst quarter of 2005 and the second 
quarter of 2008. Debt is defi ned as the sum of MFI loans and 
market-based debt.
Chart 53 Change in the bank credit-to-GDP 
ratio compared with the real cost of bank 
credit in the run-up to the financial crisis
(x-axis: real cost of bank credit in percentage; y-axis: change in 
the bank credit-to-GDP ratio in percentage points)
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Notes: The real cost of bank credit is derived from the composite 
MFI interest rates on loans to NFCs, defl ated by the HICP; 
it indicates the average for the period between the fi rst quarter 
of 2005 and the second quarter of 2008. The change in the bank 
credit-to-GDP ratio is calculated for the period between the fi rst 
quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2008.
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DEBT ACCUMULATION AND THE SEVERITY OF THE DOWNTURN  
The reversal of artifi cially subdued uncertainty and low perception of risk began with the outbreak 
of the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2007. Subprime mortgage defaults started to increase at 
the very start of 2007, and so did the cost of insuring mortgage portfolios. The “Minsky moment” 
happened, with over-indebted households facing increasing challenges in refi nancing their 
mortgages, on the back of declining house prices and the rising cost of borrowing, in a general 
context of slowing economic activity. The resulting sell-off of mortgage-backed securities led to a 
sharp drop in their value, and raised serious concerns about the soundness of major banks around 
the world, which are widely exposed to these types of structured product. The resulting global 
fi nancial panic and the dramatic re-pricing of risk then led to a severe slowdown in economic 
activity, falling consumption and investment, and a marked decline in trade. The severity is shown 
by the development of investment as illustrated in Chart 55.
At the peak of the contractionary period, the investment loss amounted to 14%, where the 
investment loss is measured as the difference between the actual level of real gross fi xed capital 
formation and the level that would have prevailed by projecting the pre-crisis trend forward 
(see Chart 55).122 Moreover, the investment pattern displays modest signs of recovery thereafter. 
This severe drop in investment, and in economic activity more broadly, is a common feature across 
advanced economies, possibly refl ecting the concurrent fi nancial source, and global scale, of the 
latest crisis. Indeed, as documented above, recessions associated with major fi nancial crises tend to 
be more severe than other types of recession. In addition, synchronised downturns across countries, 
of the kind experienced in the global recession 
of the late 2000s (marked by the grey shaded 
area in Chart 55), cannot rely on the alleviating 
force of the external environment and, in fact, 
are characterised by adverse feedback loops 
among various economies. A question then 
arises: to what extent did debt accumulation 
prior to the crisis pave the way to such severe 
downturns for euro area economies, as predicted 
by the vast available literature on fi nancial 
crises?123 Intuitively, excessive debt jeopardises 
borrowers’ ability to honour their debts, either 
because of shocks to the cost of debt repayment 
or to their income or wealth. Even seemingly 
small shocks can set a number of adverse 
feedback loops in motion, which ultimately 
exert sizeable and long-lasting effects on the 
economy at large. Moreover, the larger the 
balance sheets, the stronger the amplifi cation 
mechanism is likely to be, both in the run-up to 
the crisis and during the inevitable downturn. 
A formal analysis provides supporting evidence 
of the impact of debt accumulation on the 
probability of a fi nancial crisis episode in the 
122 More specifi cally, the trend considered here is a linear trend extracted over the period between 1995 and 2004; the exclusion of the three 
years preceding the crisis is intended to avoid unsustainable boom-period dynamics affecting the estimation of a long-term trend.
123 See, for example, Kindleberger (1978), Tobin (1989), and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013).
Chart 55 Euro area real gross fixed capital 
formation before and after the Great 
Recession
(as a percentage relative to the level in Q2 2008)
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by the Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee of the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research. Data are taken from 
March of each year.
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17 euro area countries, using quarterly data over 
the period from the fi rst quarter of 1980 to the 
second quarter of 2012. More specifi cally, a 
logit model with country fi xed effects is 
employed, where the variable of interest (i.e. the 
crisis dummy) takes the value of 1 in the case of 
a crisis episode and 0 in all other cases. Notably 
high debt accumulation, in the form of past real 
loan growth, is statistically signifi cant across 
various model specifi cations which control for 
real and fi nancial variables and their 
interactions.124 
Not only does the intensity of debt accumulation 
appear to increase the likelihood of fi nancial 
instability, but it also weighs on the severity of 
the downturn.125 By drawing on the historical 
international crises illustrated above, Chart 56 
displays the accumulation of debt during the 
four years prior to the specifi c crisis, and the 
level of real investment and real GDP three 
years after the crisis period. Two key 
conclusions can be drawn from the chart. First, 
large accumulation of debt prior to a crisis is 
associated with subdued development of real 
GDP and investment in the aftermath of the 
crisis. Second, and consistent with what is 
illustrated above, there are some similarities 
between the pattern for the latest euro area crisis 
and the most severe fi nancial crises (the “Big 
Five” crises): the large accumulation of debt 
prior to the crisis continues to weigh on the 
economy three years after the crisis, with real 
GDP and investment levels remaining below 
pre-crisis peaks.
The link between pre-crisis debt accumulation 
and the severity of the contraction is confi rmed 
by developments across euro area countries, as 
can be seen in Chart 57; for instance, investment 
loss in 2009, at the peak of the contraction, was 
more pronounced in those economies that had 
experienced a sustained accumulation of debt in 
the years leading up to the crisis. As in Chart 55, 
the investment loss is defi ned as the percentage 
deviation of the actual level from the level that 
124 See Table 2 in Annex 6. The variables controlled for by the model are stock prices, real investment and the credit-to-GDP ratio.
125 The connection between the intensity of credit accumulation in the expansionary phase and the severity of subsequent recessions has 
been recently documented by a number of empirical studies, which review historical episodes; see, in particular, Jorda et al. (2012).
Chart 56 Credit accumulation prior to 
recessions and subsequent recovery
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Chart 57 Pre-crisis debt accumulation 
compared with investment loss during 
the crisis for euro area economies
(x-axis: pre-crisis debt accumulation in percentage points; 
y-axis: investment loss in percentages)
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Notes: Investment loss is defi ned as the deviation of the real 
gross fi xed capital formation from the pre-crisis trend. The trend 
considered here is linear, extracted over the period from 1995 
to 2004. The exclusion of the three years preceding the crisis is 
intended to avoid unsustainable boomperiod dynamics affecting 
the estimation of the long-term trend.
88
ECB
Occasional Paper No 151
August 2013
would have prevailed by projecting the pre-crisis trend forward. In addition, rising corporate sector 
indebtedness during the years preceding the crisis was particularly pronounced in those euro area 
countries that also saw large residential investments. Some evidence, primarily based on the US 
experience, suggests that the link between housing busts and fi nancial crises is an important factor 
in explaining weak post-recession recovery.126
CORPORATE SECTOR DELEVERAGING AND THE MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS127
In this section, the connection between the process of balance sheet adjustment and the 
macroeconomy at large is explored. At the forefront of the assessment is the acknowledgement 
that excessive accumulation of debt calls for a subsequent unwinding process. While necessary, 
reducing debt is often a long and painful process. The extent to which such adjustment weighs on 
the economy, beyond the short term, has varied widely across historical episodes. Focusing on the 
“Big Five” crises, Table 7 illustrates the build-up of corporate sector debt in a ten-year window 
before and after the peak. On average, the ratio of bank credit to GDP rose by 21 percentage points 
and 29 percentage points in the fi ve years and ten years prior to the crisis respectively, while the 
subsequent deleveraging process is of half the magnitude. Notably, while the increase in bank 
credit was sizeable in the run-up to virtually all severe fi nancial crises, the subsequent retrenchment 
tended to vary in size and timing across crisis episodes. In Finland for instance, the reduction in 
bank credit is of comparable magnitude to the pre-crisis rise. As emphasised in the next section, 
this deleveraging process has accompanied, and been facilitated by, a sharp and persistent recovery 
in economic activity. By contrast, debt reduction in Japan was delayed in the fi rst decade after the 
outbreak of the crisis. Such reluctance to undergo the necessary balance sheet adjustment turned out 
to be costly, in that it led to stagnant economic activity for approximately a decade, as analysed in 
the next section. Overall, post-crisis deleveraging appears to be a lengthy process, often taking the 
form of an unwinding of a large fraction of pre-crisis debt accumulation. 
Chart 50 has summarised the changes in the debt-to-GDP cycle for selected euro area corporate 
sectors around the latest crisis episode. The lagging pattern of bank credit around turning points 
in economic activity,  together with a sharp contraction in GDP, meant that the debt-to-GDP ratio 
continued to rise during the early stages of the recession, beginning to decline only later, when 
economic activity had rebounded somewhat. Such lagging adjustment of indebtedness is common 
126 See, for instance, Bordo and Haubrich (2012).
127 Prepared by Giacomo Carboni, Annalisa Ferrando, Felix Geiger, Carmen Martínez-Carrascal and Manuel Rupprecht.
Table 7 Ratio of bank credit given to the non-financial private sector to gdp, before 
and after severe financial crises
(percentage points)
Run-up to the crisis Post-crisis adjustment 
Country Maximum debt ratio 
around the crisis 
minus the minimum 
in the ten years prior 
to the crisis
Maximum debt ratio 
around the crisis 
minus the minimum 
in the fi ve years prior 
to the crisis
Minimum debt ratio 
in the fi ve years after 
the crisis minus 
the maximum around 
the crisis
Minimum debt ratio
in the ten years after 
the crisis minus 
the maximum around 
the crisis
Spain (1978) 20 15 -10 -10
Norway (1987) 37 34 -8 -8
Sweden (1991) 20 19 -10 -10
Finland (1991) 37 28 -31 -39
Japan (1992) 33 7 -3 -9
Average for the fi ve episodes 29 21 -12 -15
Sources: ECB and ECB calculations.
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in most euro area economies. To assess the extent to which such a pattern is also common across 
fi rms, Table 8 shows the leverage ratios of the sample of NFCs used in the analysis in Chapter 2, 
broken down by fi rm size. It is interesting to note that the aggregate deleveraging pattern is 
similar to the one experienced by fi rms with 
“low leverage” levels, irrespective of the size 
of the fi rm. Indeed, the average leverage of 
fi rms which initially had zero or low levels 
of debt has continued to increase during the 
crisis, while fi rms with initially high levels of 
leverage began a deleveraging process almost 
immediately. All fi rms with high ratios of debt 
to total assets, irrespective of their size, have 
undergone a deleveraging process. At the same 
time, this process has been more pronounced for 
SMEs than for large fi rms.
Deleveraging pressures for euro area NFCs also 
conceal important differences across sectors, 
depending on the excesses accumulated in 
the past. For instance, as discussed briefl y in 
Sections 1.4 and 2.2, fi rms in the construction 
and real estate services sector have experienced 
a signifi cant rise in debt over the last decade, 
largely refl ecting booming housing markets in 
a number of euro area countries. Therefore, the 
need to unwind past imbalances in this sector 
is greater, and more desirable from a welfare 
perspective, than in others.
Table 8 Leverage ratios before and after the crisis, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
Indebtedness of fi rms in 2007, broken down 
by fi rm leverage
2007 2008 2009 2010
Aggregate
zero leverage 0.0 3.6 4.7 5.4
low leverage 9.6 11.0 11.3 11.1
high leverage 44.6 37.6 34.2 30.1
SMEs
zero leverage 0.0 3.6 4.8 5.4
low leverage 9.7 11.0 11.3 11.1
high leverage 44.7 37.6 34.2 30.0
Large companies
zero leverage 0.0 2.6 2.7 4.0
low leverage 8.7 10.4 10.9 11.4
high leverage 41.3 37.9 35.7 35.1
Sources: AMADEUS and ECB calculations.
Notes: Leverage is defi ned as the sum of short-term debt plus long-term debt divided by total assets.  Firms with low leverage in 2007 are 
those that in 2007 had positive leverage below the median leverage (amongst indebted companies) in the corresponding sector and country 
in which the fi rm operates. Firms with high leverage in 2007 are those that in 2007 had leverage above the median leverage (amongst 
indebted companies) in the corresponding sector and country in which the fi rm operates. The size of companies is defi ned as in chapter 2 
based on the European Commission defi nition. For detail see Annex 3. 
Chart 58 Ratio of corporate sector debt 
to GDP in euro area economies
(in percentage points)
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Notes: Corporate sector debt is defi ned as the sum of MFI 
loans and market-based debt. The “expected deleveraging 
pressures” are calculated as the simple average of three statistical 
benchmark estimates: the deviation of corporate debt to GDP at 
the end of 2012 from the historical average, from the pre-boom 
2004 level, and from the euro area median at the end of 2012. 
EA denotes euro area.
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Overall, compared with the sizeable surge before the outbreak of the crisis, the subsequent 
retrenchment in the debt-to-GDP ratio has, so far, been rather contained. If history is any guide, 
further signifi cant deleveraging is expected, in particular in those countries that had experienced 
a pre-crisis boom. A tentative quantifi cation of the deleveraging pressures for euro area corporate 
sectors is illustrated by the blue bars in Chart 58; it is derived on the basis of three distinct statistical 
benchmarks, namely the deviation of the corporate debt-to-GDP level at the end of 2012 from 
historical average, from the pre-boom 2004 level and from the euro area median.128 All three 
benchmarks identify deleveraging pressures for euro area fi rms in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the 
Netherlands. The main caveat is that the equilibrium debt levels can differ across countries and vary 
over time. Structural change in the economy and sectoral composition, as well as developments in 
fi nancial markets and economic patterns, among other factors, may explain the differences in the 
long-term equilibrium levels of debt.      
MACROECONOMIC PATTERNS IN THE DELEVERAGING PROCESS 
Theory and historical evidence show the deleveraging process to be long and potentially painful; the 
extent to which this is the case depends on a number of factors, primarily related to the alternative 
macroeconomic channels through which the deleveraging process may occur. 
In an attempt to identify various deleveraging patterns, the assessment fi rst draws on the historical 
episodes of debt reduction in the Nordic countries and in Japan during the 1990s. An extensive 
body of comparative research often portrays these episodes as polar opposite cases of post-fi nancial 
crisis adjustment, in the form of banking system restructuring, regained internal and external 
competitiveness and economic recovery. The following brief review of these episodes provides 
a historical anchor for a more stylised account of the deleveraging process in the aftermath of 
fi nancial crises. 
The Nordic countries in the 1990s 
The fi nancial crises in Sweden and Finland, and to a lesser extent Norway, during the 1990s were 
largely a case of a credit-led boom/bust cycle.129 A process of fi nancial deregulation had paved the 
way to a sustained lending boom, following a lack of responsible fi nancial behaviour within a 
changing environment. In addition, specifi c rules within the tax system, combined with sustained 
infl ation, meant that the after-tax real interest rates were low and often negative, thus providing an 
incentive to borrow, both domestically and abroad.130 The surge in bank lending fuelled asset prices, 
primarily in real estate and on the stock market, which caused collateral values and fi nancial wealth 
to rise, and this led to further credit expansion. The bust began with an increase in the real after-tax 
interest rate, as Finnish and Swedish central banks raised nominal interest to defend their fi xed 
exchange rate, and the tax deductibility of mortgage rates was limited. The resulting fall in asset 
prices revealed the fragility of the private sector’s balance sheets, in the form of climbing losses and 
soaring corporate sector bankruptcies, which led to severe banking crises. Amplifi ed by the tight 
monetary policy stance aimed at defending the fi xed exchange rate, the severe recession consisted 
in a drop in consumption and investment, particularly in the construction sector, and an explosion 
of public defi cits. The abandonment of the exchange rate peg to the European Currency Unit in 
late 1992, and the subsequent fall in nominal interest rates, stimulated the recovery, which was 
supported by a sharp rebound in exports. At the same time, governments intervened promptly and 
boldly in order to rebuild their banking systems. Such interventions involved creditors being 
128 The estimate of the expected deleveraging pressures is the simple average of the three benchmark estimates.
129 For a detailed assessment of the fi nancial crisis in Finland and Sweden, see, for instance, Jonung et al. (2008), and Honkapohja (2009).
130 Flows of foreign capital played a crucial role both in the accumulation of debt prior to the crisis and in the subsequent downturn.
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guaranteed by the government, liquidity support being provided by the central bank, various 
institutions being restructured in the form of mergers and acquisitions, business models being 
reshuffl ed, bad assets being transferred to separate management companies, and fi nally a capital 
injection of public funds being provided. The long-lasting economic and export performance was 
also related to a major industrial restructuring undertaken in Sweden and Finland in favour of more 
dynamic and competitive sectors, such as information and communication technologies. 
Japan during the 1990s 
The Japanese economy also underwent a process of capital market deregulation and fi nancial 
liberalisation in the mid-1980s which led to a sharp increase in consumer and housing-related 
lending. The credit-led boom was then fuelled by self-reinforcing feedback loops involving 
climbing real estate prices, rising collateral values and loosening credit standards. The subsequent 
bursting of stock and real estate price bubbles, together with the resulting economic slowdown, 
weakened banks’ balance sheets, raising the number of non-performing loans, and exerting 
pressures on their capital base. The reluctance of regulators to force banks to deal promptly and 
effectively with non-performing loans left the banking system in a fragile situation; this was not the 
case in the Nordic crises. Some evidence points to the emergence of an equilibrium in which 
vulnerable banks opted for a policy of “evergreening” loans, whereby credit was extended to fragile 
fi rms, so as to avoid them having to recognise further losses on their balance sheets.131 This process 
is consistent with the evidence of subdued, yet not contracting, extension of bank credit to the 
private sector in the aftermath of the bubble burst, which prevented corporate sector debt 
retrenchment. It was only after almost a decade of having a stagnant economy in Japan (the “lost 
decade”), and after banks had cleaned their balance sheets and raised capital, that the process of 
reducing corporate sector debt could begin; it then extended well into the 2000s. 
ALTERNATIVE DELEVERAGING PATTERNS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EURO AREA 
Drawing on the historical episodes presented above, this section focuses on stylised economic 
patterns associated with deleveraging in the aftermath of fi nancial crises. These distinct patterns 
primarily differ on issues such as corporate balance sheet adjustment strategies, the interaction 
among deleveraging processes in various sectors, and the role played by policy. While deleveraging 
processes do not necessarily call for direct policy interventions per se, historical evidence shows 
that the design of policy measures to tackle structural corporate fi nance issues and investment 
decisions represents a challenging balancing act. 
Policy interventions should, in general, avoid disorderly or abrupt deleveraging processes that, in 
an extreme scenario, could take the following form: banks address their liquidity and funding needs 
in a disorderly manner, triggering an abrupt deleveraging process through quantitative constraints 
being imposed on the provision of loans, and associated tightening lending standards. At the same 
time, the resulting heightened uncertainty and fragile balance sheet conditions lead fi rms to scale 
back on investments. Finally, the collective effort by corporations to address debt overhangs by 
selling assets may trigger falling asset prices which, in turn, reduce a fi rm’s net worth and aggravate 
balance sheet weaknesses. In such circumstances, both supply-side and demand-side factors have 
a strong and self-reinforcing adverse impact on the economy. Similarly, household balance sheets 
can be particularly vulnerable, as a result of the high levels of debt accumulated in the run-up to the 
crisis, and the bleak labour market prospects. Overall, the synchronised efforts of various sectors 
131 For an investigation of the misallocation of credit in Japan in the aftermath of the fi nancial crisis, see, for instance, Peek and 
Rosengren (2008).
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to reduce their leverage then end up being self-defeating, in the context of adverse feedback loops 
in the economy and sizeable downside risks to price stability. In such an extreme scenario, timely 
monetary policy interventions may be effective in containing deleveraging pressures that stem from 
a shortage of liquidity and the associated funding for banks. In addition, these policy measures are 
conducive to a broader mitigation of macroeconomic risks as they alleviate some of the pressures 
on the economy. Governments may also provide support to households via the social security net; 
however, such room for fi scal manoeuvre might be limited by the need to adjust past excesses. 
However, some types of policy intervention aimed at preventing an abrupt credit crunch may, when 
misguided, contribute to delaying the necessary adjustment and, ultimately, increase the economic 
costs of the deleveraging process. Concerned by the adverse short-term consequences of their 
interventions on bank lending policies, banking supervisors may be tempted to exercise forbearance 
towards banks. In this context, excessive and overly protracted monetary accommodation could end 
up contributing to the masking of underlying balance sheet problems, in ways that make it easier 
for troubled and ineffi cient institutions to continue operating. Bank intermediation also becomes 
durably impaired, and the provision of new credit remains constrained. In addition, it is not only 
these subdued credit fl ows that weigh on the recovery process, but also their ineffi cient allocation. 
Indeed, in such a context, the risk is the emergence of a situation of the type experienced in Japan 
during its “lost decade”. Fragile banks have an incentive to continue fi nancing troubled and 
ineffi cient fi rms, so as to avoid recognising further losses. In this scenario, the unwinding process 
can become a long-lasting drag on the economy, and is likely to be curbed by subdued output 
dynamics.132 In this constant balancing act, policy interventions should, therefore, avoid delaying 
the necessary adjustment process. 
Balancing the risks described above means encouraging a steady, controlled and ordered 
restructuring process in the fi nancial and non-fi nancial sectors, consistent with sustainable long-
term patterns. These interventions are centred on an early recognition of losses and write-downs on 
the part of creditors, thereby acknowledging that some lending is no longer viable. An overly 
indebted non-fi nancial corporate sector puts particular strain on the banking sector. If creditors’ 
balance sheet capacity is also restricted, a prompt recapitalisation of the banking system is of utmost 
importance, as part of a general effort to reduce excess capacity and improve effi ciency in the 
banking sector.133 Once the balance sheets of credit institutions have been strengthened, corporate 
defaults as such may have a much more contained impact on the economy than a banking crisis. 
Indeed, the typical accelerator mechanisms associated with credit and collateral, inherent to the 
banking sector, are likely to have a limited role in the case of corporate default. In addition, a fi rm’s 
default could take the form of a broader cleansing process, in which resources are ultimately 
reallocated to more productive sectors.134 Structural reforms aimed at increasing competitiveness 
and reducing unemployment are a crucial part of crisis resolution, much like exports. Historical 
evidence and theoretical insights suggest that, in a context of weak domestic demand associated 
with internal balance sheet adjustments, regaining external competitiveness is crucial for stimulating 
exports and, hence, sustaining economic recovery.  
132 In this context, where the burden of existing debt is relatively large, even otherwise profi table opportunities are not taken up.
133 Private burden-sharing should be used as far as possible. Only if this redistribution does not allow the private sector to fully absorb 
losses, should the public sector support reparation and strengthen particular segments of the private sector’s balance sheets. See the box 
entitled “Towards a new EU framework for bank recovery and resolution”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, August 2012. In this respect, public 
creditworthiness and the need to build “buffer stocks” in times of more favorable macroeconomic dynamics are of crucial importance.
134 See Giesecke et al. (2012).
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4 F IRMS ’  F INANCING 
CONDIT IONS , 
INDEBTEDNESS AND 
THE MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT
Overall, within a comprehensive and in-depth set of policy tools and structural reforms, the 
process of unwinding excessive debt may have an adverse macroeconomic impact in the short run. 
At the same time, as fundamentals improve again over the medium term (bolstered by structural 
and sustainability-enhancing reforms), this process should proceed together with, and be reinforced 
by, sustained recovery and long-lasting economic growth.
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ANNEXES
1 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
USING EURO AREA ACCOUNTS TO ANALYSE NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS – METHODOLOGICAL 
CONCEPTS EXPLAINED135
This report uses national fi nancial and non-fi nancial sector accounts data and, for the euro area, 
the “euro area accounts” (EAA), as these are the most comprehensive data sources for the NFC 
sector. The EAA report data according to the residence of the respective unit (e.g. an enterprise, 
independent of whether this unit is controlled by a non-resident unit). The EAA cover non-fi nancial 
transactions ranging from production and income generation to the use of entrepreneurial income 
for dividend payments and internal fi nancing. The non-fi nancial transactions are integrated with 
the fi nancial accounts to provide a full view of internal and external fi nancing together with 
non-fi nancial and fi nancial investment. Furthermore, transactions are combined with “other 
changes” (i.e. changes which are not due to transactions) in assets to derive a complete presentation 
of balance sheet developments. The EAA, as well as the national fi nancial and non-fi nancial 
accounts, are compiled according to the same international statistical standard.136 Financial and 
non-fi nancial accounts data are thus comparable between countries, and the data for NFCs are 
consistent with data for the other sectors, which are fi nancial corporations, households, governments 
and the rest of the world. At the same time, the aggregate view provided by macroeconomic data 
has some limitations, especially with regard to analysing distributional aspects of fi rms’ fi nancing.
Financial accounts data differ from business accounting and other data sources, in particular 
regarding the valuation of fi nancial assets and liabilities, and the presentation of fi nancial 
transactions and positions between entities of the same enterprise group. These differences are 
explained below.
MARKET VALUATION
Financial assets and liabilities are generally valued at current price, which, in the case of debt 
securities and quoted shares, is equal to the market price.137 It is worth noting that market valuation 
applies not just to assets but also to liabilities. In particular, the outstanding amount of equity issued 
by NFCs may thus vary substantially because of valuation changes. The total change in the market 
value of NFC equity may be broken down into transactions, i.e. changes owing to the issuance or 
redemption of new shares, and non-transaction changes, which are generally due to price changes.138
INCLUSION OF FINANCIAL POSITIONS BETWEEN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
The fi nancial accounts data used in this report are non-consolidated with respect to institutional 
sectors (loans between resident NFCs are included, for example). Therefore, fi nancial positions 
135 Prepared by Andreas Hertkorn. 
136 “The European System of Account, 1995” (ESA 1995) defi nes the accounting rules for the national accounts to be compiled by 
EU Member States. It is the methodological annex of an EU Regulation, see http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/
esa95/en/titelen.htm
137 For unquoted shares, the current price must generally be estimated based on market prices of similar corporations for which market 
prices are available. Other equity generally has to be valued at own funds (equity and reserves) at book value.
138 Changes in the amounts outstanding can also be the result of other volume changes or reclassifi cations. These changes, however, occur 
rather infrequently and scarcely affect the overall picture of the underlying dynamics. In the case of fi nancial assets other than equity, 
e.g. debt securities and loans, other changes also include write-downs/offs (owing to corporate default, for example).
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between NFCs also include assets and liabilities between NFCs belonging to the same enterprise 
group (intragroup positions). Non-consolidated fi nancial accounts thus differ from the consolidated 
accounts in business accounting (where intragroup positions are consolidated out). Comprehensive 
“group-consolidated” data are, however, not available for the NFC sector in the fi nancial accounts 
or other internationally comparable data sources. Furthermore, consolidated data are, in principle, 
less comparable for countries of different sizes, as in large countries there tends to be a higher 
proportion of fi nancing between resident NFCs, i.e. consolidation tends to have a relatively larger 
effect for bigger economies. In addition, unconsolidated data are informative in that they provide a 
detailed picture of fi rms’ interconnectedness, which, especially in times of crisis, may also contain 
refi nancing or credit risks.
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2 INDICATORS OF FIRMS’ CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND FINANCING
Table A1 Maturity of financial assets held by NFCs in the euro area and across countries
(percentages)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Ratio of short-term to long-term fi nancial assets
Average Q1 2000-Q2 2008 49.2 37.5 47.8 61.7 61.7 20.0 13.8 32.1 52.8 23.1 61.7 68.8 29.9 19.8 30.2 67.6 13.1 27.4
Average Q3 2008-Q4 2012 51.2 46.4 76.7 30.8 122.4 20.7 21.9 43.7 74.6 24.8 63.0 52.3 23.8 16.7 37.7 64.5 14.3 32.9
Q4 2012 only 37.7 44.3 76.2 36.9 90.3 19.9 24.5 45.3 64.5 8.0 60.9 46.4 23.7 15.9 38.4 68.2 14.4 32.7
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation. Data are only available for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia 
and Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
Table A2 Selected liquidity indicators for euro area NFCs
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Net working capital as a percentage of total liabilities
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 5.3 1.9 6.1 6.4 -0.8 0.5 0.1 -6.5 5.7 12.0 2.9 8.3 -0.9 -2.7 -2.5 4.3 1.4 0.1
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 10.0 5.6 7.6 5.1 -1.7 2.0 3.0 -3.6 12.5 12.6 3.7 13.1 3.4 -2.3 -3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8
Q4 2012 only 7.8 6.8 9.1 9.1 -4.9 3.2 4.4 -3.3 9.2 3.8 4.8 13.1 4.8 -2.0 -2.8 5.1 3.7 3.9
Ratio of short-term fi nancial  assets to short-term liabilities (percentages)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 128.8 117.2 180.4 192.2 96.4 107.9 101.0 53.1 157.1 336.3 118.8 176.3 96.0 72.3 76.7 149.1 151.3 101.6
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 163.2 155.5 195.8 164.7 91.3 138.6 145.8 69.6 242.0 365.6 125.0 236.8 144.2 73.8 71.0 136.8 213.1 130.6
Q4 2012 only 162.0 173.6 229.0 215.5 72.2 171.3 168.0 72.7 205.0 273.0 134.2 240.0 167.9 74.4 76.6 154.4 245.8 144.6
Cash ratio 1 (expressed as a percentage)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 36.9 73.5 103.5 158.4 96.4 107.6 58.4 44.6 151.0 319.2 46.6 123.3 76.2 71.3 49.9 137.0 150.5 66.9
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 45.4 98.9 109.2 80.1 91.3 136.8 83.2 60.6 235.1 336.1 54.5 176.1 100.7 71.4 36.6 110.2 212.7 84.4
Q4 2012 only 48.5 115.7 130.4 81.1 72.2 165.7 101.2 65.0 198.0 194.4 65.8 169.9 116.2 73.1 40.6 119.5 245.7 95.7
Cash ratio 2 (expressed as a percentage)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 33.9 69.1 100.5 153.2 93.5 102.8 52.9 44.4 147.5 318.5 46.3 117.5 75.4 70.0 48.2 133.4 124.8 64.1
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 41.8 97.7 107.9 78.5 85.4 131.1 75.9 60.4 233.3 335.2 54.5 168.5 100.1 70.7 36.0 107.6 190.4 80.6
Q4 2012 only 45.2 114.9 129.1 80.0 69.5 157.4 94.6 64.9 194.4 193.2 65.8 162.5 115.4 72.2 40.2 117.9 229.9 92.3
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation. Net working capital is calculated as the difference between short-term fi nancial assets and short-term 
liabilities (equal to the sum of short-term loans and short-term debt securities). Cash ratio 1 = (currency and deposits + short-term 
debt securities)/short-term liabilities. Cash ratio 2 = (currency and deposits)/short-term liabilities. Data are only available for Estonia from 
the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the 
fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A3 Capital structure indicators for euro area NFCs
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Debt-to-equity ratio (percentages)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 60.7 90.6 60.1 109.4 64.2 63.8 44.9 71.5 73.0 16.0 94.1 78.6 108.7 70.5 59.6 54.0 52.2 65.6
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 55.0 93.1 63.8 94.3 190.4 100.6 52.9 94.0 96.7 40.5 98.1 75.7 89.2 84.9 94.0 63.4 86.0 77.2
Q4 2012 only 49.2 83.7 58.6 86.3 151.8 89.6 51.6 103.2 93.7 50.4 119.7 67.8 92.6 94.3 92.3 58.7 90.5 73.7
Debt-to-equity ratio (using long-term debt, percentages)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 29.8 63.4 45.5 88.5 37.5 50.9 33.5 43.4 52.3 9.7 56.6 56.4 83.2 50.5 39.1 35.7 47.2 46.3
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 30.0 68.1 48.1 73.2 130.0 87.6 40.7 66.6 76.4 33.0 60.6 56.6 73.3 65.9 63.1 43.3 80.1 57.7
Q4 2012 only 30.3 62.8 45.1 68.2 103.4 79.7 40.2 72.8 73.7 46.9 80.0 50.6 78.2 75.7 64.3 40.0 85.2 56.0
Change in the debt-to-equity ratio between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks (in percentage points)
4.1 1.0 9.2 62.7 49.5 29.6 10.2 20.1 23.7 15.2 -10.0 3.2 1.9 17.0 31.2 12.9 21.7 13.8
Change in the debt-to-equity ratio (using long-term debt) between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks 
(in percentage points)
4.9 3.2 6.9 42.5 42.2 29.3 8.2 21.4 24.0 19.0 -7.7 3.9 5.1 16.6 21.3 9.7 20.7 12.4
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation unless otherwise noted. Notional stocks have been calculated as the change in the amounts 
outstanding (taking the fi rst quarter of 2000 as the base period (or a later starting point depending on data availability)) owing to transactions, 
i.e. excluding valuation changes. “Equity” corresponds to shares and other equity as defi ned in fi nancial accounts. Data are only available 
for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and 
Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A4 Capital structure indicators for euro area NFCs, as a percentage of total liabilities
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Debt 
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 36.7 38.6 32.0 42.1 36.1 31.3 26.6 34.4 35.4 13.1 39.0 38.2 49.4 34.4 29.7 26.6 31.0 33.8
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 35.0 38.5 32.7 40.5 61.3 42.1 29.6 40.3 41.9 27.1 39.1 38.1 44.5 39.0 39.1 30.4 41.0 37.4
Q4 2012 only 32.7 36.8 30.8 37.8 55.4 40.5 29.2 41.6 41.1 31.5 42.0 36.6 45.2 40.7 39.3 29.2 42.7 36.6
Shares and other equity
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 61.0 43.3 53.3 39.6 58.6 49.3 60.1 48.5 48.7 81.6 41.4 49.2 46.8 48.9 50.1 49.4 60.4 51.9
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 63.9 41.5 51.2 43.1 32.6 42.0 56.1 43.0 43.4 67.7 40.0 50.6 49.9 46.0 41.6 47.9 47.9 48.5
Q4 2012 only 66.4 44.0 52.6 43.8 36.5 45.2 56.5 40.3 43.9 62.5 35.1 54.0 48.8 43.2 42.5 49.7 47.2 49.6
Other liabilities
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 2.3 18.1 14.8 18.2 5.3 19.4 13.3 17.1 15.9 5.4 19.6 12.7 3.8 16.8 20.1 23.9 8.6 14.3
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 1.1 20.0 16.1 16.4 6.2 15.9 14.4 16.6 14.7 5.1 20.9 11.4 5.6 15.0 19.4 21.7 11.0 14.1
Q4 2012 only 0.9 19.2 16.6 18.4 8.1 14.3 14.3 18.2 15.0 6.0 23.0 9.4 6.0 16.1 18.2 21.1 10.1 13.8
Change in the proportion of debt between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks (in percentage points)
1.8 -0.1 2.8 13.5 13.1 10.5 4.8 6.8 6.5 8.8 -3.7 2.3 1.0 6.0 9.3 4.7 7.2 5.0
Change in the proportion of shares and other equity between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks 
(in percentage points)
-1.8 -0.7 -5.4 -15.4 -12.6 -8.0 -3.4 -4.4 -5.3 -8.9 0.2 0.9 0.0 -3.4 -9.3 -3.0 -9.1 -3.7
Change in the proportion of other liabilities between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks 
(in percentage points)
0.0 0.8 2.6 1.8 -0.6 -2.6 -1.4 -2.4 -1.2 0.2 3.6 -3.1 -1.0 -2.5 0.0 -1.7 1.9 -1.3
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation unless otherwise noted. Notional stocks have been calculated as the change in the amounts 
outstanding (taking the fi rst quarter of 2000 as the base period (or a later starting point depending on data availability)) owing to transactions, 
i.e. excluding valuation changes. Data are only available for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia 
from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A5 MFI loans in euro area NFCs’ capital structure, as a percentage of total debt 
and total liabilities
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Proportion of MFI loans in total debt (percentages)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 21.4 50.2 45.2 42.3 70.6 58.3 39.6 60.4 47.5 20.6 43.5 47.5 62.7 45.7 57.7 25.5 25.7 49.1
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 16.2 46.9 42.3 39.3 72.9 59.6 39.2 62.2 76.3 13.1 43.4 56.7 45.2 42.9 59.3 46.1 28.5 49.9
Q4 2012 only 14.4 45.5 37.4 28.2 79.4 51.5 37.0 62.8 76.0 9.9 37.8 58.1 43.2 38.5 55.6 44.6 28.9 46.7
Proportion of MFI loans in total liabilities (percentages)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 7.9 19.4 15.0 17.5 25.4 18.2 10.5 20.8 17.1 2.7 16.9 18.1 31.6 15.7 17.2 7.1 8.1 16.6
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 5.7 18.0 13.9 16.0 44.8 25.1 11.6 25.1 32.0 3.4 16.9 21.6 20.1 16.7 23.2 14.0 11.7 18.7
Q4 2012 only 4.7 16.8 11.5 10.6 44.0 20.9 10.8 26.1 31.2 3.1 15.9 21.3 19.5 15.7 21.8 13.0 12.3 17.1
Change in the proportion of MFI loans in total liabilities between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks 
(in percentage points)
-1.5 -1.3 -1.4 3.4 4.6 7.1 1.4 4.3 14.9 0.9 -0.3 4.5 -3.8 1.1 5.7 7.0 2.8 2.6
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation unless otherwise noted. Notional stocks have been calculated as the change in the amounts 
outstanding (taking the fi rst quarter of 2000 as the base period (or a later starting point depending on data availability)) owing to transactions, 
i.e. excluding valuation changes. Data are only available for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia 
from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
Table A7 composition of NFCs’ short-term liabilities
(percentages)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Short-term loans
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 96.9 94.8 98.5 100.0 99.9 97.7 88.8 98.2 100.0 88.8 100.0 99.8 99.4 78.9 99.0 97.0 59.5 94.9
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 97.0 96.1 99.2 100.0 99.9 99.1 94.8 98.8 99.5 94.1 100.0 99.8 99.4 60.3 99.3 99.4 63.7 96.3
Short-term debt securities
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 3.1 5.2 1.5 0.0 0.1 2.3 11.2 1.8 0.0 11.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 21.1 1.0 3.0 40.5 5.1
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 3.0 3.9 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.9 5.2 1.2 0.5 5.9 0.0 0.2 0.6 39.7 0.7 0.6 36.3 3.7
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation. Data are only available for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and 
Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
Table A6 Maturity structure of NFCs’ liabilities
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Ratio of short-term to long-term liabilities (percentages)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 23.7 16.5 10.0 11.4 19.2 8.6 8.4 19.6 13.6 5.7 23.9 14.1 13.6 13.3 14.7 13.5 3.3 13.2
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 19.2 14.8 10.6 12.2 26.2 6.9 8.6 16.5 11.5 5.7 23.4 12.2 9.2 11.5 19.0 14.0 3.3 12.4
Change in the ratio of short-term to long-term liabilities between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, based on notional stocks 
(in percentage points)
-1.4 -1.7 1.2 8.7 -1.2 -0.9 1.1 -3.4 -2.0 -3.9 -0.2 -0.8 -2.2 -1.0 4.7 1.4 0.2 -0.1
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation unless otherwise noted. Notional stocks have been calculated as the change in the amounts 
outstanding (taking the fi rst quarter of 2000 as the base period (or a later starting point depending on data availability)) owing to 
transactions, i.e. excluding valuation changes. Short-term liabilities comprise short-term loans and short-term debt securities. Long-term 
liabilities comprise shares and other equity, long-term loans, pension fund reserves and long-term debt securities. Data are only available 
for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and 
Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A8 Composition of NFCs’ long-term liabilities
(percentages)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Long-term loans
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 21.5 29.2 29.5 44.6 22.1 32.8 19.0 23.3 33.8 7.0 30.4 31.1 38.4 30.9 27.3 23.8 28.7 26.2
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 21.7 29.7 30.2 40.8 49.0 46.2 22.0 32.3 41.2 20.5 32.7 32.0 34.0 36.1 37.5 29.2 39.3 30.9
Long-term debt securities
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 1.1 2.4 1.8 1.4 4.6 0.6 5.9 2.1 0.4 1.7 5.8 4.7 6.5 2.1 0.7 2.5 3.1 3.3
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 1.3 3.4 2.2 1.4 7.3 0.4 6.8 3.4 2.1 3.9 5.0 4.0 8.3 2.9 1.1 1.0 5.1 3.9
Shares and other equity
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 77.1 61.5 68.8 54.0 73.3 66.5 75.1 69.9 65.7 91.1 63.9 64.2 55.1 66.5 71.9 73.7 68.2 68.5
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 76.9 59.5 67.6 57.8 43.7 53.4 71.1 60.1 56.7 75.5 62.4 63.9 57.7 60.4 61.4 69.8 55.6 63.4
Pension fund reserves
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 0.2 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 0.0 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation. Data are only available for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and 
Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
Table A9 Composition of the total debt of NFCs, broken down by maturity
(percentages)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Short-term loans
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 49.2 28.5 23.9 20.2 42.0 20.1 22.5 39.0 28.4 34.9 39.8 28.3 22.9 22.4 33.8 32.9 5.7 28.0
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 43.9 25.6 24.5 22.2 31.7 12.8 21.8 28.8 20.9 18.4 38.3 25.2 17.8 13.6 32.8 31.5 4.4 24.3
Short-term debt securities
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 1.6 1.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.9 0.7 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 6.0 0.3 1.0 3.8 1.5
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 1.4 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 8.9 0.2 0.2 2.5 0.9
Long-term loans
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 46.3 53.0 71.5 77.3 48.2 77.4 57.2 46.8 70.7 47.7 50.6 62.3 65.8 66.0 64.1 59.8 81.6 58.7
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 51.6 53.8 70.1 75.2 59.3 86.2 58.7 57.3 75.1 67.2 53.6 66.4 66.1 70.6 65.1 66.1 82.4 63.1
Long-term debt securities
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 2.4 4.3 4.3 2.5 9.7 1.5 17.5 4.2 0.9 11.8 9.6 9.3 11.2 4.6 1.7 6.3 8.8 7.3
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 3.1 6.1 5.1 2.6 8.9 0.8 18.3 5.9 3.9 12.5 8.1 8.4 16.1 5.7 1.9 2.2 10.7 8.1
Pension fund reserves
Average Q1 2000 – Q2 2008 0.5 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 9.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5
Average Q3 2008 – Q4 2012 0.1 13.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation. Data are only available for Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and 
Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A10 Overview of the external financing growth of non–financial corporations across
euro area countries
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Annual rate of change across fi nancing instruments (percentages)
Total external fi nancing (total liabilities)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 5.9 2.7 13.4 7.0 7.3 8.9 3.9 4.0 15.7 14.5 10.5 3.2 7.8 5.9 8.8 13.4 2.9 4.7
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 5.6 1.4 2.2 0.8 0.9 –0.3 2.6 1.1 5.5 –1.7 4.7 0.4 1.3 2.0 0.6 2.2 2.0 1.6
Shares and other equity
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 3.9 2.9 5.9 2.5 3.6 4.0 2.8 1.6 14.3 15.1 14.5 2.7 9.0 5.5 0.6 11.3 0.6 3.0
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 5.8 1.0 3.4 –4.6 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.8 5.4 –7.7 2.5 1.8 0.1 1.9 0.8 2.1 1.8 1.9
Debt fi nancing (loans, debt securities issued, pension fund reserves of NFCs)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 8.7 3.1 20.2 10.4 14.5 16.0 8.0 8.7 19.4 16.0 4.0 4.7 6.8 7.9 20.7 18.5 7.0 8.0
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 5.1 1.0 –1.2 4.4 0.5 –0.1 2.8 0.4 5.5 15.6 3.9 0.9 2.5 3.1 1.8 2.1 2.9 1.6
Trade credit payable*
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 3.5 2.9 4.1 8.1 N.A. 10.3 3.8 1.6 9.4 N.A. 20.9 3.7 11.2 4.8 13.0 16.6 5.0 4.7
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 69.1 4.8 5.4 3.5 N.A. –8.0 3.1 1.0 7.0 N.A. 11.3 –2.1 5.9 –0.3 –1.3 3.0 –0.8 0.5
Debt fi nancing, of which:
Loans 
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 8.7 2.4 19.7 10.7 12.7 16.8 8.6 8.6 18.0 19.4 4.2 4.9 6.2 7.2 20.7 20.0 6.7 8.1
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 4.7 0.4 –1.8 4.3 1.0 –0.1 1.1 –0.1 7.3 13.1 3.7 0.3 0.6 2.8 1.6 2.2 1.9 0.9
Debt securities issued
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 12.1 13.2 32.5 –0.4 41.4 –3.5 5.8 19.6 N.A. 1.8 2.1 4.0 11.8 13.4 25.4 6.7 10.1 8.3
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 14.3 5.3 11.4 8.8 –4.2 4.8 11.0 11.5 –36.8 38.4 5.3 9.5 13.8 4.9 20.3 0.8 10.5 9.5
Pension fund reserves
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 0.7 4.1 N.A. N.A. N.A. –11.8 N.A. 5.7 N.A. 9.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 12.5 N.A. N.A. N.A. 4.3
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 97.3 2.1 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. –1.6 N.A. –9.3 N.A. N.A. N.A. –0.3 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.9
Loans, of which:
MFI loans (domestic)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 2.6 1.3 N.A. 24.5 13.2 18.8 6.3 8.9 21.7 12.9 3.9 6.5 3.8 8.9 25.3 23.4 7.6 8.0
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 –1.1 0.1 –3.4 –6.7 –2.7 –3.5 1.8 0.8 6.2 –2.9 2.8 3.3 1.4 –0.6 –0.8 1.2 3.8 –0.2
Inter–company loans**
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 13.2 10.3 2.3 N.A. N.A. 5.7 9.7 6.1 N.A. 29.5 N.A. N.A. 35.1 8.5 17.8 11.4 3.6 10.3
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 3.1 1.0 –3.1 N.A. N.A. 7.8 –0.9 –12.2 N.A. 24.1 N.A. N.A. 0.1 10.0 9.1 21.5 2.4 2.8
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Table A10 Overview of the external financing growth of non–financial corporations across 
euro area countries (cont’d)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Other loans (mainly from other fi nancial institutions)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 6.9 4.7 15.6 5.2 6.5 20.1 15.3 3.2 10.2 8.5 5.8 3.7 8.5 9.1 7.3 16.4 12.0 6.2
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 12.4 1.0 2.2 14.5 18.5 4.3 1.9 –0.9 13.0 15.8 4.6 –4.2 0.9 4.3 4.0 2.1 0.6 1.8
Annual rate of change across maturities (in percentages)
Short–term debt fi nancing (short–term loans, short–term debt securities issued)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 7.5 3.1 15.5 18.5 11.2 12.0 8.4 3.4 14.1 19.0 6.6 4.5 2.9 7.2 27.0 22.1 11.4 6.4
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 1.8 –3.5 –2.6 4.1 –2.2 –10.7 1.3 –3.0 5.8 –13.2 5.1 1.1 –3.5 –3.0 –3.8 –0.4 –4.3 –1.6
Long–term debt fi nancing (long–term loans, long–term debt securities issued, pension fund reserves)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 10.1 3.1 22.1 9.1 17.0 17.3 7.9 12.7 21.7 14.5 2.4 4.8 8.2 8.2 17.5 16.7 6.7 8.7
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 7.9 2.8 –0.3 5.1 2.0 1.7 3.3 2.1 5.4 30.6 3.2 1.0 3.9 5.0 5.2 3.3 3.6 2.8
Long–term external fi nancing (shares and other equity, long–term loans, long–term debt securities issued, pension fund reserves)
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 5.3 3.0 10.9 5.2 7.1 8.3 4.0 4.8 16.6 15.0 10.0 3.3 8.5 6.3 5.2 12.6 2.3 4.7
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 6.3 1.7 2.1 –0.6 1.8 1.8 2.6 1.8 5.4 –1.5 2.8 1.5 1.6 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3
Short–term debt fi nancing, of which:
Short–term loans 
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 7.4 2.4 15.1 18.5 11.2 12.6 10.4 3.3 14.1 21.5 6.4 4.5 3.0 3.8 27.2 22.5 11.4 6.5
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 1.9 –2.6 –2.0 4.1 –2.2 –10.5 1.3 –3.0 5.8 –12.6 5.7 1.1 –3.6 –6.1 –3.9 –0.4 –6.4 –1.4
Short–term debt securities 
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 16.7 23.1 132.9 N.A. 30.8 –3.7 –6.2 19.0 N.A. 1.8 N.A. 202.3 –8.6 21.1 19.1 237.0 13.6 4.9
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 0.9 –10.2 –44.6 N.A. N.A. –11.3 3.9 –2.6 45.6 –18.5 N.A. 170.5 62.3 2.0 19.8 –1.1 1.1 –4.2
Long–term debt fi nancing, of which:
Long–term loans 
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 10.2 2.4 21.8 9.3 14.4 18.2 7.9 13.6 19.7 18.7 2.5 5.2 7.5 8.3 17.3 18.8 6.5 8.9
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 7.1 2.0 –1.4 5.0 3.3 1.6 1.0 1.7 7.8 28.4 2.4 0.1 1.8 4.7 4.8 3.5 2.5 1.9
Long–term debt securities 
Average Q1 2000 – 
Q2 2008 12.1 11.4 30.2 0.4 42.1 –2.4 8.4 20.3 N.A. 1.8 1.3 4.2 12.3 6.5 35.9 0.3 9.1 9.2
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 22.3 12.2 14.9 8.8 –4.2 14.0 12.0 12.6 –37.5 50.8 8.2 9.5 13.7 9.9 22.7 1.3 14.6 12.1
Source: ECB.
Notes: The calculation of average annual growth rates is based on the respective data ranges shown in the table. Data are only available for 
Estonia from the fourth quarter of 2003; for Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2004; and for Luxembourg and Malta 
from the fi rst quarter of 2005. Trade credit data are published quarterly for Germany, Estonia (from 2007 onwards), Spain, France, Italy, 
Austria (from 2006 onwards), Portugal, Slovenia (from 2004 onwards), Slovakia (from 2004 onwards) and Finland; trade credit data for 
the other euro area countries are based on annual data and available until 2011. Averages based on annual data refer to the periods 2000–08 
and 2009–2011. Inter–company loan data are available for Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A11 Selected balance sheet indicators for NFCs across euro area countries 
(percentages)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Debt-to-GDP ratio
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008 145 70 86 115 54 97 88 73 108 134 133 97 83 120 68 51 93 86
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012 179 69 102 185 67 139 103 90 172 285 147 94 104 157 96 49 115 103
Debt-to-gross operating surplus ratio
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008 736 316 N.A. 408 256 568 563 337 N.A. N.A. N.A. 437 384 691 439 N.A. 378 428
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012 862 299 N.A. 711 331 732 694 476 N.A. N.A. N.A. 423 483 906 607 N.A. 544 523
Debt-to-total liabilities ratio
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008 37 39 32 42 36 31 27 34 35 13 39 38 49 34 30 27 31 34
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012 35 38 33 40 61 42 30 40 42 27 39 38 44 39 39 30 41 37
Debt-to-equity ratio
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008 61 91 60 109 64 64 45 71 73 16 94 79 109 71 60 54 52 66
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012 55 93 64 94 190 101 53 94 97 40 98 76 89 85 94 63 86 77
Interest rate payment burden
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008 26 13 N.A. 9 10 19 31 10 N.A. N.A. N.A. 18 11 20 14 N.A. 16 17
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012 22 12 N.A. 14 9 20 28 9 N.A. N.A. N.A. 16 13 25 19 N.A. 23 16
Debt maturities (percentage of total debt)
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008
short-term loans 49 28 24 20 42 20 22 39 28 35 40 28 23 22 34 33 6 28
short-term securities 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 2
long-term loans 46 53 71 77 48 77 57 47 71 48 51 62 66 66 64 60 82 59
long-term securities 2 4 4 3 10 2 17 4 1 12 10 9 11 5 2 6 9 7
pension funds 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012
short-term loans 44 26 25 22 32 13 22 29 21 19 39 25 18 14 33 31 4 24
short-term securities 2 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 2
long-term loans 46 53 71 77 48 77 57 47 71 48 51 62 66 66 64 60 82 59
long-term securities 2 4 4 3 10 2 17 4 1 12 10 9 11 5 2 6 9 7
pension funds 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
Ratio of short-term assets to short-term debt (percentages)
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008 129 117 180 192 96 108 101 53 157 336 119 176 96 72 77 149 151 102
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012 163 156 196 165 91 139 146 70 242 366 125 237 144 74 71 137 213 131
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are based on market valuation. Debt is defi ned as the sum of loans, debt securities issued and pension fund reserves of NFCs. 
Short-term debt is defi ned as debt with an original maturity of up to one year, while long-term debt is defi ned as debt with an original 
maturity of over one year. EA denotes euro area.
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Table A12 Ratio of MFI loans to gross value added, and MFI loan growth across sectors 
of economic activity 
(percentages)
BE DE EE IE GR ES FR IT CY LU MT NL AT PT SI SK FI EA
Ratio of MFI loans to gross value added across sectors of economic activity
All sectors
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 34.7 39.5 N.A. 87.5 41.1 77.1 40.9 52.8 102.9 146.0 85.2 54.4 55.8 68.2 51.0 27.0 30.6 49.5
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 35.8 40.5 49.8 89.3 57.1 90.8 48.6 63.5 156.7 157.4 97.4 67.5 61.2 79.2 66.2 25.7 38.8 56.8
Industry
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 37.2 24.0 N.A. 30.7 78.7 75.2 35.2 91.7 120.4 196.2 76.7 36.0 46.6 62.6 53.8 23.3 27.5 47.2
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 43.9 30.0 40.9 27.2 105.7 94.8 44.4 108.1 219.7 304.0 125.3 48.0 47.1 78.2 96.8 26.6 39.0 57.0
Construction and real estate services 
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 78.1 91.0 N.A. 318.0 39.0 181.1 108.4 95.6 213.7 390.9 249.6 119.2 126.7 195.4 46.5 48.4 86.4 115.5
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 92.0 88.5 142.4 474.7 53.8 237.1 135.9 127.4 376.4 470.9 324.6 223.8 180.5 220.1 124.9 52.4 105.5 142.8
Wholesale and retail trade
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 35.3 28.9 N.A. 46.7 41.8 33.3 27.5 38.9 105.0 110.2 65.3 30.4 30.5 44.9 61.8 29.7 19.7 32.8
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 33.4 26.8 27.6 48.7 52.5 34.5 28.3 44.5 121.3 101.3 75.5 40.4 30.9 42.9 77.0 25.4 23.1 34.7
Services other than real estate
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 16.1 31.9 N.A. 36.9 28.4 46.3 17.5 18.4 37.4 70.0 60.3 38.0 47.6 38.0 47.0 19.6 11.0 28.0
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 15.0 30.8 23.6 33.9 46.6 55.3 18.2 20.0 67.9 64.5 55.6 32.9 36.9 51.2 22.5 12.4 14.6 28.9
Annual rate of growth of MFI loans across main sectors of economic activity
All sectors
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 5.5 1.4 N.A. 27.0 10.8 22.5 8.3 8.8 22.4 8.0 12.7 8.2 1.9 6.7 29.4 23.4 10.1 9.2
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 –1.6 –0.4 –5.2 –15.0 3.0 –4.6 1.5 0.5 7.0 –4.9 3.1 3.5 2.4 –1.4 –0.9 1.0 3.7 –0.7
Industry
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 3.5 2.4 N.A. 13.2 4.1 12.1 5.7 5.0 3.2 6.0 12.8 7.6 –0.1 2.3 20.8 22.9 6.2 5.7
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 –1.6 1.6 –1.3 –13.4 13.7 –3.1 –0.5 –2.3 25.5 –4.8 6.6 5.2 0.2 1.3 6.4 4.1 –0.5 –0.6
Construction and real estate services 
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 9.1 1.1 N.A. 37.0 22.4 32.9 10.6 15.0 34.3 10.2 22.7 8.3 7.0 9.6 108.3 24.6 11.4 13.6
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 1.2 0.3 –6.3 –16.4 –3.9 –6.6 3.4 2.5 2.4 –3.1 –1.4 13.2 3.4 –4.4 5.1 5.9 6.9 –0.2
Wholesale and retail trade
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 4.3 –0.9 N.A. 18.8 9.3 15.8 4.1 7.0 4.5 5.0 4.3 5.0 1.2 5.0 14.5 22.6 11.4 5.9
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012 –4.0 –1.9 –7.7 –12.5 –3.5 –3.0 1.0 0.4 4.7 –6.2 6.4 9.3 –0.1 –4.2 3.0 –2.3 –0.7 –0.6
Services other than real estate
Average Q1 2003 – 
Q2 2008 4.6 1.9 N.A. 16.7 14.3 18.6 8.6 7.6 40.7 7.4 8.5 11.1 –2.4 6.0 33.9 23.6 11.5 7.6
Average Q3 2008 – 
Q4 2012
–0.5 –2.5 –5.8 –12.2 10.9 –1.9 –2.3 2.2 14.0 –7.8 4.7 –7.6 3.6 3.2 –12.9 –5.3 5.4 –2.0
Source: ECB.
Notes: Data are available from the fi rst quarter of 2003. Data are only available for Malta from the fi rst quarter of 2005; for Cyprus 
and Slovenia from the fourth quarter of 2005; for Slovakia from the fi rst quarter of 2006; and for Estonia from the fi rst quarter of 2009. 
EA denotes euro area.
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Table A13 Change in the debt-to-equity ratio of NFCs across euro area countries 
(percentage points)
 BE  DE  EE  IE  GR  ES  FR  IT  CY  LU  MT  NL  AT  PT  SI  SK  FI EA
Average Q1 2000 - Q2 2008
Overall change 2.2 22.4 1.0 23.8 91.2 43.3 17.3 30.3 22.6 4.2 -10.1 24.5 -53.1 16.1 28.1 14.7 41.9 24.1
Change owing to transactions 17.3 2.8 41.1 77.6 47.9 77.0 20.9 49.0 22.6 1.3 -21.9 12.8 -28.3 16.2 56.1 65.7 33.5 27.5
Change owing to valuation 
effects -15.1 19.6 -40.1 -53.8 43.3 -33.6 -3.5 -18.7 0.0 2.9 11.8 11.7 -24.7 -0.1 -28.0 -51.0 8.4 -3.4
Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012
Overall change -12.7 -9.1 -6.2 -14.7 5.9 -1.1 0.5 20.0 -2.6 28.5 25.8 -16.0 4.6 17.7 8.6 -7.9 13.3 -1.7
Change owing to transactions -6.1 0.6 -22.2 129.2 -1.8 -16.0 -0.9 -9.4 -2.6 21.0 14.7 -4.4 11.0 3.7 0.6 -0.3 3.9 -2.8
Change owing to valuation 
effects
-6.6 -9.7 16.0 -143.9 7.8 14.9 1.3 29.4 0.0 7.5 11.2 -11.5 -6.4 14.0 8.0 -7.6 9.4 1.1
Source: ECB. 
Notes: Data are based on amounts outstanding at market valuation and on notional stocks. Notional stocks have been calculated as 
the change in the amounts outstanding (taking the fi rst quarter of 2000 as the base period (or a later starting point depending on data 
availability)) owing to transactions, i.e. excluding valuation changes. EA denotes euro area.
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Chart A3 Debt-to-total liabilities ratio 
of NFCs across euro area countries
(percentages)
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Notes: Data are based on amounts outstanding. Debt includes 
loans, debt securities and pension fund reserves. Total assets 
are proxied by total liabilities. The 75th, 50th (median) and 25th 
percentiles denote the values below which 75%, 50% and 25% 
of the observations can be found, respectively.
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3 DATASET OF FIRM-LEVEL DATA 139
SAMPLE BASED ON THE BUREAU VAN DIJK AMADEUS DATABASE
The source of fi rm-level data is the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database, which includes comparable 
fi nancial information for public and private companies. In particular, the information consists of 
the main components of the balance sheet (i.e. current assets (including liquidity), fi xed assets 
(including tangible assets), short- and long-term liabilities, and shareholders’ funds) and of the 
income statements (i.e. turnover, operating income and profi t). Other characteristics included in the 
information are the sector in which the company operates, the age of the company, the number of 
people it employs and whether or not it is listed.
The observations included in the database cover the period from 1993 to 2010. The database 
includes fi rms located in all 17 euro area countries, even if the coverage is different in terms of the 
starting point from which data are recorded and the number of corporations included.140
Having obtained the data from the database, a number of processes had to be followed to prepare 
them for this report. At a preliminary stage, data quality controls were used to eliminate fi rms 
with missing or unreliable data for the variables of interest, such as negative assets or debt, and 
outlier values for selected fi nancial indicators. As a further step, the values of variables of interest 
were winsorised at the fi rst and 99th percentiles; the cut-off points were calculated for each sector, 
country and year in order to take into account differences in these three categories.
Since this report mainly focuses on the past decade, and owing to a widespread increase in the 
number of observations across all countries since 2000, in particular for smaller fi rms, the fi nal 
dataset includes data from 2001 to 2010. As a fi nal step, and in order to calculate certain variables 
139 Prepared by Antonio De Socio.
140 Austria provided a dataset from national sources (Supervisory Statistics, Models and Credit Quality Assessment Division, 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank) in order to increase the number of fi rms included.
Table A14 Number of observations, broken down by country and year
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Austria 1,231 221 324 609 715 657 797 736 0 0 5,290
Belgium 42,935 48,394 54,467 51,625 48,052 45,327 45,387 40,038 31,350 8,285 415,860
Cyprus 50 52 53 54 140 161 200 216 165 78 1,169
Germany 5,293 10,141 16,331 24,422 82,277 119,166 129,201 128,276 102,957 82,072 700,136
Estonia 10,627 10,822 11,883 16,184 17,858 20,151 22,200 23,409 19,921 15,644 168,699
Spain 314,696 358,335 381,562 407,177 422,621 427,927 406,418 370,816 288,892 234,928 3,613,372
Finland 37,658 41,316 44,956 43,816 46,823 52,356 64,761 70,082 61,284 51,115 514,167
France 363,543 420,939 443,703 478,720 507,256 535,360 559,472 563,979 465,413 381,992 4,720,377
Greece 17,746 18,881 19,932 20,171 21,076 20,885 19,428 17,123 8,395 6,973 170,610
Ireland 818 925 1,237 1,845 2,352 2,701 2,873 2,789 1,956 1,424 18,920
Italy 106,335 157,566 163,859 308,747 338,003 378,670 393,484 357,341 209,543 164,066 2,577,614
Luxembourg 231 233 341 434 563 680 690 535 310 164 4,181
Malta 46 19 155 197 238 263 282 336 302 230 2,068
Netherlands 3,197 3,983 4,457 4,889 5,189 5,602 5,712 5,388 4,374 3,476 46,267
Portugal 19,327 27,703 40,128 49,953 153,069 162,188 167,057 152,780 64,714 49,103 886,022
Slovenia 4,900 6,490 6,964 8,113 8,650 9,021 8,518 7,284 5,191 3,887 69,018
Slovakia 345 1,206 2,116 2,961 3,951 5,435 6,946 6,727 5,681 4,089 39,457
TOTAL 928,978 1,107,226 1,192,468 1,419,917 1,658,833 1,786,550 1,833,426 1,747,855 1,270,448 1,007,526 13,953,227
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that required lagged observations and to increase the reliability of fi rms’ data, companies were only 
considered if they had been monitored for at least three consecutive years.
As a result of this process, the dataset includes around 14 million observations (see Table A14). 
Most of these observations are of companies located in France, Spain and Italy. Among the 
largest euro area countries, there are fewer fi rms observed in Germany or the Netherlands than in 
Portugal. The number of observations is lowest for Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg and Austria.141
More than 2.5 million fi rms are included in the dataset. Table A15 presents some of their 
characteristics. In general, most of the companies included are relatively small and young, and 
nearly all of them are unlisted: micro and small142 fi rms represent 94% of the total, whereas public 
companies only account for 0.1%.
The details of the breakdown of the sample by sector are reported in Table A16.143 Most of the 
companies are in the construction and real estate sector (25%), the manufacturing sector (18%) 
or the retail trade sector (17%) – this distribution can also be linked to the size of fi rms included 
in the dataset.
141 The representativeness of the sample, in terms of the number of fi rms, can be tested by comparing the number of fi rms in the dataset with 
those in Eurostat data. We have chosen to make a comparison across fi rm size, as the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus dataset is considered 
more representative for large companies. However, Eurostat only groups fi rms according to the number of employees, while this report 
follows the European Commission’s method that takes into account turnover and total assets, as well as the number of employees. For 
this reason, the results of the comparison have to be approached with caution. The results show that the Eurostat dataset has a very low 
coverage (less than 30%) of large fi rms in Austria, Cyprus and Ireland. The representativeness in other countries is high (above 50%) for 
large fi rms in Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), for medium and large fi rms in Belgium, Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia, and for 
small fi rms in Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Portugal and Greece. Eurostat data for Malta are not available.
142 See below for details on size classifi cation.
143 See below for details on sector classifi cation.
Table A15 Main characteristics of firms
Country Number 
of fi rms
Number 
of observations
Size (percentage of total) Size
Real total assets 
(EUR thousands)
Age 
(years)
Percentage 
listedmicro small medium large
Austria 5,290 27,431 13.3 22.7 43.8 20.2 53,214 21 n.a.
Belgium 77,719 415,860 74.0 15.8 7.8 2.4 15,056 16 0.2
Cyprus 241 1,169 16.4 40.1 31.5 12.0 142,348 23 40.8
Germany 155,769 700,136 75.4 12.7 6.7 5.2 40,854 17 0.6
Estonia 30,297 168,699 82.1 14.0 3.4 0.6 1,088 7 0.0
Spain 627,686 3,613,372 73.9 22.0 3.4 0.7 3,777 11 0.0
Finland 87,461 514,167 84.1 11.7 3.0 1.2 5,572 15 0.2
France 777,568 4,720,377 83.9 12.6 2.8 0.8 5,544 13 0.1
Greece 27,657 170,610 45.2 42.5 10.2 2.1 9,337 16 1.0
Ireland 4,416 18,920 76.2 9.6 9.7 4.6 41,657 12 0.5
Italy 499,115 2,577,614 71.8 21.6 5.3 1.2 7,202 14 0.1
Luxembourg 1,037 4,181 44.2 26.0 20.6 9.2 86,054 23 1.1
Malta 413 2,068 42.8 28.4 20.8 7.9 13,395 18 1.0
Netherlands 8,865 46,267 19.5 15.7 34.3 30.4 221,403 28 1.9
Portugal 190,468 886,022 82.4 14.3 2.7 0.5 2,425 13 0.0
Slovenia 12,102 69,018 61.5 25.4 9.9 3.2 5,550 12 0.5
Slovakia 8,738 39,457 43.5 31.2 19.7 5.6 3,941 9 1.3
Total 2,514,842 13,975,368 77.0 17.0 4.0 1.3 8,076 13 0.1
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SIZE AND SECTOR CLASSIFICATION
The size classes are defi ned using information on turnover, assets and the number of employees 
(if recorded). In order to control for differences in infl ation, the values of turnover and assets are 
calculated in real terms, using the GDP defl ator (the reference year is 2000). The classifi cation is 
based on the ceilings defi ned by the European Commission.144 Micro fi rms have fewer than ten 
workers and turnover or assets of less than €2 million. The corresponding fi gures for small fi rms 
are 50 workers and turnover or assets of less than €10 million, and for medium-sized fi rms 250 
workers, turnover of less than €50 million and assets of less than €43 million. Above these cut-off 
points, fi rms are classifi ed as large.
The sector classifi cation is based on NACE 2 codes. Firms whose code is not available are 
excluded from the dataset. Furthermore, fi rms operating in agriculture, fi shing, mining, fi nancial 
activities, public sector, education, health, entertainment, and other services (sections A, B, K, O, 
P, Q, R, and S) are excluded. The detailed sectoral classifi cation used in the report is as follows.
1. Manufacturing: section C, divisions 10-33.
2. Electricity, gas and water supply: sections D and E, divisions 35-39.
3. Construction and real estate: section F, divisions 41-43, and section L, division 68.
4. Wholesale trade: section G, divisions 45-46.
144 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-fi gures-analysis/sme-defi nition/index_en.htm
Table A16 Distribution of firms across sectors
(percentages)
Country Sector
manufacturing Electricity, 
gas and 
water
Construction 
and real 
estate
Wholesale 
trade
Retail 
trade
Accommodation Transportation 
and storage
Information, 
communication, 
and research 
and 
development
Other 
services
Austria 37.0 3.1 15.5 3.5 22.7 1.8 5.2 2.6 8.6
Belgium 12.3 0.7 22.8 11.3 21.0 5.8 5.4 4.4 16.4
Cyprus 26.3 0.3 5.5 14.6 35.8 9.5 3.5 2.3 2.3
Germany 19.3 2.3 23.0 7.8 18.2 1.6 4.5 5.2 18.2
Estonia 12.0 1.4 22.1 11.6 17.1 3.9 8.9 5.0 18.0
Spain 17.9 0.7 28.5 11.6 18.4 6.1 4.2 2.5 10.1
Finland 13.6 2.1 27.2 8.5 14.2 4.1 7.6 5.3 17.3
France 13.2 0.6 23.6 15.4 15.9 10.2 3.7 3.8 13.6
Greece 26.0 0.6 9.7 6.6 30.6 13.0 3.5 3.8 6.2
Ireland 8.5 0.9 53.0 2.9 5.4 1.1 2.0 4.9 21.3
Italy 25.8 1.0 26.2 8.1 16.9 4.8 4.2 4.5 8.4
Luxembourg 18.4 2.2 18.9 10.2 19.9 2.2 6.0 4.0 18.2
Malta 29.5 0.4 8.0 10.5 23.3 8.7 5.7 8.9 5.0
Netherlands 22.3 2.5 16.2 3.4 25.2 1.5 7.1 6.2 15.6
Portugal 17.5 0.5 18.6 17.1 18.4 8.7 7.3 1.8 10.3
Slovenia 31.8 0.9 9.2 8.1 29.7 1.3 9.4 3.0 6.5
Slovakia 25.7 2.9 17.0 9.8 23.8 2.1 4.5 3.6 10.5
Total 17.6 0.9 24.9 12.1 17.4 7.1 4.5 3.6 11.9
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5. Retail trade: section G, division 47.
6. Transportation and storage: section H, divisions 49-53.
7. Accommodation and food: section I, divisions 55-56.
8. Information, communication and R&D: section J, divisions 58-63, and section M, division 72.
9. Other services: section M, divisions 69-71 and 73-74, and section N, divisions 80-82.
LIST OF INDICATORS USED IN THE REPORT
The indicators derived from the Amadeus data and used in the analysis are as follows.
 • Cash holdings or liquidity: (cash and cash equivalent) / total assets.
 • Asset tangibility: tangible fi xed assets / total assets.
 • Net working capital: (stocks + debtors + other current assets – cash and cash equivalent – 
creditors) / total assets.
 • Investment: (change in tangible fi xed assets + depreciation) / tangible fi xed assets of the 
previous year.
 • Leverage: (long-term debt + loans) / total assets.
 • Growth: yearly rate of growth of turnover.
 • Profi tability: operating profi t / total assets.
 • Cash fl ow: (profi t + depreciation) / total assets.
 • Interest payment burden: interest paid / (operating profi t + depreciation).
Table A17 presents descriptive statistics concerning these indicators at the country level.
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Table A17 Summary statistics, broken down by country
Country Liquidity Tangibility Net working 
capital
Investment Leverage Growth Profi tability Cash 
fl ow
Interest 
payment 
burden
Austria Mean 0.08 0.30 0.41 0.26 0.17 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.13
Median 0.02 0.24 0.40 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.06
Standard 
deviation 0.13 0.27 0.26 0.35 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.12 0.40
Belgium Mean 0.17 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.54
Median 0.08 0.25 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.40
Standard 
deviation 0.20 0.30 0.28 0.41 0.24 0.41 0.17 0.15 0.47
Cyprus Mean 0.09 0.33 0.28 0.11 0.28 0.08 0.42 0.01 0.46
Median 0.04 0.28 0.27 0.05 0.26 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.55
Standard 
deviation 0.12 0.25 0.24 0.42 0.20 0.35 0.89 0.32 0.32
Germany Mean 0.17 0.22 0.52 0.31 0.27 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.28
Median 0.09 0.12 0.54 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.16
Standard 
deviation 0.20 0.24 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.13 0.34
Estonia Mean 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.15 1.72
Median 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.12 2.06
Standard 
deviation 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.52 0.25 0.75 0.29 0.33 1.07
Spain Mean 0.15 0.29 0.47 0.23 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.41
Median 0.08 0.20 0.48 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.22
Standard 
deviation 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.42 0.23 0.54 0.16 0.13 0.45
Finland Mean 0.23 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.35
Median 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.14
Standard 
deviation 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.48 0.23 0.18 0.42
France Mean 0.24 0.15 0.27 0.29 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.28
Median 0.16 0.08 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.11
Standard 
deviation 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.47 0.19 0.38 0.19 0.16 0.36
Greece Mean 0.13 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.37
Median 0.07 0.20 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.22
Standard 
deviation 0.16 0.27 0.31 0.39 0.22 0.45 0.13 0.12 0.41
Ireland Mean 0.37 0.25 0.36 0.12 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.83
Median 0.27 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.06 1.10
Standard 
deviation 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.27 0.53 0.52 0.21 0.64
Italy Mean 0.10 0.21 0.44 0.32 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.39
Median 0.04 0.11 0.44 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.21
Standard 
deviation 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.47 0.21 0.50 0.13 0.10 0.47
Luxembourg Mean 0.16 0.20 0.42 0.32 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.67
Median 0.09 0.11 0.43 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.37
Standard 
deviation 0.19 0.24 0.32 0.50 0.18 0.50 0.16 0.14 0.70
Malta Mean 0.11 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.87
Median 0.03 0.17 0.33 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.93
Standard 
deviation 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.35 0.23 0.48 0.22 0.14 0.72
Netherlands Mean 0.14 0.26 0.41 0.29 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.43
Median 0.06 0.17 0.40 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.21
Standard 
deviation 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.15 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.46
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DIFFERENT MEASURES OF LEVERAGE
The measure of indebtedness included in Chapter 3 only includes fi nancial debt 145 (leverage = loans 
+ long-term debt), in order to exclude the role played by other liabilities that could be structurally 
different across countries, such as provisions or tax deferral. In the main analysis, leverage is 
calculated as the ratio between fi nancial debt and total assets.
A possible alternative specifi cation of leverage would only include equity, in order to present a more 
precise relationship between these two sources of fi rms’ funding. More specifi cally, the alternative 
measure is: leverage cap = (long-term debt + loans) / (long-term debt + loans + shareholders’ funds).
The only difference between these two measures is the inclusion of assets or equity. If the balance 
sheets of the fi rms were such that assets = fi nancial debt + equity, they would provide the same 
ranking of fi rm indebtedness. However, there are other items on the balance sheets that could be 
structurally different across countries or sectors (e.g. trade credit or tax credit), so that these two 
measures of leverage may not be perfectly correlated. A possible advantage of the second measure 
is that it only relies on the two main components of liabilities, so it is not infl uenced by structural 
differences in the composition of assets (or liabilities). However, it does not always monotonically 
increase along with leverage; in fact, if equity is negative and also greater than fi nancial debt, a fi rm 
would have a negative value and appear as having low levels of leverage.146
The presence of fi rms with negative equity is also a problem for the fi rst measure of leverage, 
which is not able to detect them, as the measure is always positive.147 To avoid this problem, and 
145 Financial debt is not perfectly identifi ed in the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database. In particular, some long-term fi nancial debt may be 
included under “Other non-current liabilities”. This category also contains different items, for example provisions, which could differ 
among countries.
146 Firms with negative equity represent around 9% of the dataset; the majority of them are micro fi rms. The mean values over time remain 
almost unchanged across all countries, sectors and class sizes.
147 By way of an example, consider two different fi rms, whose balance sheets are as follows. Firm A: assets = liabilities = 50, fi nancial 
debt = 30, other debt = 70, shareholders’ funds = -50. Firm B: assets = liabilities = 50, fi nancial debt = 30, other debt = 10, shareholders’ 
funds = 10. The fi rst fi rm is more leveraged than the second, as it has a negative capital. However, the fi rst measure of leverage would 
show 3/5 for both of them, while the second would show -5/3 for fi rm A and 1/3 for fi rm B. Hence the fi rst measure would consider them 
to be equal, while the second would classify fi rm A as less leveraged than fi rm B.
Table A17 Summary statistics, broken down by country (cont’d)
Country Liquidity Tangibility Net working 
capital
Investment Leverage Growth Profi tability Cash 
fl ow
Interest 
payment 
burden
Portugal Mean 0.17 0.24 0.40 0.22 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.39
Median 0.07 0.16 0.39 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.18
Standard 
deviation 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.42 0.24 0.50 0.18 0.16 0.46
Slovenia Mean 0.07 0.37 0.13 0.29 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.19
Median 0.03 0.35 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.07
Standard 
deviation 0.10 0.25 0.31 0.43 0.22 0.47 0.14 0.13 0.30
Slovakia Mean 0.17 0.33 0.21 0.32 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.22
Median 0.09 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.09
Standard 
deviation 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.47 0.14 0.59 0.20 0.17 0.30
TOTAL Mean 0.18 0.22 0.37 0.27 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.37
Median 0.09 0.12 0.35 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.18
Standard 
deviation 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.45 0.22 0.47 0.18 0.15 0.44
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also because the report focuses on how fi rms decide to structure their fi nances, fi rms with negative 
equity have been eliminated from the analysis so the two indicators are similar (the correlation is 
above 0.8 at the fi rm level and around 1 at the country level). The second measure has been used to 
check the results.
The report contains several indicators of leverage derived from different sources. In Chapters 2 
and 4 the measures of leverage are derived from fi nancial accounts, while in Chapter 3 leverage 
is constructed using balance sheet information at the fi rm level. Box 6 illustrates some of the most 
relevant differences between the two datasets and shows that the country ranking is very similar, 
once some of these differences are controlled for.
Box 6 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS, 
IN THE CASE OF LEVERAGE
This report mainly uses two different data sources. The fi rst is the national fi nancial and non-
fi nancial sector accounts data and, for the euro area, the “euro area accounts”. The second is the 
Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database. The two sources have been described at length in Annex 1 
and at the beginning of Annex 3. This box illustrates the differences between these two data 
sources, taking as an example the defi nition of leverage as used in the report.
One difference is the coverage: fi nancial accounts data include all NFCs, while the Amadeus 
database only includes those fi rms whose balance sheet information is available, with the result 
that the two data sources are not equally representative. Moreover, as summarised above, the 
coverage for each country is not the same. 
A second relevant difference is the valuation of balance sheet entries, which are valued at market 
prices in the fi nancial accounts and at book price in the Amadeus database.
Further differences could be related to the components of assets or debt. In the indicators derived 
from the fi nancial and non-fi nancial accounts, debt also includes pension fund reserves, and total 
assets are proxied by total liabilities at the country level, as total assets are only available at the 
euro area level. However, the defi nition of debt on the basis of balance sheet information only 
includes fi nancial debt, and the ratio is calculated using total assets.
Another difference with the indicators described in Section 3.2 is due to the fact that fi rms 
without debt are excluded for analytical purposes, as the objects of interest are the determinants 
of fi rms’ leverage.
A fi nal difference is linked to the aggregation method used to combine granular information. 
While macro data can be considered as weighted averages1, statistics used from individual data 
1 The ratio of two totals (e.g. total debt to total assets) is equal to a weighted average of the ratios of its components (e.g. fi rms), where 
the weight for each fi rm is the ratio between its denominator (e.g. fi rm assets) and the total denominator (e.g. total assets). In fact: 
?i Xi ??iYi i
yi xi
?iYi yi
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are simple averages. This last point is strictly 
related to the advantage of using micro data: 
even if they do not provide extensive coverage, 
they can offer a more detailed insight into 
more specifi c aspects, such as fi rm size, and 
also provide an idea of the heterogeneity 
among fi rms.
Some of these differences can be taken into 
account in order to compare more 
homogeneous aggregates. The results show 
that the leverage ranking is similar among 
countries; apart from valuation effects, larger 
differences can be linked to the change in 
coverage for a given country. Chart A 
presents a comparison across countries when 
the ratio of debt to total assets has been 
calculated as follows: (a) using weighted 
averages from Amadeus balance sheet data; 
and (b) only including loans and debt 
securities in the numerator of the 
macroeconomic fi nancial and non-fi nancial 
sector accounts dataset (i.e. excluding 
pension fund reserves), and only including 
total liabilities (as a proxy for total assets) in 
the denominator. These two ratios are similar for most countries, even if the comparison is still 
infl uenced by valuation effects (since liabilities, which include equity, are valued at market 
value) and different coverage across countries.2 
2 Another possible way of making ratios more comparable could be to use notional values from fi nancial accounts, so that the impact 
of market evaluation is eliminated. However, the ratios would depend on the reference period. Similar results are obtained when 
using notional values and the fi rst quarter of 2000 as the reference period.
Chart A Leverage across countries
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB 
calculations.
Note: Leverage is defi ned in the Amadeus database as the sum 
of short- and long-term debt divided by total assets, whereas in 
the national fi nancial and non-fi nancial sector accounts data it is 
defi ned as loans plus debt securities.
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Chart A6 Leverage of euro area non-financial 
corporations, broken down by quantiles 
of size
(percentages)
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Chart A7 Leverage of euro area non-financial 
corporations, broken down by economic 
sector over time
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4 CASH HOLDINGS
Chart A8 Cash holding ratio and net working capital, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median cash holding ratio for fi rms with high net working capital (above the 90th percentile), medium net 
working capital (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low net working capital (lower decile). The cash holding ratio is defi ned as 
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, and net working capital is defi ned as the ratio of short-term assets other than cash net 
of accounts receivable to total assets.
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Chart A9 Cash holding ratio and cash flow, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median cash holding ratio for fi rms with high cash fl ow (above the 90th percentile), medium cash fl ow 
(between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low cash fl ow (lower decile). The cash holding ratio is defi ned as the ratio of cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets, and cash fl ow is normalised by the average amount of total assets in the period.
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Chart A10 Cash holding ratio and indebtedness, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median cash holding ratio for fi rms with high fi nancial debt (above the 90th percentile), medium fi nancial 
debt (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low fi nancial debt (lower decile). The cash holding ratio is defi ned as the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets, and indebtedness is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets.
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Chart A11 Cash holding ratio and tangible fixed assets, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median cash holding ratio for fi rms with high tangible assets (above the 90th percentile), medium tangible 
assets (between the 45th and 55th percentile) and low tangible assets (lower decile). The cash holding ratio is defi ned as the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets, and tangible assets are defi ned as the ratio of tangible fi xed assets to total assets.
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Chart A12 Cash holding ratio and firms’ cash flow volatility, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median cash holding ratio for fi rms with high cash fl ow volatility (above the 90th percentile), medium cash 
fl ow volatility (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low cash fl ow volatility (lower decile). The cash holding ratio is defi ned as the 
ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets, and a fi rm’s cash fl ow volatility is measured by dividing the standard deviation of that 
fi rm’s cash fl ows from the last four years by the average cash fl ow over the same period.
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5 INVESTMENT
Charts A13-17 show the difference in investment rates of fi rms facing different degrees of fi nancial 
pressure in selected euro area countries. These differences are presented as levels (usually low, 
median and high), expressed in relative terms based on the difference between the highest and 
lowest deciles, and normalised by the median.148 For the countries under consideration, it can be 
seen that fi rms under higher fi nancial pressure generally invest less, and their investment decisions 
seem to be affected most signifi cantly by profi tability and interest payment burdens. As for the 
investment dynamics across countries, the impact of the crisis on investment rates is evident 
irrespective of a fi rm’s profi tability, although this can be seen more clearly in countries such as 
Spain and the Netherlands. Leverage has a negative relationship with investment for fi rms based 
in Germany and in Italy while, for fi rms located in the Netherlands, France and Spain, there seem 
to be some threshold effects. The demand for capital from Dutch fi rms with medium or high levels 
of leverage is slightly lower than that of fi rms with low levels of debt, while for fi rms in France 
148 More precisely, for each of the fi nancial indicators considered, Charts A13 and A22 show, for the sample period, the average difference 
between the median investment rates for fi rms for which this indicator shows a high value (above the 90th percentile) and the median 
investment rate for fi rms for which this indicator shows a low value (below the 10th percentile), normalised by the median investment 
rate for fi rms for which this indicator stands at intermediate levels (between the 45th and the 55th percentiles).
Chart A13 Investment ratios and the financial position of firms at the country level
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: For each of the fi nancial indicators considered, the charts show the average difference in the sample period between the median 
investment rates for fi rms for which this indicator shows a high value (above the 90th percentile) and the median investment rate for fi rms 
for which this indicator shows a low value (below the 10th percentile), normalised by the median investment rate for fi rms for which this 
indicator stands at intermediate levels (between the 45th and the 55th percentiles).
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and Spain the differences are blurred for those with medium to low levels of leverage. Finally, the 
relationship between cash holdings and investment is quite different across countries; according to 
this descriptive analysis, the link appears to be positive and monotonic in Italy, while, in Germany 
and the Netherlands, it seems to be non-linear. In other countries, such as Spain and Portugal, the 
relationship is not as clear, as fi rms with medium cash holdings invest slightly more than the others.
Chart A14 Investment ratio and cash flow for the median firm
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with a high cash fl ow (above the 90th percentile), a medium cash fl ow 
(between the 45th and 55th percentile) and a low cash fl ow (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the change in tangible fi xed 
assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and cash fl ow is defi ned as the ratio of post-tax profi ts plus the depreciation of fi xed assets 
to total assets.
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Chart A15 Investment ratio and cash holdings for the median firm
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high cash holdings (above the 90th percentile), medium cash holdings 
(between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low cash holdings (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the change in tangible 
fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and cash holdings are defi ned as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
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Chart A16 Investment ratio and leverage for the median firm
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms which have no fi nancial debt, a low level of fi nancial debt (below the 
25th percentile of the distribution of leverage ratios across indebted companies) and a high level of fi nancial debt (above the 75th 
percentile of the distribution of leverage ratios across indebted companies). The investment ratio is defi ned as the ratio of the change in 
tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation to total assets, and leverage is calculated by dividing fi nancial leverage by total assets.
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INVESTMENT RATIO AND THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF FIRMS, BROKEN DOWN BY SIZE
Firms are divided into four size classes: micro, small, medium and large. As shown in 
Charts A18-A21, fi rms under higher fi nancial pressure invest less, regardless of the size of the 
company. Similarly, comparing the sub-charts in Chart A22, which indicate the differences in 
investment rates for fi rms facing very high or very low fi nancial pressures, shows that profi tability 
Chart A17 Investment ratio and interest payment burden for the median firm
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The different charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high interest payment burden (above the 90th percentile), 
medium interest payment burden (between the 45th and 55 percentiles) and low interest payment burden (lower decile). The investment ratio 
is defi ned as the change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and the interest payment burden is defi ned as the 
ratio of interest payments to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, plus fi nancial revenues, divided by total assets.
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and the interest payment burden signifi cantly affect the investment decisions of fi rm of all sizes. 
The link between fi nancial pressure and investment seems to be inversely related to the fi rm’s size 
while, for the cash holding and indebtedness indicators, the differences in investment rates seem to 
be similar for all fi rm sizes.
Chart A18 Investment ratio and cash flow for the median firm, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high cash fl ow (above the 90th percentile), medium cash fl ow 
(between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low cash fl ow (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the change in tangible fi xed 
assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and cash fl ow is defi ned as the ratio of post-tax profi ts plus the depreciation of fi xed assets 
divided by total assets.
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Chart A19 Investment ratio and cash holdings for the median firm, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with a high cash holding ratio (above the 90th percentile), a medium cash 
holding ratio (between the 45th and the 55th percentile) and a low cash holding ratio (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and the cash holding ratio is calculated by dividing cash and cash 
equivalents by total assets.
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Chart A20 Investment ratio and indebtedness for the median firm, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
no  indebtedness
low indebtedness
high indebtedness
a) Micro firms b) Small firms
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
c) Medium firms d) Large firms
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The different charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with no fi nancial debt, a low level of fi nancial debt (below the 
25th percentile of the distribution of leverage ratios across indebted companies) and a high level of debt (above the 75th percentile of 
the distribution of leverage ratios across indebted companies). The investment ratio is defi ned as the change in tangible fi xed assets plus 
depreciation divided by total assets, and “indebtedness is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets.
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Chart A21 Investment ratio and interest payment burden for the median firm, broken down 
by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with a high interest payment burden (above the 90th percentile), a medium 
interest payment burden (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and a low interest payment burden (lower decile). The investment ratio 
is defi ned as the change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and the interest payment burden is defi ned as the 
ratio of interest payments to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, plus fi nancial revenues divided by total assets.
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Chart A22
(percentages)
a)  Firms with a high cash flow compared with firms with 
a low cash flow
b)  Firms with high cash holdings compared with firms 
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: For each of the fi nancial indicators considered, the bar charts show the average difference, in the sample period, between the 
median investment rates for fi rms for which this indicator shows a high value (above the 90th percentile) and the median investment rate 
for fi rms for which this indicator shows a low value (below the 10th percentile), normalised by the median investment rate for fi rms for 
which this indicator stands at intermediate levels (between the 45th and the 55th percentiles).
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Chart A23 Relationship between the investment ratio and cash flow during the crisis, 
broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Chart A 24 Relationship between the investment ratio and cash holdings during the crisis, 
broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Chart A25 Relationship between the investment ratio and leverage during the crisis, 
broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Chart A26 Relationship between the investment ratio and the interest payment burden during 
the crisis, broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Chart A27 Relationship between the investment ratio and trade credit for the median firm, 
broken down by firm size
(percentages)
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Sources: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database and ECB calculations.
Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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Chart A28 Impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a country’s financial 
position (Belgium)
(percentages)
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Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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Chart A28 Impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a country’s financial 
position (Germany)
(percentages)
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Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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Chart A28 Impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a country’s financial 
position (Spain)
(percentages)
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Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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Chart A28 Impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a country’s financial 
position (France)
(percentages)
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Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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Chart A28 Impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a country’s financial 
position (Italy)
(percentages)
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Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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Chart A28 Impact of the crisis on the link between investment and a country’s financial 
position (Portugal)
(percentages)
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Notes: The charts depict the median investment ratio for fi rms with high levels of trade credit (above the 90th percentile), medium levels 
of trade credit (between the 45th and 55th percentiles) and low levels of trade credit (lower decile). The investment ratio is defi ned as the 
change in tangible fi xed assets plus depreciation divided by total assets, and trade credit is calculated by dividing the accounts payable by 
total assets. Med(inv_1 (2)) indicates the median investment ratio one (two) year before the crisis (set at 2008); med(inv) is the median 
investment ratio in 2008 and med(inv_f1) is the median investment ratio one year after the crisis.
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6 FINANCIAL CRISES AND ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS
Table A18 Financial crises and turning points in economic activity in advanced economies 
since the 1960s
Country Business cycle peaks
Severe fi nancial crises (the “BigFive”)
Spain 1978
Norway 1987
Finland 1991
Sweden 1991
Japan 1992
Milder Financial crisis
Australia 1989
Canada 1981
Germany 1980
Denmark 1987
France 1992
United Kingdom 1973
United Kingdom 1990
Italy 1992
United States 1984
Other business cycle peaks
Australia 1961 1973 1976 1981
Canada 1989
Switzerland 1974 1981 1990 1994 2001
Germany 1966 1974 1992 2001
Denmark 1973 1979 1992 2001
Spain 1974 1992 1992
France 1974
United kingdom 1979
Italy 1974 2002
Japan 1973 1997 2001
The Netherlands 1974 1980 2001
Norway 1981
Sweden 1976 1980
United States 1969 1973 1979 1981 1990 2000
Sources: Jorda et al. (2012), Laeven and Valencia (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and Kamisky and Reinhart (1999).
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Table A19 Probability of a crisis episode in euro area economies since the 1980s: the effect 
of debt accumulation
Regressions
Effect of debt accumulation on the probability of a fi nancial crisis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
∆ log (real loans) 72.83*** 72.07*** 68.50** 63.54** 81.56*** 53.76* 62.87** 70.37**
(25.66) (26.71) (29.63) (28.67) (24.35) (29.67) (29.46) 30.97)
∆ log (real stocks) 5.200 4.612 -0.816 12.10** 6.994*
(3.459) (3.566) (7.277) (5.509) (3.955)
∆ log (real investment) 7.798 10.28 67.76* 24.55 10.91
(17.85) (19.84) (34.88) (16.21) (17.23)
∆ log (real loans)* ∆ log (real stocks) 224.9
(277.6)
log (loans/GDP) 3.686* 8.129***
(1.991) (3.114)
∆ log (real loans)* ∆ log (real investment) -282.9 -531.3
(312.5) (346.1)
∆ log (real stocks)* ∆ log (real investment) -64.84
(177.7)
Observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057
chicountry 6.952 7.018 6.725 6.373 9.590 16.66 7.022 7.421
pcountry 0.959 0.957 0.965 0.973 0.845 0.340 0.957 0.945
pseudo-r2 0.0819 0.0907 0.0912 0.0940 0.120 0.183 0.0889 0.101
pseudo-l -87.39 -86.55 -86.51 -86.24 -83.76 -77.74 -86.73 -85.60
chi2 38.42 35.86 52.67 57.10 43.13 51.01 82.38 88.42
plogit 0.00132 0.00479 2.95e-05 1.10e-05 0.000460 9.28e-05 3.27e-10 1.40e-10
AUROC 0.751 0.752 0.753 0.756 0.782 0.846 0.767 0.777
seroc 0.0569 0.0567 0.0559 0.0586 0.0528 0.0427 0.0524 0.0524
Source: ECB calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

